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The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a critical concern of the United 
States since World War II. While limiting the spread of nuclear weapons was a uniform 
goal of American administrations, in actual practice, there was significant variability in 
approaches to states as they approached the threshold of weaponization or crossed it. 
Against allied South Korea, America used the threat of military abandonment and 
technology denial to force the country to curtail its nuclear ambitions. In the case of a 
hostile China in the 1960s, military threats were the tool of choice. Policy variability cut 
across the ally/opponent divide, encompassing an ambivalent acceptance of non-aligned 
India’s nuclear capabilities by Ford in the 1970s and an acquiescence with China’s by 
Reagan in the 1980s. I argue that explanations based purely on the International Structure 
or Domestic Politics do not sufficiently explain these outcomes. I propose a causal 
mechanism that shapes the U.S. response to nuclear proliferation based on two 
independent variables, ‘Strategic Liability’ and ‘Commercial Value’. Strategic Liability 
is rooted in the International System, while Commercial Value is rooted in the domestic 
political economy of the U.S. Strategic liability is the Executive’s perception of risk from 
the nuclear program of a particular state, whereas Commercial value is the Executive’s 
estimation of the economic importance of that state. I show how these variables act on the 
American Executive, privileging its role in shaping the United States’ response to a 
state’s attempts to develop nuclear weapon capabilities. I posit four policy outcomes 
based on the combination of these independent variables, which take a high or low value. 
I test my argument by analyzing the U.S. response to the four major cases noted above, 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Research Design 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a source of concern for the United 
States, which has worked to preserve its monopoly (in the early days of nuclear power) or 
dominance over nuclear weapon capabilities relative to other states. However, this has 
not prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons across the globe, albeit to a much 
lesser extent than feared in the early days of the Cold War, a point made by scholars such 
as Gavin1. Apart from America’s nearest competitor- the Soviet Union, American allies 
such as Great Britain and France, as well as states such as China that have had a 
complicated relationship with the U.S., quickly crossed the nuclear threshold and built 
their own nuclear weapon stockpiles. In recent decades other countries such as India, 
Israel and Pakistan have entered the nuclear club. The role of the United States as one of 
the originators of nuclear weapon technology and the linchpin of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime in the form of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 means that it has 
played a central role in shaping the nuclear weapons programs of other states.  The 
degree to which the U.S. has remained faithful to its stated goals of nuclear non-
proliferation and the enforcement of these norms has varied significantly, from eventual 
acceptance of France’s nuclear weapons, to efforts to stymie the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear weapon programs. While unsuccessful in these latter cases, the U.S. was able to 
persuade states such as Libya and South Korea to give up their nuclear weapon programs 
and is actively engaged in capping and rolling back North Korea’s nuclear weapon stocks 
                                                 
1  Gavin focuses on how the lessons of the 1960s and the successful use of the NPT as a tool by the U.S. to 
limit nuclear weapon proliferation are relevant to a successful management of nuclear crises today. See 
Gavin, Francis, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s”, International Security, Vol. 
29, No. 3, Winter 2004/2005, pp. 100-135. 
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and denying that capability to states such as Iran. Significant evidence exists (Jo et al., 
2007)2  that America used its security guarantees as inducements and the threat of their 
withdrawal as a threat to prevent states such as South Korea from developing their own 
nuclear weapons.   
Multiple studies have analyzed the dynamics that resulted in denouements in 
American conflicts with countries such as Iraq over nuclear weapons, but few have paid 
attention to a far more prevalent phenomenon, that of U.S. acquiescence with the nuclear 
weapon status of regional or non-superpower states, often in contradiction with its stated 
goals. The central questions I ask are these – What accounts for the variation in American 
response to nuclear proliferation, especially its willingness to ignore or waive its stated 
commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation and upholding the framework of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation regimes? What are the implications of this dynamic for the 
broader question of a superpower’s adherence to International Institutions and norms? In 
my research, I examine where the source of U.S. nuclear policy preferences regarding 
nuclear weapon aspirant states lies and what accounts for the variation in U.S. strategy. 
Why does the U.S. appear to follow different strategies towards nuclear proliferation in 
various parts of the world, when it is America’s stated policy to try and reduce the 
number of nuclear weapon state and consequently improve its relative power position? I 
examine both Realist accounts of U.S. nuclear policy as well as theories of Domestic 
politics that may offer clues as to this question and posit a ‘two-level’ theory that grounds 
U.S. nuclear policy in a framework that relies on two causal variables, one Geopolitical, 
and the other primarily domestic in nature. 
                                                 
2 Jo and Gartzke argue that the presence of a ‘defender’ does not make much of a difference in whether or 
not a state pursues a nuclear program, but argue that the U.S. played a role in influencing the South Korean 
decision not to pursue a nuclear weapons program. See Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of 




The remainder of this chapter is composed as follows. I start with a survey of the 
current state of scholarship in the field of nuclear proliferation, highlighting key insights 
as well as the gaps in the existing literature, which are especially prominent when one 
seeks to come up with a framework which can explain a wide gamut of policy responses, 
ranging from acquiescence to actively seeking to rollback proliferation efforts. Next, I 
introduce my two level scheme to predict the American response to nuclear proliferation, 
explaining the salience of the two independent variables and the privileged role the 
Executive occupies in its causal mechanism. Finally, I present an overview of the cases 
that I seek to examine to test the validity of the thesis. 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
Realist theories generally explain issues such as nuclear policy changes using a 
one-dimensional prism of balance of power or balance of threat. For example is India’s 
possession of nuclear weapons ‘good’ or ‘bad’ from a structural perspective for the 
United States? One could make an argument that India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons set 
off a nuclear arms race in South Asia, complicating U.S. non-proliferation efforts. On the 
other hand, a nuclear India presented itself as a possible regional balancer against China. 
Realism alone does not adequately explain how U.S. foreign policy would work in such 
an instance. Nor would Realism alone adequately explain a shift from U.S. efforts to roll 
back India’s nuclear program to acquiescence with India’s nuclear ambitions.  Some 
Realist based literature on the spread of nuclear weapons (see Waltz, 19813) argues that 
nuclear weapons have proven to be effective in preventing the outbreak of war, and this 
has been the argument in other, more prescriptive works4.  On accounting for the 
                                                 
3 Waltz, Kenneth, “The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – Why more may be better”, The Adelphi 
Papers, Vol. 21, Issue 171, 1981. 
4 Waltz has an optimistic take on the Iran nuclear situation in Sagan, Waltz, (2012). Other scholars such as 
Sagan (Sagan, 1994) have taken a much more pessimistic view of the spread of nuclear weapons, arguing 
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variation in American non-proliferation policy around its stated adherence to non-
proliferation goals, Realists (Mearsheimer (1994), Schweller (2001))5 have been 
generally dismissive of any autonomous restraints on powerful states of the sorts imposed 
by International organizations or norms, arguing that these states essentially circumvent 
or bend these restraints when faced with geopolitical exigencies. However, such theories 
do not generally explain why super-powers such as the U.S. have pursued different 
responses to other powers that have pursued nuclear weapons, accepting states such as 
Great Britain, France and China (albeit  hesitantly) while trying to persuade others such 
as India and Pakistan to roll back their capabilities. In a sense, we would have to 
construct a Realist argument for why proliferation occurs, because it is remarkably silent 
on the proximate causes of the phenomenon. One could argue that Off-shore Balancing 
(Mearsheimer, 2003)6 would cause states to allow regional allies to proliferate. The 
problem with such a hypothesis is that nuclear technology is a uniquely disruptive 
phenomenon. Once a state obtains this technology, conventional balance of power 
dynamics can break down, for the regional balancer, armed with a nuclear capability, 
could potentially forgo the constraints imposed on it by the hegemon whose bidding it 
had to do at the outset of such off-shoring. If that is the case, the hegemon should have no 
incentive to allow the regional power to proliferate, which the record contradicts. 
 The reality is that U.S. allies, states such as Britain and France, and more 
recently, Pakistan, have all developed nuclear capabilities, in many cases with the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
that differences in domestic organizational structure of the proliferating states, especially, weak civilian 
governments, can lead to a greater danger of nuclear war. See Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring debate” W.W. Norton, 2012 and Sagan, Scott D., “The Perils of 
Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, International 
Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1994), pp. 66-107. 
5 Mearsheimer, John, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 19, 
No. 3, Winter 1994, pp. 5-49 and Schweller, Randall, “The Problem of International Order Revisited. A 
Review Essay”, International Security, Summer 2001, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 161-186. 
6 Mearsheimer, John, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, W.W. Norton and Company, 2003. 
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looking the other way. It is possible that the United States accepted and sometimes even 
encouraged the nuclear programs of these states because of perceived stabilizing factors, 
but an analysis of contemporary accounts show that there was significant concern with 
the programs of even perceived allies like France, and in any case, it is not clear from a 
“Realist” account why the United States went from opposing to accepting the 
aforementioned states’ nuclear programs, and why it distinguished between similarly 
situated allies, at least from a Realist standpoint, like Britain and France (and even South 
Korea).7 Even if one were to allow that the U.S. acted opportunistically by turning a blind 
eye to International Non-Proliferation regimes due to geo-political reasons (as one would 
postulate based on a Realist argument), the difference in American attitudes towards 
India’s nuclear program in the late 1990s versus India in the 2000s or even the 
differences in policies towards states such as South Korea and South Africa cannot be 
explained without reference to domestic economic factors in the U.S. In the specific case 
of India, even if Geopolitical factors, namely China’s rise as a strategic competitor to the 
U.S. made a nuclear-armed India more attractive, it is hard to argue that this factor alone 
made the U.S. move from a passive acceptance of India’s nuclear capabilities to one of 
actual acquiescence. Realist explanations for U.S. responses to nuclear proliferation, such 
as the one we have described, or more accurately, constructed, above, are clearly under-
determining when it comes to explaining variation in American response to nuclear 
proliferation (see Gavin, 2012).8  
                                                 
7 More generally, Realist theories such as Waltz’s, by his own admission, are not theories of foreign policy  
and are thus not particularly useful when one is trying to understand a specific foreign policy issue 
outcome. See Waltz, Kenneth, “Theory of International Politics”, Waveland Print Inc. 2005. 
8 See Gavin’s criticism of the framework used Waltz and Sagan and of their predictions and prescriptions 
as not meeting the test of seriousness for consideration by policy makers. See Gavin, Francis, “Politics, 
History and the Ivory Tower – Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate”, Journal of Strategic 




Bargaining theory based frameworks offer a different take on this issue. More 
generally, they have been used to study the occurrence and duration of wars in the 
context of commitment and asymmetric information problems, (Wolford et. al, 2011). 
With reference to nuclear proliferation, this framework has been used to study the 
phenomenon of preventive wars and ‘regime change’. Dittmeier (2013) uses this 
framework to study the occurrence of preventive wars undertaken by status-quo powers 
to stop proliferation attempts by rivals9. Powell (2003) looks at the role of nuclear 
weapon acquisition by a regional power in thwarting ‘regime change’ attempts by a 
super-power such as the United States10.Whether or not attempts to obtain nuclear 
                                                 
9Wolford et al. focus on wars that exhibit characteristics of both asymmetric information and commitment 
problems. Pertinent to the discussion on nuclear proliferation, they argue that instances such as the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq result in ‘absolute war’ due to the willingness by the status-quo state to impose its terms 
rather than rely on ‘revealing’ its overwhelming power to enforce adherence to international commitments.  
Dittmeier focuses on ‘dynamic commitment’ problems, typically large and rapid shifts in the power of a 
rising challenger state – which would occur  due to a challenger’s pursuit of nuclear weapons - induces a 
status-quo power to pre-emptively attack. He argues that the relative paucity of such wars is due to the 
presence of a great power security guarantee to the challenging state, which reduces the incentive for a 
status-quo power to conduct preventive war (China’s supposed security guarantee to Pakistan against India 
is one such example discussed, as is the absence of such a guarantee for Egypt). Of course, this discussion 
does not look at the sources of great power preferences for accommodation or opposition to a particular 
state’s nuclear proliferation, which, as I will show, will result in a wide variation of policy outcomes. See 
Wolford, Scott et al. “Information, Commitment and War” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55, No. 
4, August 2011, pp. 556-579, and Dittmeier, Christopher R “Proliferation, preemption and intervention in 
the nuclearization of second-tier states” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 25(4), 2013, pp.492-525. 
10Powell in particular, argues that the possession of a nuclear weapon by a small regional power increases 
its deterrence and makes it relatively immune to ‘regime-change’ by a powerful state such as the United 
States. One of the lessons that many have drawn from American involvement in Iraq and Libya is that the 
possession of nuclear weapons by one or both of these states may have changed the dynamics of the 
conflict between them. On the other hand, the history of nuclear weapon development programs and U.S. 
efforts to slow or dissuade states includes opposition to friendly, hostile and non-aligned states alike, and 
‘regime-change’ or ‘deterrence’ may only be one factor among many to consider. Also, it is not obvious 
even in the cases of countries such as 1960s China or Libya, where the U.S. was opposed to the governing 
regime, that regime change rather than other considerations such as further proliferation to third parties or 
room for maneuvering in peripheral conflicts was more important. The reasons a state pursues nuclear 
weapons may not be the same reasons another opposes that pursuit. However, one useful conclusion from 
this frame-work is that a prospective change in the nature of the Bargaining relationship between the two 
states (and third parties) would be a factor in American decisions to accept or support the nuclear aspirant’s 
program, and should be considered as part of any explanation for American support or acceptance of a 
nuclear aspirant. See Powell, Robert, “Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile 




weapons trigger a war is a key puzzle that this literature attempts to resolve. This 
approach has generally focused on situations where a challenger’s nuclear aspirations are 
perceived to be a military threat to a status-quo state within the context of a pre-existing 
conflict situation, such as between Iraq and the United States, or between Pakistan and 
India. Bargaining theory approaches such as this offer important insights in predicting 
whether a status-quo power’s attempts to ‘deter’ a nuclear challenger will actually result 
in preventive war. This in turn is often predicated on the status-quo state’s ability to deter 
proliferation through the threat of war, the aspirant’s response to the threat, and the 
calculations of such an operation being successful. This is separate from the question of 
whether the status quo power even wants to deter the challenger and if so, whether war 
and other coercive means are even considered appropriate by it. Indeed, in the instances 
of India in 1974, and China at approximately the same time, one could make the 
argument that the U.S. intended to reluctantly accept, rather than deter their nuclear 
programs. Even in the case of South Korea, an ally, American attempts to stop the 
R.O.K.’s acquisition of nuclear weapons precluded even the discussion of coercive 
military tactics.  
Another example of a  recent work that  has focused on the dynamics of 
preventive is an effort by Debs and Monteiro11 where the authors examine situations in 
which states launch preventive wars against adversaries that are suspected to be 
developing nuclear weapon capabilities, even though this suspicion may be based on 
imperfect (or wrong information). They argue that this phenomenon is especially 
prevalent in cases of large and rapid endogenous power shifts where the nuclear aspirant 
is investing significant resources in developing this capability, and is presented with 
                                                 
11 Debs, Alexandre and Nino Monteiro, Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty and War, 
International Organization, Volume 68, Issue 01, January 2014, pp. 1-31. 
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incentives to hide this development so as to present a fait accompli to its adversaries. This 
incentive to ‘hide’, and the common knowledge of this possibility, creates counter 
incentives for the adversary to attack even when there is a possibility that such an attack 
may be unwarranted. This is a compelling argument for cases when states already 
perceive a high degree of liability from another state’s freshly acquired or qualitatively 
enhanced nuclear weapon capability. However, it is worth noting that this covers a 
relatively narrow set of cases – it is essentially a framework to cover proliferation and the 
response to it in an adversarial dyad (such as the United State and Iraq). However, there 
are several other instances where the United States has responded to the nuclear 
proliferation attempts of a state that is not necessarily an adversary. It may be an ally 
(South Korea, Pakistan), a non-aligned state (India) or a sometime adversary (China). 
This response has varied from strong consideration of preventive war (as with China in 
1964) to non-military means of strong coercion (South Korea) to a form of acceptance 
(India in the 1970s) and even acquiescence (with an economically resurgent China in the 
1980s). Indeed, this phenomenon clearly shows that while the United States may retain 
latent preferences against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, its degree of liability and 
the perceived benefits of accommodating states that present strong commercial 
possibilities may play a role in its policy response. It is also useful to note that there is a 
strong likelihood that the United States is  influenced by the possibility that the nuclear 
weapon capabilities of a state, even an ally, may create destabilizing dynamics in a 
region, pushing it to intervene even when it does not detect a primary threat or liability. I 
will argue that this secondary conflict or knock-on effect played a significant role in the 
American response to the nuclear programs of states such as South Korea. This wide 
variation in approaches and the variables that engender them require further examination.   
 
 9 
There have been other notable attempts to analyze different aspects of American 
non-proliferation policy. Fuhrman and Kreps (2010)12 have examined cases where states 
such as the U.S. have launched preventive (anti-proliferation) attacks and hypothesized 
that such actions are likely to be considered in the context of pre-existing military 
conflict, foreign policy divergence or the existence of non-democratic regimes in the 
aspirant state. However, such studies only seek to explain the existence or otherwise of a 
military component, and do not examine the wide variation in American response to 
nuclear proliferation, which has ranged from the military actions examined above to more 
nuanced opposition and even outright acquiescence. Furthermore, works such as this do 
not account for the fact that a state such as the United States may feel compelled to 
intervene even when it is not involved in a direct military conflict, such as in cases where 
a nuclear proliferant’s actions may trigger a regional conflict. Separately, Fuhrmann13 has 
examined cases where the United States has supported civilian nuclear programs in 
countries such as India, as a way to strengthen the latter - a fellow democracy and rising 
competitors to China - politically and economically. In this instance, the author discounts 
economic explanations for the nuclear deal with India. However, the problem with this 
argument is that the American nuclear deal with India coincided with a period of 
tremendous expansion in economic ties between the two countries, whereas India has 
been a democracy and a military rival to China for a considerably longer period. While 
concern with China’s long-term threat to American strategic interests had been building 
since the late 1990s, the American push to cooperate with India’s nuclear program 
                                                 
12 Fuhrman, Matthew and Sarah Kreps “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative 
Empirical Analysis: 1941-2000” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54, No. 6, December 2010, pp. 
831-859. 
13 Fuhrmann, Matthew “Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs  Cause Nuclear 
Insecurity”, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 2012, p. 109. 
 
 10 
occurred following an unprecedented period of economic growth during the 
administration of George W. Bush.  Another factor to consider is that a decision to 
cooperate with the civilian nuclear program of a nuclear weapons state typically involves 
acquiescence with that state’s nuclear weapons program, even if there is no direct 
assistance. The technical know-how and domestic resources are fungible, even if external 
assistance is not. In fact, the example of American cooperation with China’s civilian 
nuclear program, was, I will show, an illuminating example of how strategic and 
commercial imperatives came together for the Reagan administration as it decided to 
expand nuclear cooperation with China. I will show how the American impetus to 
develop nuclear trade ties with China in the 1980s (and India) had a strong commercial 
component, which was qualitatively different from programs that were part of the ‘Atom 
for Peace’ initiatives of an earlier era. While works such as Fuhrman’s focus primarily on 
the latter type of civilian nuclear assistance programs, the previous discussion 
demonstrates that the American reaction to the nuclear weapons programs of aspiring 
states goes beyond mere support or denial of civilian nuclear assistance. In addition to the 
probability that the United States may militarily coerce states that are perceived to be 
engaged in nuclear proliferation, there is also the possibility of more subtle strategies 
ranging from  ‘softer’ attempts to rollback these nuclear programs to ‘weakly’ accepting 
and even fully acquiescing with them . My work will focus on the spectrum of such 
strategies and the factors that influence the American government’s resort to a particular 
one.  
 Innenpolitik or Domestic politics based explanations on the other hand attribute 
little causal power to structural factors, reducing their importance when it comes to 
explaining clear instances of states reacting to security threats. Within this school, 
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Bureaucratic Politics based approaches (Allison, 1972)14, privilege the role of the 
Executive or the Bureaucracy in determining foreign policy. While Bureaucratic Politics 
may play a role in shaping the details of policy proposals, career bureaucracies rarely 
appear to be able to initiate foreign policy change15. They can however, stymie 
presidential foreign policy initiatives. Presidents frequently attempt to politicize 
bureaucratic policy making, and while the results are frequently counter-productive 
(Lewis, 2008)16, Presidents have strong incentives to try and do so. To the extent that 
Bureaucratic Politics based approaches have been tried in explaining American responses 
to nuclear weapons proliferation, such as the fact that the U.S. had held off from 
attacking Iran in contrast with the conflict with Iraq (Oren, 2011)17, such narratives have 
focused quite narrowly on short-term tactical responses, rather than grand strategy. Other 
examples that employ bureaucratic politics based explanations (Tan (1992) on the U.S. – 
China Nuclear agreement)18, underplay the role of the Executive in shaping and finalizing 
nuclear initiatives. I will show that the Executive is extremely instrumental in defining 
the parameters and framework of these negotiations and outcomes. 
Commercial foreign policy based approaches such as Frieden’s19, suggest that 
U.S. foreign policy, in particular foreign economic policy, takes a more coherent and 
easily discernible shape when domestic sectoral conflicts are resolved allowing one 
                                                 
14 Allison, Graham, “Essence of Decision”, Harper Collins; 1st edition, 1972. 
15 See Mistry, Dinshaw, “Diplomacy, Domestic Politics and the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement”, Asian 
Survey October 2006, (p. 683) for a discussion the safeguards India agreed to, that could be attributed to 
actions of the career bureaucracy in the U.S. 
16 Lewis, David E, “The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic 
Performance” Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008. 
17 Oren, Ido, “Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The Domestic Politics of America’s response to 
Iran’s nuclear program”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:4, 2011, pp. 659-684. 
18 Tan, Qingshan “U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: China’s Non-Proliferation Policy”, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 29, No. 9, September 1989, pp. 870-882. 
19 See Frieden, Jeff, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy”, International Organization, Winter 
1998 for a discussion on American Foreign Economic Policy in the inter-World War years. 
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dominant domestic coalition to drive foreign policy, as “Internationalists” did in the 
1930s. Commercial or Capitalist Peace theorists have made similar arguments about how 
Capitalism binds states into peaceful ties (see Gartzke (2007) and McDonald (2007))20. 
While offering compelling alternative arguments to explain the absence of war among 
democracies and capitalist states, it is nevertheless hard to fully explain Foreign Policy 
variation of the sort we see across American responses to proliferation using this 
dimension alone, as the cases of (capitalist) South Korea or South Africa-both of whose 
nuclear weapon pursuits were sought to be thwarted by the U.S.-demonstrate. To the 
larger point of whether domestic parochial factors alone can explain the variation in 
American adherence to international regimes (as scholars such as Stone and Copelovitch 
suggest21), the discussion above clearly shows that at least in the case of Non-
Proliferation, these theories are under-determining. In contrast to these single-level 
frameworks, I will show that policy emerges from the interaction between international 
structural factors and primarily domestic ones acting through the mechanism of the 
Presidency, an institution that is uniquely positioned to affect and be affected by these 
two contrasting factors.  
 Theories of foreign policy that synthesize domestic and international politics tend 
to provide a less parsimonious, but potentially richer and (more) explanatory view of 
state behavior, one that Realist or Commercial, ‘Innenpolitik’ ones do not. Putnam’s two-
                                                 
20 Gartzke, Erik, “The Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, 2007, pp. 166-
191. 
McDonald, Patrick, “The Purse Strings of Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51. No.3, 
2007, pp. 569-582. 
21 Stone (2004) and Copelovitch (2010) discuss the variations in IMF policy based on donor state domestic 
interests.  
Stone, Randall W, “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa”, American Political Science Review, 
98:4, November 2004, pp. 577-591. 
Copelovitch, Mark, “Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending”, 




level games approach22 envisions the Statesman (or the Executive in American terms), 
playing simultaneous international and domestic ‘games’ constrained by both domestic 
and international constraints and trying to come to an agreement that satisfies the ‘win-
sets’ or the set of outcomes that would be acceptable to both their international 
counterparts and domestic constituents. While this framework offers a promising start, 
we need to account for the fact that in many instances of nuclear proliferation,  there are 
significant incentives for the Executive to preclude any form of negotiations with 
domestic actors (such as Congress) if the former perceives that such negotiation is 
unnecessary or unhelpful to perceived strategic objectives. This is particularly the case 
when there are no formal treaties to be ratified or agreements to be consented with. The 
case of India in 1974 is of particular relevance here since, as I will show, the Nixon-Ford 
administrations conferred a weak de facto acceptance on an Indian nuclear weapon 
capability following India’s first nuclear test in 1974 without turning to Congress for 
input, because it was the administration’s sole prerogative to determine Indian adherence 
to non-proliferation commitments. In this instance, Congressional action to ‘catch up’ 
with the reality of India’s nuclear capability was undermined by the actions of the 
administration, as I will demonstrate later.  I will show that the Executive dominates 
nuclear policy making even in cases where structured negotiations with Congress are 
necessary, as in the case of the U.S.-China Civil Nuclear agreement. That agreement 
initiated a major change in U.S. Nuclear policy and cannot be explained without 
reference to events spread over several years preceding the signing of the agreement as 
well as a significant amount of time after, when the U.S. Government strove to get it 
through Congress. In this case, the Reagan Administration played a key role in ‘framing’ 
                                                 
22 Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1998), pp. 427 – 460. 
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the agreement as an economic and strategic benefit, overcoming the ‘nuclear 
proliferation’ centric view that opponents in Congress tried to paint the deal with. In fact, 
the American political structure presents several advantages that privilege the Executive 
branch over Congress in the conduct of nuclear proliferation policy. To begin with the 
subject is closely association with national security, historically an area where the 
American President has enjoyed wide deference and authority by Congress. More 
important is the fact that states have historically chosen to cloak their nuclear programs in 
secrecy. Since the United States’ intelligence operations typically reside in the Executive 
branch, limited and infrequent opportunities for Congress to receive accurate intelligence 
assessments about the nature of a state’s nuclear activities lead to information gaps and a 
lack of agility that only contribute further to Executive predominance. This factor plays a 
significant role in the ability of the Executive to ‘frame’ a particular nuclear policy 
question in advance of attempts by other actors to do so. I will show that this dynamic 
was especially predominant in American policy towards China during the Reagan 
administration, when President Reagan decided to cooperate with China’s civilian 
nuclear program. 
There have been several efforts to highlight the role of the Executive in foreign 
policy making. Trubowitz’s ‘Politics and Strategy’23 privileges the role of the Executive 
in making Foreign Policy. This account borrows from the Realist account of Structural 
International constraints in that the amount of ‘Geopolitical slack’ that statesmen have 
influences how they react to international issues. However, another equally important 
causal role is played by the preferences of his domestic coalition for ‘guns’ or ‘butter’, 
the argument being that if the preferences of the Executive’s domestic support coalition is 
                                                 
23 Trubowitz combines the causal elements of both Realist and Innenpolitik theories, and distinguishes his 
argument from neo-classical Realism in that fashion. See Trubowitz, Peter, “Politics and Strategy”, 
Princeton University Press, 2011. 
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for guns – i.e. defense spending and a more ‘muscular’ foreign policy, that will shape the 
President’s Foreign Policy in ways that favor military action, and if the preferences are 
for ‘butter’ – that is, more domestic welfare spending, it will moderate and reshape the 
President’s international policies. In the case of the U.S.-India Nuclear agreement, one 
can clearly see differences in the preferences of President George W. Bush and Clinton, 
differences that can be directly attributed to both international factors such as the threat 
from China, as well as domestic ones like the traditional Republican support from 
Defense industry networks, and the domestic non-proliferation groups’ sway over 
Democratic policies. My research proposal falls into the same ‘two-level’ scheme as 
enumerated above and attempts to explain Foreign Policy, specifically policy towards 
nuclear weapon proliferation, in terms that take both structural and domestic factors into 
account. 
1.3 THEORY AND CAUSAL EFFECTS 
While I have argued above that Realist theories are under-determining, variables 
rooted in the International structure nonetheless play an important role in determining 
foreign policy. With nuclear proliferation, we have already analyzed the inadequacies of 
using a Realist approach that splits nuclear weapons into a dichotomous framework that 
views them as either stabilizing or destabilizing. Nor would we be able to simply argue 
that the variation in U.S. policy can be explained simply as a function of geopolitical 
opportunism.  For example, to understand why the U.S. would weakly accept Pakistan’s 
nuclear program in the 1980s, but try and block France’s in the 1950s, we have to look at 
the role of nuclear weapons in determining not just the relationship between the U.S. and 
the state in question, but also what role these weapons would play in changing the nature 
of the relationship between the U.S. and other states that might be affected by these 
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developments. One factor that may be relevant is whether the U.S. has the same liabilities 
and responsibilities if Pakistan were to develop nuclear weapons as it would if France 
developed such a capability. For example, a France armed with nuclear weapons could 
conceivably have driven other European states towards nuclear weapons acquisition, a 
valid concern for American policy-makers in the 1950s. Whereas a Pakistani nuclear 
weapon capability in the 1980s, something which India already possessed, meant the U.S. 
was confronted with a reduced risk of new proliferation than would otherwise have been 
the case. Further, how do we explain the variation in American policy towards India and 
Pakistan during the Presidency of George W. Bush? One could argue that Domestic 
Political-Economy factors influenced the acceptance of India’s nuclear program, which 
was an example of rapid change due to issue reframing; a phenomenon well documented 
by scholars of public policy (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993)24. India and the U.S. shared a 
large and growing trade relationship in the 2000s, a phenomenon that contributed in no 
small way to the decision of the Bush administration to sign a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with India. Based on a wide selection of cases, I show that this two-level 
framework drove U.S. policy towards nuclear weapons both prior to and after the 
establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework in the late 
1960s. Given these variations, I propose an explanatory model to explain American 
policy towards nuclear weapon proliferators that incorporates Geopolitical and Domestic 
factors. My two independent variables are  
- Strategic Liability – This is the cost incurred by the United States if and 
when a nuclear aspirant crosses the nuclear threshold to weapons ownership. 
                                                 
24 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones, “Agendas and Instability in American Politics“, University of 
Chicago Press, 1993. 
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Within the American government, the Executive branch is the one that is 
primarily influenced by, and reacts to, this Liability. 
- Commercial Value– This represents the degree to which the American 
Executive’s domestic coalition is invested in trade and economic ties with the 
proliferating state and the reputation of the proliferator’s regime among 
political and business elites 
The first independent variable is what I term the ‘Strategic Liability’ of the state 
in question to the United States. Strategic Liability influences U.S. policy towards 
nuclear policy in the following way. All else being equal, I posit that the existence of an 
independent nuclear weapon capability in the hands of a regional state reduces the United 
States’ freedom of action and can be taken as a permissive signal by other potential 
proliferators. This dynamic manifests itself as a concern that if the U.S. were to make an 
exception to its rules for a particular state and recognize its nuclear program or even 
cooperate with the civilian nuclear program of such a state, this recognition may drive 
other states to develop their own nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann, 2009). This sort of 
argument was used by opponents of the U.S.-India nuclear deal (Perkovich, 2005) and is 
what one could term the basic Strategic Liability to the U.S.  From this foundation, I 
argue that the factors that contribute to or diminish U.S. liability  when reacting to 
another state’s nuclear program are the existence of a common threat, the effect of the 
state’s nuclear program on other U.S. allies or competitors in the same region, and 
finally, the stability of nuclear aspirant’s regime. The existence of a common threat and 
the cross-pressure on other regional actors are factors that go hand in hand.  
While the existence of a common threat creates incentives for the U.S. to leverage 
the proliferator’s nuclear weapons capabilities to balance against the threat and mitigates 
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America’s liability, the same capabilities can also create liabilities for the U.S. in the 
form of incentives to other allies or enemies in the region to proliferate, or by creating 
destabilizing dynamics in the proliferator’s region that might precipitate security crises. 
Consider the case of France, whose nuclear weapons program illustrates how this 
dynamic may have worked. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
stationed troops in Europe, and Western European military and foreign policies have 
significantly been influenced by the U.S. Further, the U.S.-French relationship, and 
France’s membership of NATO were part of a complex web of strategic interactions in 
Europe that included Great Britain and West Germany. From a contemporary (1950s) 
standpoint, a French nuclear weapon would have presented a very real possibility that 
other American allies West Germany would follow suit, and made the U.S. liable for 
such a program and possibly more involved in any strategic crises that follow.  On the 
other hand, an India with a nuclear weapons capability in the twenty-first century, acting 
as a counter-weight to China (with Pakistan already armed) does not pose the same 
challenges in so far as provoking China, since China already possesses its own nuclear 
arsenal. 
To illustrate how regime stability affects Strategic Liability, consider the cases of 
South Africa and France.  South Africa was not part of any major American led treaty 
organization nor was it arguably (and discounting South African claims at that time of 
being susceptible to Soviet Communist aggression) located in a strategically competitive 
region for the United States.  One of the biggest American concerns with the South 
African nuclear program as it gathered steam in the 1970s and 80s, was that these nuclear 
weapons could fall into the hands of a potentially hostile post-Apartheid regime (van 
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Wyk, 2007, 2010)25. Even in the case of a major ally such as France, worries and 
uncertainties about a Communist ascent to power in the 1950s led to similar opposition to 
its nuclear weapons program (Baum, 1990)26.I argue that this factor contributes to 
America’s Security Liability and influences American policy makers into trying to roll 
back the nuclear programs of states that are similarly positioned.   
Finally, consider the case of India. While presenting challenges to the U.S. in the 
form of cross-pressures on Pakistan’s nuclear program, and opportunities in the form of a 
potential counter-weight to China, India has historically not been part of any formal 
treaty or security alliances with the U.S., nor, since the end of the cold war, has it been 
part of a hostile alliance against it. I argue that this relative autonomy mitigates the sort of 
negative considerations described above in the French case for the U.S., reducing 
Strategic Liability and creating space for a more flexible policy of acquiescence with 
India’s nuclear weapon program. To operationalize Strategic Liability and apply a 
qualitative measure, I posit four discrete components that decide its value 
a- Primary Conflict -The existence of an unresolved conflict between the 
nuclear aspirant and the United States itself. 
b- Secondary Conflict (Knock-On effects) -The existence of unresolved 
conflicts or tensions between the nuclear aspirant, whether an American 
ally or enemy, and other states in the region that possess the capability 
or have demonstrated previous intent to develop nuclear weapons, but 
have not done so. This variable incorporates the “knock-on” effects or 
                                                 
25 van Wyk, Martha S., “Sunset over Atomic Apartheid. United States-South African Nuclear Relations, 
1983-91”, Cold War History, Vol. 10, No. 1, February 2010, pp. 51-79. 
van Wyk, Martha S., “Ally or Critic? The United States’ response to South African Nuclear Development, 
1949-1980”, Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 195-225. 
26 Baum, Keith W., “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: The Eisenhower Administration, France, and 
Nuclear Weapons”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 315-328. 
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secondary consequences (from the perspective of the U.S) of nuclear 
proliferation. This variable measures the American perception that a 
third party state will perceive a significant danger from the nuclear 
aspirant’s proliferation efforts, and will perceive incentives to engage in 
further nuclear proliferation or conflict. 
c- Regime Instability – This component signifies the risk of the nuclear 
aspirant’s regime collapsing and the nuclear weapons falling into the 
hands of a potentially hostile entity, such as a rogue state or non-state 
actor. 
d-  Common Threat Perception – The perception among government 
elites (importantly, the Executive Branch) in the U.S. that it shares a 
common strategic threat with the nuclear aspirant. This acts as a 
mitigating factor in Strategic Liability, but typically only when the 
Common Threat is already a nuclear power for the reasons described 
above. 
I use publicly available data on inter-state conflicts to qualitatively code (a) and (b) as 
either ‘High’ or ‘Low’.  For Regime Instability, I use the presence or absence of Intra-
State and Non-State conflicts to classify each nuclear aspirant’s Regime Instability as 
‘High’ or ‘Low’ depending on the prevalence and strength of internal insurgencies or 
civil conflict. I argue that if any one of the three contributing factors to Strategic Liability 
(a, b or c) are ‘High’, then this places the nuclear aspirant in the ‘High’ Strategic Liability 
Category. The rationale for this is that from the perspective of the U.S. Executive, each of 
these in itself poses an unacceptable increase in strategic risk to the U.S. On the other 
hand, the Common Threat Perception variable typically only plays a role when the other 
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factors are ‘Low’, further diminishing Strategic Liability but not qualitatively changing 
the coding of the case. 
While Strategic Liability plays a major role in influencing American nuclear 
policy, it is not completely determining by itself. I argue that American nuclear policy is 
heavily influenced by Domestic factors acting on the Executive, specifically the nature of 
commercial ties or the Commercial Value of the relationship between the U.S. and the 
state in question. In contrast to authors such as Stone (ibid.) and Copelovitch (ibid.) who 
argue that domestic parochial factors singularly determine states’ deviation from 
International Institutional rules and norms, I argue that in the Non-Proliferation case, 
these factors, and specifically the economic interests of the Executive’s domestic 
coalition, account only partly for this variation and deviation.  That commercial factors 
can strengthen commitments to peace has been argued by authors such as McDonald27. I 
propose a variant of the Commercial Ties thesis to argue that close Commercial ties 
between the U.S. and the nuclear aspirant influences American policy-makers and in 
particular the President by creating incentives for the Executive to offer a conciliatory 
approach to the nuclear programs of the aspirant state, especially when it perceives a low 
strategic liability. When strategic liability is perceived to be high, the presence of a strong 
commercial impetus will constrain the Executive’s ability and impetus to pursue a 
punitive response that includes economic measures. These incentives and constraints are 
especially reinforced when the potential for significant economic growth is present, given 
the Executive’s traditional role in championing and negotiating American access to 
overseas markets. Since such initiatives often require reciprocal concessions between the 
                                                 
27 See McDonald’s argument on how smaller (capitalist) governments can make more credible 
international commitments. McDonald, Patrick, “The Invisible Hand of Peace. Capitalism, the War 
Machine, and International Relations Theory”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009 
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U.S. and the state in question, pressure on the Executive to factor economic interests in 
nuclear policy – applied by domestic coalitions as well as by members of the 
administration -  can be especially acute.  Shared commercial ties can also play a role in 
reducing the risk that the partner state will ‘go rogue’, adopting policies that could 
significantly hurt American interests. One could argue that these factors played a key role 
in the Indian case during the George W. Bush administration. A variant of this dynamic 
shaped a restrained push-back is also operational when the U.S. is dealing with high 
strategic liability in the context of a significant commercial relationship with the aspirant 
state, where  these strong commercial ties circumscribe the coercive efforts of the United 
States, leading to a more restrained pushback. I term this factor the ‘Commercial Value’ 
variable. It represents the degree to which the Executive branch is invested in trade and 
economic ties with the potential proliferator.  I argue that the extent of these linkages 
affect the acceptance of the state’s nuclear weapons program by the U.S., playing 
primarily a positive role in such acquiescence. I hypothesize that the changes in this 
variable are driven by the revealed information about the commercial credibility and 
reputation of the regional power through the expansion of inter-state trade linkages and 
trade lobbies, and the consequent change in perception of the Executive. To understand 
and quantify the impact of the Commercial Value variable, I analyze the relative 
preference of the President’s domestic coalition for trade with the proliferator by 
analyzing the archival record of deliberations within the administration and in Congress 
on issues such as free-trade initiatives, commercial (civilian) nuclear and military trade 
and economic assistance to the concerned state, the importance of the latter’s economic 
success to American trade and political interests. Next, I analyze the contribution of trade 
with the proliferating state to the U.S. economy and its importance to the U.S. economy 
and domestic interests important to the Executive, using publicly available bilateral trade 
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data. If this qualitative analysis shows that the majority of these factors are positive for 
the state in question, I code the state’s commercial value as ‘High’, and as ‘Low’ when 
the opposite occurs. 
 The Dependent Variable – U.S. response to proliferation –I posit that the U.S. 
response to proliferation by an aspirant will fall into four distinct categories, each 
characterized by distinct observable implications that together constitute a unique 
response, as shown in Figure 1. The nature of the relationship between the U.S. and the 
nuclear aspirant will determine the subset of available options. The first combination is 
the case where we have High Security Liability and Low Commercial Value. This 
quadrant should see the U.S. being able to exert the maximum possible pressure on the 
nuclear aspirant because of the lack of economic ties and the high degree of security risk. 
Since the lack of a significant commercial relationship generally implies the lack of any 
significant military alliance, the measures I predict should be 
- Overt as well as covert military threats or actions, not limited to nuclear 
infrastructure. 
- Coercive financial and economic measures backed by threats of force 
- Diplomatic sanctions including attempts to expel or prevent the aspirant from 
joining any international institutions. 
I term this subset of policy actions ‘Active Rollback’. This is the most stringent policy 
action that is taken by the U.S. 
The second combination is the one with a Low Security Liability and Low 
Commercial Relationship. Here, the absence of a significant security concern means that 
the U.S. will be averse to taking military action that may lead to a full-scale conflict. On 
the other hand, the lack of a significant economic relationship will mean that the U.S. will 
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not find any compelling reasons to actively collaborate with the aspirant state. While I 
expect to find limited economic sanctions, consistent with the fact that the U.S. will incur 
limited costs in this quadrant, the existence of compliance costs and the possibility of 
damaging relations with third parties may limit the deployment of this measure. 
Therefore, I expect the policy outcome to include the following measures 
- Non-cooperation with civilian nuclear and dual-use programs in an effort to 
cap further nuclear weapon development or stockpiles. 
- Technology denial, especially in military and nuclear areas. 
- Limited Economic sanctions. 
Ultimately, I posit that the absence of a high degree of Strategic Liability means that the 
U.S. will be ultimately willing to ‘live’ with the aspirant maintaining a limited nuclear 
weapons capability. I term this subset of actions a policy of Weak Acceptance.  
The next combination is one where the United States perceives high strategic 
liability but also high commercial value. I argue that the perception of high commercial 
value in this quadrant qualitatively differentiates the American policy response from 
other instances of increased strategic liability where commercial value may be absent. 
For example, it is obvious that the nature of the American relationship with South Korea 
is significantly different from the one it had with Libya under Gaddafi. Here, I posit the 
following superset of options available in the military, economic and diplomatic arenas. 
Military: Overt military action, covert military action, blockades, (military) 
alliance degradation. 
Economic: Economic sanctions, denial of market access, sanctions on civil and 
dual-use military technology. 
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Diplomatic: Denial or Suspension of membership in International institutions. In 
addition, threats to carry out punitive military or economic measures can be made 
either overtly or covertly through “Quiet” diplomacy. That threats and this 
particular attribute of threats can make a material difference in the reaction of the 
adversary as well as the subsequent interaction between the two states is a point 
that has been made by authors such as Jervis (1970) and Schelling (ibid)28. 
Consequently, I posit the following observable implications for each of the four 
combinations of independent variables, starting with High Security Liability/High 
Commercial Value; A High Security Liability classification implies that the U.S. faces a 
significant negative change in its security interests if the aspirant obtains nuclear weapons 
capability. This classification also implies that the U.S. possesses multiple security 
related options that it can activate in response to the aspirant’s program.  However, the 
presence of a correspondingly high Commercial Value in the relationship will mean that 
the U.S. may be constrained from enforcing any harsh offensive military or economic 
measures to prevent domestic economic damage. Thus, it will be forced to limit its 
economic sanctions. Also, the fact that the U.S. shares a close economic relationship with 
the nuclear aspirant will mean that any threats are much more likely to  be made covertly 
initially, allowing both parties to ‘save face’, and avoid damage to this other important 
aspect of their ties. Discreet threats also allow the U.S. to step back from having to carry 
out these actions without losing credibility. As a result; I expect the policy outcome to 
consist of the following measures in this quadrant  
                                                 
28 Jervis provides an exposition on how the images states project to others in times of mutual antagonism is 
a material factor in the outcome of their confrontation. Likewise, Schelling’s work on Deterrence Theory 
focuses on the nature and importance of threats in nuclear standoffs. See Jervis, Robert, “The Logic of 
Images in International Relations”, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970 and Schelling, Thomas, 
“The Diplomacy of Violence”, Yale University Press, 1966. 
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- Degradation in the strategic alliance relationship (if the aspirant is engaged in 
one with the U.S.). 
- Covert technology disruption activities. 
- Suspension or denial of cooperation in nuclear or dual-use civilian technology 
- Threats and actions to suspend or expel the nuclear aspirant from international 
institutions. 
- A long ‘gestational’ period of threats before actual action, with the U.S. 
applying quiet or covert pressure initially. 
Ultimately, I argue here that while economic considerations will limit the stringency of 
U.S. actions, the high Security Liability will mean that the U.S. will not accept even a 
limited nuclear weapon capability, continuing to pursue a Rollback policy. I group this 
subset of actions into a policy that I term ‘Soft Rollback’. 
Finally, the fourth combination of Low Liability and High Commercial Value is 
the one I deem the most permissive. The lack of significant security issues and a high 
degree of commercial value will mean that the U.S. will be loath to pursue military or 
economic actions. The existence of a Common Threat will be a factor in this quadrant 
since it will further reduce any inclination on the part of the U.S. to sanction the state and 
will lead in fact to acquiescence with the aspirant’s nuclear weapons program. In this 
quadrant, I predict that we will see an absence of any of the negative sanctions listed 
above and will in fact see 
- Cooperation with the aspirant’s Civilian nuclear program 
- No sanctions on dual-use technology 
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- Attempts to block any other states or international institution from imposing 
negative sanctions on the nuclear aspirant’s due to its nuclear weapons 
program. 
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Figure 1: Position of nuclear weapon aspirant states in the two-level scheme 
1.3.1 Privileging the Executive in this framework 
I have previously argued that the Executive’s position in the American political 
system confers advantages that privilege its role in nuclear policy making. I have 
described how the Administration’s prerogative in adjudicating a state’s compliance with 
international agreements gives the President wide discretion in fashioning a policy 
response. I have also theorized on how the Executive is able to rapidly ‘frame’ a nuclear 
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administration’s policy towards India as an example. I elaborate further on this topic in 
relation to my theoretical framework. With specific reference to the independent 
variables under discussion here, the Executive’s control of both the external intelligence 
and war making apparatus of the American government imply that it is in a strong 
position to calculate the Strategic liability of a particular state’s nuclear program, and to 
do so in much more of an agile fashion than can Congress. Congressional access to this 
information is intermittent and often reliant on the Executive branch for judgment of 
intelligence reports that are often subjective. Further, while there are occasions where 
Congressional focus on a particular proliferation question is heightened due to the 
contingent nature of a threat, such attention is more often diffuse. Additionally, the 
Executive retains the ability to engage in dialog with its counterparts in state that are 
potentially affected by these proliferation efforts and to obtain confidential signals.  
Congress’ ability to influence this is limited due to the absence of timely and credible 
information. In the nuclear policy sphere, the Executive’s privileged position exerts a role 
even when Commercial considerations, traditionally a much more comfortable domain 
for Congress, are at work. I will show for example that when Commercial interests are 
elevated and Strategic liability is perceived to be low, the Executive is able to use the 
support of domestic trade coalitions to overcome non-proliferation advocates in Congress 
while pursuing paradigm shifting objectives such as nuclear deals with states that outside 
the global non-proliferation framework. In instances such as the Bush administration’s 
nuclear deal with India, the Administration’s privileged access to strategic information 
regarding the nuclear strategies of that state, and its ability to drum up support from 
domestic trade groups helped it to ‘frame’ the policy question in a politically 
advantageous way. Finally, the administration is able to use its access to confidential 
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diplomatic channels (and the perception of credibility this provides) to either discount or 
highlight the often subjective intelligence that it shares with Congress.  
1.3.2 Strategic Considerations in this framework 
The framework above would appear to raise the question of how the nuclear 
aspirant’s ‘intentions’ insofar as its nuclear weapons program affects the United States’ 
response and how this perception shapes the subsequent interaction. Typically, such 
considerations come to the fore in the context of crisis situations where a nuclear aspirant 
may (or may not) intend to use a nuclear capability as a bargaining chip against a status-
quo state. The circumstances under which such as situation can lead to preventive war 
have been the topic of examination by scholars using Bargaining and Deterrence theory 
based frameworks enumerated in prior sections29.  I posit that in my framework, the 
intent of the nuclear aspirant is one among several factors that is considered by the 
United States in fashioning a policy response. From the standpoint of my two 
independent variables, the one that is most relevant to this discussion is strategic liability. 
Strategic liability primarily measures the perceived impact of the aspirant’s nuclear 
weapons program on the United States, and subsumes the intent of the aspirant. For 
example, in the extreme case where the United States perceives the intent of the 
aspirant’s state to be in favor of using its newly acquired nuclear weapons capability 
against it, it is likely in the context of an already existing primary conflict with the United 
States. In this instance, the United States will perceive the aspirant’s nuclear weapon 
capability to be directed against it, whether or not that is its real intent. In other instances, 
such as when a state allied with the U.S. begins a push to develop nuclear weapon (such 
as France did in the 1950s), I will show that what matters more is not the ‘intent’ of the 
                                                 
29 Debs and Monteiro (2012), Dittmeier (2013), Powell (2003), Wolford (2011). 
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ally – which is often to develop a strategic capability independent of the U.S. – but rather 
the perceived impact, which includes a chain reaction of proliferation in the 
neighborhood. While the intent of the allied state plays a role at the tactical level, it does 
not change the overall American strategy. These dynamics illustrate how the perceived 
intent of the nuclear aspirant is factored into my model of the United States’ perception 
of the former’s nuclear capabilities, with its effect varying significantly across quadrants. 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN – CASE SELECTION 
Using the selection methodology detailed in the previous section, I select cases 
that show variation across my two independent variables, Strategic Liability and 
Commercial Value. The cases include both countries as well as the same country across 
multiple time periods. I examine a broad selection of major regional powers that have 
attempted to develop nuclear weapon capabilities, excluding by definition the Soviet 
Union since it was involved in a direct conflict with the U.S. and does not fit the 
definition of a regional power.  I base my analysis on one primary case in each quadrant, 
choosing one that presents sufficient complexity in the independent variables so as to test 
the robustness of my argument. I also analyze multiple secondary cases to ensure that my 
theory is sufficiently tested. I focus my analysis on pivotal moments when the nuclear 
aspirants are poised to make major choices in their nuclear weapons programs, such as 
when they are testing nuclear weapons, declaring weapon capabilities, deciding to pursue 
the enrichment of weapons grade radioactive material or undertaking a significant 
expansion of their nuclear programs. 
My primary case for the combination of High Strategic Liability and Low 
Commercial Value is China in the 1960s under the Lyndon Johnson Administration. The 
conflicts in Vietnam and Korea, where the U.S. and China were on opposite sides, and 
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the absence of commercial ties between the two states places the Chinese-American 
relationship of this era in this quadrant. I analyze archival data from the LBJ 
administration to show that the U.S. pursued a policy of Active Rollback towards the 
Chinese nuclear program during the period leading up to and following the Chinese 
nuclear tests until the de jure recognition of China by the United States as a nuclear 
weapon power following the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1968. I show that the Sino-Soviet relationship complicated the strategic liability calculus 
of the United States towards China’s nuclear program and provided nuance to its policy 
of Active Rollback. 
For the Low Strategic Liability/ Low Commercial value case, I analyze the Indian 
case in the 1970s under Presidents Nixon and Ford when they started the process of 
gradually repairing relations with India, which had been badly dented by the fallout of the 
Bangladesh War. It was in this period that India conducted its first ‘Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion (PNE)’ in 1974. The Ford administration adopted what can be termed a weak 
acceptance or indifference towards India’s nuclear program, focusing instead on 
gradually mending fences with the latter. This case is additionally notable for what I will 
show to be the misreading of India’s intent by the Ford administration. I will show here 
that while the Indian nuclear test was intended to be a technology demonstrator by the 
Indira Gandhi administration, the U.S. perceived it to be the start of a push by India to 
weaponize its nuclear program. Nevertheless, I will show that the Ford administration 
perceived the impact of an Indian nuclear capability to be benign, since one of India’s 
major rivals, China, already had a nuclear weapon capability, and the other, Pakistan, was 
considered too weak to pursue one in the near future. 
My case for the quadrant which signifies a high degree of Strategic Liability and 
high Commercial value, South Korea, presented a high degree of Security Liability to the 
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U.S. due to its high degree of involvement in local conflicts, while at the same time 
complicating the American calculus due to the high degree of commercial linkages 
between the two states. Its entanglement in the conflict with North Korea, another nuclear 
aspirant and the chances that a South Korean nuclear weapons program could 
conceivably drive Japan, the previously dominant colonial power in the neighborhood to 
adopt the same course, meant that the Strategic Liability incurred by the U.S. if the South 
Koreans developed nuclear weapons was high. I argue that unlike other instances where 
the lack of commercial ties allowed American Presidents to pursue a relatively severe 
policy of Active Rollback against the nuclear aspirant, the presence of commercial ties 
would force the U.S. to adopt a more restrained policy of ‘Weak’ Rollback, not exerting 
any overt or covert military pressures. By an analysis of the archival record, I  show that 
this is what occurred in the South Korea case during the Administrations of Presidents 
Carter and Reagan from the mid-1970s to the mid – 1980s when South Korea sought to 
weaponizes its nuclear program. In this instance, I will show that what mattered most to 
the Ford administration was the impact of a South Korean nuclear weapon capability on 
Japan and China, and not so much the intent behind the South Korean program, which 
was to develop a security capability independent of the American security guarantee. 
For the Low Strategic Liability/ High Commercial Value case, the Sino-U.S. 
relationship under President Reagan is my primary case, with the more recent case of 
India and President Bush’s signing of the U.S.-India nuclear deal providing a testable 
framework for my hypothesis for this quadrant. The U.S.-China nuclear agreement which 
opened up commercial American nuclear technology to the Chinese heralded an 
American policy of Strategic Acquiescence towards China’s nuclear weapons program. 
Using primary archival and secondary source material, I show that the significant 
widening in U.S.-Chinese trade relations following the liberalization of the Chinese 
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economy in the late 1970s and the rise of China as a rival to America’s main Cold War 
foe, the Soviet Union, provided the impetus for the change in American policy towards 
China’s nuclear weapons program. 
My research in support of these hypotheses is primarily qualitative, especially to 
confirm that the dependent variable, U.S policy towards the proliferator, takes the shape 
expected in the previous section. Using archival research in Presidential Libraries, 
Congressional and other contemporary records30, I aim to show evidence confirming not 
only that the observable implications posited were actually implemented, but also that 
these were undertaken for the reasons I set forth in my placement of the aspirant in my 
two variable scheme . The evidence includes deliberations on balancing against a 
common threat versus the permissive or destabilizing signals from acquiescing with the 
proliferator’s nuclear weapons program, and arguments and debate around the stability of 
the proliferating state’s regime, leading to the predicted actions. Confirmation of my 
hypothesis on the causal mechanism lies in finding evidence that there is a strong 
correlation between the actual policies adopted by the U.S. with evidence that the factors 
influencing Strategic Liability and Commercial Value were a major component of 
Executive debates and arguments in the time leading up to policy operationalization.    
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into chapters structured around each 
of the four quadrants that are created by the pairing of Strategic Liability and Commercial 
Value. Each chapter focuses on one combination, with an initial focus in each on the 
characteristic attributes that this combination imparts to the dyadic relationship and the 
policy outcome that I predict will occur based on these attributes. Next, I situate the cases 
                                                 
30 Research was conducted using archival material obtained from visits to the Lyndon B. Johnson 
Presidential Library and access to research material at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, the Gerald 
Ford Presidential Library and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Material from these libraries and 
from other sources was also obtained from the Digital National Security Archive Website and the Foreign 
Relations of the United States series at the U.S. State Department. 
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that belong in this quadrant, elucidating on why these cases belong in the quadrant. I then 
examine the available data on the dyadic relationship – using a combination of archival 
research into primary source material, secondary material and interviews with 
participants – for evidence that the causal variables did indeed lead to the postulated 
policy outcomes predicted. The examination of each case involves a particular focus on 
and around crucial events in the nuclear program of the aspirant state so as to understand 




Chapter 2:  Active Rollback  
I argue that the greatest motivation for American policy-makers to act forcefully 
against a nuclear proliferator exists when the Strategic Liability incurred by the United 
States as the state weaponizes its nuclear capability is high, and the Commercial Value of 
the U.S.-Proliferator relationship is weak. I claim that this combination presages and 
privileges particularly stringent threats and policy actions by the United States against the 
nuclear aspirant. In this chapter, I analyze those cases which are situated in a High 
Strategic Liability, Low Commercial Value relationship with the United States. In each of 
these instances, I interrogate the factual record to test the validity of this causal 
relationship.  
I begin by enumerating the particular attributes of this quadrant, that is, the 
relationship between the United States and the state in question, across two attributes, 
(High) Strategic Liability and (Low) Commercial Value. The case that I examine 
extensively here is Communist China in the 1960s, when it was accelerating its nuclear 
weapons program. Specifically, I analyze the time period between when China was 
considering whether to conduct a nuclear test (1963) and when China’s nuclear weapon 
status was recognized internationally in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). I 
choose China because of the complexity of its relationship with the U.S. and the 
reflection of this complexity on the structure of my independent variables. China was 
involved in an indirect conflict with the U.S. in Vietnam, wars with other nuclear 
aspirants such as India, and an uneasy relationship with the USSR. This makes it a ‘hard’ 
case against which to test my theory. In my analysis, I show that the combination of high 
strategic liability and low commercial value led the U.S. to pursue a policy of Active 
Rollback towards China’s nuclear weapons program. I find that in the latter period of the 
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Johnson administration, the U.S. also pursued a backchannel policy of negotiation and 
moderation that was at odds with its public posture of Active Rollback towards China’s 
nuclear program. I argue that this duality can be explained by the existence of singular 
events such as the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation treaty, and further, that these 
events can be accommodated by my model. 
2.1 BACKGROUND – AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE 1960S 
Having inherited a fraught situation across the Taiwan straits and a conflict in 
Vietnam where China was aiding the North Vietnamese against the American backed 
Southern government, the Kennedy Administration viewed Communist China warily. 
Longstanding domestic support for Taiwan31 meant that there was little incentive and 
much to lose for President Kennedy by attempting to drastically change the policy of 
containing China that he inherited from his predecessor, Eisenhower. Indeed, President 
Kennedy is reported to have referred to a Chinese nuclear test as one of the worst events 
that could occur under his watch. While there were extensive deliberations within the 
Kennedy Administration on the use of military force to counter China’s nuclear weapons 
program32, it was under his successor, Lyndon Johnson, that the U.S. was confronted with 
an immediate decision on whether to use force to try and prevent a Chinese nuclear test.    
During the Kennedy administration and the early part of the Johnson Presidency, 
the emergence of China’s nuclear weapons capability was viewed with great concern due 
to its attendant implications for U.S. interests in Asia, in particular, the possible 
                                                 
31 The years preceding the ascent of Kennedy to the Presidency had seen multiple crises in the Taiwan 
Straits and the passing of a “Formosa Resolution” in Congress authorizing the President to come to 
Taiwan’s aid if China were to attack it. Additionally, scholars have argued that Kennedy’s previous 
criticism of Truman for having “lost China” and his own small margin of victory in the 1961 elections 
made him very hesitant to stated aim of taking a “new look” towards China (see Lumbers, Michael, 
“Piercing the Bamboo Curtain”, Manchester University Press, 2008, pp. 21-24). 
32 Chang, Gordon, “Friends and Enemies, The United States, China and the Soviet Union 1948-1972”, 
Stanford University Press, 1991, pp. 237-243 
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constraints a nuclear China could place on American policies in the region. In addition to 
this primary issue, the U.S. was also greatly disturbed about the signals a nuclear-armed 
China would send to states such as Taiwan, Japan and India. Complicating the American 
calculus was the evolving nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. While the Soviet Union 
had been China’s biggest strategic partner and supplier of nuclear know-how, the early 
1960s brought with it the beginnings of a Sino-Soviet split, and the decision by the 
Chinese government to proceed on its own with a nuclear weapon test. Kennedy in 
particular viewed the Sino-Soviet split as removing a moderating constraint on the 
Communists in China, whose bellicose rhetoric on nuclear weapons scared him and his 
inner circle of advisors33. While the Kennedy Administration years are an important 
prelude to understanding how the U.S. came to grips with China’s burgeoning nuclear 
weapons program, the start of the LBJ era in late 1963 and early 1964 is particularly 
crucial to my argument, for this was the period when the Chinese were in the process of 
deciding whether or not to conduct a nuclear weapons test, and the United States was 
deciding what actions, if any, to take against the Chinese nuclear program.  
It would be accurate to say that the U.S.-China relationship at the beginning of the 
Johnson administration was non-existent. America still recognized the Nationalists in 
Taiwan as the true Chinese government. China under Mao remained hostile to the United 
States and the two countries had sparred directly and indirectly over Korea, Taiwan and 
most recently, Vietnam. American allies such as Japan were wary of Chinese ambitions. 
India, then still a potential ally whose nuclear program the U.S. hoped to restrict, had 
been recently caught off-guard and overwhelmed in a conflict with China. Further, the 
U.S. was embroiled in a war in Vietnam against the Communist North Vietnamese whom 
                                                 
33 Walt Rostow, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Kennedy is  cited  as saying that 
Chinese leaders felt that a nuclear war would be good for them, in Chang, Gordon ibid., p. 239. 
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the Chinese were siding with.  In addition to these factors, while the Sino-Soviet 
relationship was heading for a split, it was far from clear that the Soviets and the Chinese 
were ready to look at the United States as the “enemy’s enemy”.  
This is the historical time-period which I examine in detail in the following 
section. There is now a significant amount of literature on the deliberations inside the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations regarding the Chinese nuclear threat and the 
actions the United States could have taken to deal with this eventuality. However, much 
of this literature has focused either on the strategic reasons for which the U.S. abstained 
from attacking China’s nuclear facilities either immediately prior to or after China’s first 
nuclear test in 1964, or on the lessons to be learned from American forbearance in this 
case in the context of the successful adoption of the NPT34. In contrast, my focus here 
will primarily be on how the relationship between the two states affected the set of 
nuclear policy actions actively considered or operationalized by the United States 
Government. I examine how the evolving nature of the relationship between the two 
countries changed the way the U.S. viewed the Chinese nuclear program qualitatively, 
with determinative implications for U.S. policy towards it. In the next section, I develop 
an argument to locate China between 1963 and 1968 in one of the four quadrants formed 
by the combination of my two independent variables - the High Strategic Liability/ Low 
Commercial Value quadrant -  vis-à-vis its significance to the United States.  I then test 
my hypothesis that this ‘image’ of China  as perceived by the American Executive under 
Lyndon Johnson led to a policy of ‘Active Rollback’ against the nuclear weapons 
                                                 
34 Burr, William and Richelson, “Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle” and Gavin, Francis, “Blast 
from the Past”, respectively focus on these subjects. See Burr, William, and Jeffrey T. Richelson. "Whether 
to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64." 
International Security, Volume 25, No. 3, Winter 2000/01, pp.54-99 and Gavin, Francis J “Blast from the 




program of China, until there was a qualitative change in the American relationship with 
China during the Nixon Administration. 
In the following section, I examine the state of the relationship between the 
United States and China in the 1963-68 time-period and assign a ‘High’ or ‘Low’ Value 
to the Strategic Liability and Commercial Value variables based on the empirical record. 
Next, I attempt to find evidence for my causal hypothesis using both primary archival 
records from the Johnson administration as well as secondary source material. Successful 
validation of my hypothesis will lie in finding evidence that the set of policy options 
seriously considered and implemented against the Chinese nuclear weapons program 
were formed and bounded by Executive perceptions of High Strategic Liability and Low 
Commercial Value towards the U.S. – China relationship.  
2.2 U.S. PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 1960S CHINA – HIGH STRATEGIC 
LIABILITY AND LOW COMMERCIAL VALUE 
In the following examination of the independent variables, where appropriate or 
useful, I separate the period that encompasses the Johnson Administration’s interaction 
with China into two distinct phases, the pre-Chinese nuclear test phase and the post-
nuclear test phase. This is because, while not necessarily changing the set of policy 
actions available to the U.S., the nuclear test as an event had the possibility of changing 
the strategic calculus of all the parties involved. In particular, I examine my first 
independent variable, Strategic Liability, separately in each phase. 
I operationalize the first of my two independent variables, Strategic Liability, 
using its four component factors – Local Rivalry, Primary Conflict, Regime Instability 
and Common Threat perception – based on a qualitative examination of archival material 
- to assign a qualitative high/low value to each of these, and therefore estimating the 
overall degree of Strategic Liability.  I have defined each of these previously and argued 
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that if any of the first three components are elevated, that would imply a perception of 
high strategic liability. 
2.3 CODING STRATEGIC LIABILITY IN THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON (PRE-NUCLEAR TEST) 
TRANSITION PHASE 
To address one component of Strategic Liability – Secondary Conflict, defined as 
the existence of unresolved conflicts between American allies who were potential nuclear 
weapon powers themselves and the nuclear aspirant - tensions clearly existed between 
China and American allies such as Taiwan and South Vietnam in the period 1963-1964. 
Of the two, Taiwan, whose government still claimed represent all of China, was 
considered more likely to pursue a nuclear weapons program. While not an ally in the 
strict sense of the term, India was another country that the U.S. deemed to be the one 
most affected by China’s nuclear threat and therefore likely to pursue nuclear weapons35. 
It had recently fought a losing war with China and was confronted with choices of its 
own for its nuclear technology program. Japan was another American ally which was 
wary about Chinese designs and that had the potential to go down the nuclear route. 
Given this geo-political environment, we can clearly see that the ‘Secondary Conflict’ 
component in the U.S.-China equation was present and elevated. This characterization 
remains accurate in the period following the Chinese nuclear test as well, since the new 
reality of a nuclear China unmolested by the Great Powers could only act as a 
provocation to other nuclear aspirants that had much to fear from China. The second 
compositional factor of Strategic Liability, the existence of a Primary or Direct conflict 
between the U.S. and China, was also arguably present, though once removed, since the 
                                                 
35 “Problems of Nuclear Proliferation”, working paper, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (Gilpatric 
Committee), Box 1, Problem 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. While written after the 
Chinese nuclear test, this paper demonstrates that the U.S. had been significantly worried about India’s 
reaction to the Chinese test during the period leading up to the test as well as after. 
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U.S. had troops in South Vietnam fighting the Communists who were actively supported 
by China. The third component of Strategic Liability, Regime Instability, was, at least at 
the outset of the LBJ Administration, less relevant, since there was minimal risk from the 
American perspective that the Communist government in China would collapse. (This 
perception would be challenged later by the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966). 
Finally, a mitigating factor for Strategic Liability, the existence of a Common Threat to 
both the United States and China, was marginalized since neither the U.S. nor China 
viewed the only conceivable candidate, the Soviet Union, as one, even though the Sino-
Soviet split was well underway36. However, this perception would start to change towards 
the end of the Johnson Administration, and I will argue, played a dominant role in the 
attitudes of the Nixon and Reagan Administrations towards China’s nuclear weapon 
program. 
With two of its three aggravating factors being elevated, one could easily make 
the argument that the Chinese nuclear program’s strategic liability for America was high 
in 1963 when Lyndon Johnson took over, and continued to remain so until the end of the 
Johnson Administration. Our other independent variable, Commercial Value, was clearly 
non-existent since there were no meaningful trade relations between the two states. This 
lack of any commercial ties obviously did little to alleviate American concerns over 
China’s nuclear program. 
The archival record from the LBJ administration supports this characterization of 
the U.S. – China relationship. At the outset, President Johnson was considerably more 
                                                 
36 The Johnson Administration clearly viewed the Chinese communists as much more radical than the 
Soviet ones. This perception was bolstered by the unremittingly hostile public statements emanating from 
Beijing, even though the Chinese were more conciliatory in the back-channel talks between the two states 
that were ongoing since the Eisenhower Administration in Warsaw. See Chang, Gordon, “JFK, China and 




pragmatic about the need to eventually accommodate China as it gained in power 
internationally. Inklings of reconciliation with China’s nuclear program were evident in 
discussions among principals in the LBJ Administration37. However, the American 
political environment was still hostile towards the Government in Beijing. Johnson had to 
deal with the domestic “Taiwan lobby” that wielded considerable influence in America. 
This group, heavily represented in Congress, was opposed to any initiative that would 
legitimize the Communist Government in Beijing38. This opposition would continue to 
‘bound’ American policy actions vis-à-vis China, especially public initiatives, until the 
dramatic breakthroughs of the Nixon period. 
One of the immediate imponderables for the Johnson administration in the 
autumn of 1963 was the effect a nuclear China would have on America’s primary foreign 
policy goals in Asia, namely, the spread of Communism and the war in Vietnam. A 
nuclear armed China could signal to other Asian states that the U.S. would be reluctant to 
step in militarily in conflicts where there was a risk of Chinese military involvement39. 
Aside from this issue, another major concern for principals in the Johnson Administration 
that clearly comes through in a reading of archival records of Administration 
deliberations was the effect of China’s nuclear weapons program on countries such as 
India and Taiwan. The U.S. feared that a Chinese nuclear test would be both a permissive 
as well as provocative signal to India which could or would be forced to then make an 
unambiguous decision to steer its own nuclear program in a direction that would lead to 
                                                 
37 A memo from the acting American Consul-General in Hong Kong, calling for greater flexibility in 
dealing with China in the face of increased European trade and diplomatic relations with China was one 
such example. Source: National Security File, Country File, China, Box 237, Folder 1, Volume 1, 12/63-
9/64, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
38 Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a memo to the President in February1964 cites continuing pressure 
from Congress “against recognizing China”, ibid. 
39 The ascendancy of China is cited by some scholars as the reason for deepening American involvement in 
Vietnam. See “Full Circle”, Chang, Gordon, ibid. pp. 253. 
 
 43 
the development and operationalization of nuclear weapon capabilities. More than any 
other state, it was India that U.S. officials feared would be directly and immediately 
provoked by China’s nuclear program, and they debated long and hard about the 
possibility in the time period prior to and following the Chinese nuclear test. Japan’s 
reaction to China’s nuclear program as well as the reaction of other ‘candidates’ for 
nuclear weapon status such as France and Israel also worried policy-makers in the White 
House. 
Finally, in the case of the United States and China in the early part of the 1960s 
however, it is clear from deliberations within the Johnson Administration that the U.S. 
viewed the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to use the differences 
between the Soviet Union and China as a wedge to get the Soviets to support action 
against China’s nuclear weapons program, rather than as an opportunity to cultivate a 
relationship with China that would build it up as a counter to Soviet influence. What is 
fascinating about this dynamic is that by the end of the Johnson Administration, 
American policy makers would essentially do a U-turn and start to try and take advantage 
of the Sino-Soviet split against the Soviets. 40 Nevertheless, Kennedy’s view that the rise 
of a Communist China at odds with the Soviet Union was a dangerous portent continued 
to hold sway at the outset of the LBJ Administration as it debated the prospect of a 
nuclear China. However, there were slow shifts towards a more balanced stance as the 
degree of mutual animosity between the Chinese and the Soviets became evident towards 
the end of Johnson’s term.  
                                                 
40 A memo from Alfred Jenkins, “China Watcher” in the State Department, to President Johnson in mid-
1967 explicitly argues that the U.S. should present itself to the Chinese as a “reasonable” alternative to the 
Soviet Union. Source: National Security Files, Country File, China, Box. 241. Vol. 10. 7/67-9/67, Lyndon 
B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
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In sum, the one factor that could have mitigated America’s strategic liability, a 
common threat perception, was not present. It is therefore clear from the narrative above 
that as it debated the American response to an imminent Chinese nuclear test in 1963, the 
Johnson Administration was greatly concerned by the Strategic Liability it would incur 
with such an eventuality, with very few redeeming qualities perceived in such an 
eventuality.  
2.4 CODING STRATEGIC LIABILITY IN THE POST-NUCLEAR TEST PHASE 
In the period following the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, while concerns 
about the immediate threat to American policy prerogatives in Vietnam and Asia ebbed 
and flowed with the changes in the fortune of the South Vietnamese and American 
forces, worries about the impact of a nuclear China on other potential nuclear powers 
such as India only grew. China’s support for Pakistan in its 1965 border conflict with 
India only exacerbated tensions with China and may have been a factor in India’s 
eventual ‘peaceful’ nuclear test41 in 1974. This, and the start of Taiwan’s own nuclear 
weapons program in 1968 were key examples of how local rivalries between China and 
American allies or non-aligned states increased proliferation concerns for the United 
States.  Thus, while the Primary Conflict variable’s significance varied in the period 
between 1965 and 1968, the Secondary Conflict component remained elevated. Finally, 
the onset of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which led to mass chaos and dysfunction at 
all levels of the Chinese government, increased fears in the Johnson White House that the 
Communist government would collapse. In sum, at least two of the three aggravating 
                                                 
41 The Gilpatric Committee spent a significant amount of time on the subject of India and how its nuclear 
program could be curtailed. One of the options considered and rejected was that of providing a security 
guarantee to India against Chinese aggression, though it is very much unclear whether India would have 
even accepted such a guarantee, if offered. Source: Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 2, Folder 1, 
Problem 3, Report #1. Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
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components of Strategic Liability, namely, Local Rivalry and Regime Instability were 
elevated, with the third, Primary conflict variable elevated for the major part of Johnson’s 
tenure due to the escalating involvement of both the U.S. and China in the Vietnam War. 
Thus, the degree of Strategic Liability that the United States continued to incur from a 
nuclear China remained elevated.  
2.5 CODING COMMERCIAL VALUE IN THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP, 1963-1968 
My second independent variable, Commercial Value, or the degree of 
Commercial ties between the U.S. and China in this case, was virtually non-existent due 
to the almost total absence of trade ties between the two states as well as the lack of any 
indications that either side favored the development of such exchanges. The American 
trade embargo on China dated back to the Communist takeover of the mainland and the 
subsequent escalation of hostilities during the Korean War, with the allies coordinating 
their policies via ‘CoCom’, the Coordination Committee on Export Control42. In fact, the 
American-led sanctions regime on China was in many ways harsher than the one imposed 
on the U.S.S.R., with the additional sanctions being known as the China Differential43. 
The Korean armistice and the subsequent relaxation in hostilities led to a widening gap 
between the United States and its allies, in particular Japan, Canada and the Western 
European states, who all but abandoned the multilateral trade embargo in pursuit of 
expanded trade relations with China44. While there were anemic attempts to offer food 
                                                 
42 See Mastanduno, Michael “Trade as a strategic weapon: American and alliance export control policy in 
the early postwar period”, International Organization (1988, pp. 121-150) for a discussion of the origins 
and characteristics of this regime. 
43 See  Foot, Rosemary (1995, pp. 51-75) for a discussion on how the Korean war was the impetus for the 
United States to impose even harsher sanctions on China than on the Soviet Union. By 1958, most 
American allies had abandoned this policy leaving the United States practically alone in this policy. This 
lasted essentially till the tail end of the Johnson administration when the President Johnson exempted 
medical and other humanitarian goods from these sanctions. 
44 See Qing Simei, “The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against 
China, 1954-58’, in Cohen and Iriye eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, Columbia University 
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aid to the Chinese during the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations, unilateral 
American sanctions on the Chinese stayed relatively unchanged, especially in the years 
immediately following the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. While the American hostility to 
trade with China stayed intact, pressure from the allies ensured that this hostility did not 
extend to inhibiting their economic interests. Growing American and Chinese 
involvement in Vietnam reduced any impetus for a relaxation in American trade policy, 
even as close allies such as the United Kingdom expanded trade ties. While there were 
some Administration officials who called for a relaxation in the American trade embargo 
as early as 196445, the Johnson administration remained unmoved at that stage. A gradual 
thaw in trade policy towards China occurred towards the end of President Johnson’s term 
- with the administration permitting the sale of medical supplies. This thaw mirrored a 
similar opening on the strategic front, where the Administration was beginning to 
consider the possibility that it could work with the Chinese communists against the 
U.S.S.R.  However, fundamental change in American economic policy towards China 
would have to wait until the Nixon administration. Therefore, I code the Commercial 
value variable ‘low’. 
To summarize, given the positions taken by my two independent variables, my 
model predicts that the United States would have pursued a consistent policy of ‘Active 
Roll-back’ towards China’s nuclear policy in the post-test period as well. In the next 
section, I test this hypothesis against the archival record of policy deliberations available 
for the period.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 1990. pp. 177-128 for an example of the widening gaps between the allies which continued into the 
Johnson administration. 
45 A prominent example of a push for liberalization was James Thompson on President Johnson’s National 
Security Staff, who argued in an October 1964 memorandum that the United States needed to abandon a 
policy of “containment plus moral preachment”, which he argued had failed. Despite this, there were no 
changes on the ground till 1966. See Memorandum from James C. Thompson, October 28, 1964, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, Document 63. 
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2.6 THE EVIDENCE – DID HIGH STRATEGIC LIABILITY AND LOW COMMERCIAL VALUE 
INFLUENCE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM? 
I test my hypothesis on the causal effects of my two independent variables on 
American policy towards China’s nuclear weapons program primarily through a 
qualitative analysis of archival material available at the Lyndon Johnson Presidential 
Library46, alongside additional publicly available secondary source material. 
 This section will attempt to answer two questions 
- Did America follow a policy of Active Rollback towards China’s nuclear program 
between 1963 and 1968?  
- If it did, was it because of the perception of elevated Strategic Liability and Low 
Commercial Value? If it did not, what explains the departure from the theory? 
I examine the evidence chronologically, starting with the period coinciding with the start 
of the Johnson administration in 1963 and ending by the Inauguration of Richard Nixon 
as President in January 1969.  
The period under consideration can be divided into two parts. The first is the 
transition period where Johnson inherited Kennedy’s policy towards China, and 
confronted the immediate question of whether to do anything about China’s impending 
nuclear test, from November 1963 to October 1964 when the nuclear test occurred. The 
second period is the post-test phase which lasted through the end of the Johnson 
Administration and approximately coincided with the ratification of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty that recognized China as a nuclear weapon power. I will show that 
the United States followed a relatively consistent policy of Active-Rollback both prior to 
and immediately following the Chinese nuclear test. However, the latter part of the 
Johnson Administration from 1965 to 1968 - which saw a deepening and (deeply 




unpopular) American involvement in Vietnam, a widening Sino-Soviet split, and finally, 
the crystallization of America’s broader nuclear proliferation policy – saw the Johnson 
Administration adopt an outwardly policy of non-acceptance of China’s nuclear program 
and even occasional belligerence towards it, while discreetly discussing and signaling a 
more moderate policy of acceptance. I will argue that this seeming inconsistency with my 
model’s predictions is in fact explainable by taking into account unique factors such as 
the negotiations for the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty that are consistent with the 
framework of my model. 
2.6.1 The Kennedy- Johnson transition and China’s nuclear test  
Strategic Pressure: The United States under President Kennedy was greatly 
concerned by the acceleration of China’s nuclear program, with Kennedy describing a 
possible Chinese nuclear test as one of the most important (and implicitly dangerous) 
events that could happen for American foreign policy in the 1960s.47 That Kennedy and 
his advisors were gravely apprehensive about China’s nuclear program is attested to by 
the multiple White House meetings centered on the topic.48 The key element of 
Kennedy’s strategy (and, as we will see, Johnson’s) to curtail China’s ambitions of 
becoming a nuclear weapon power was to use the burgeoning Sino-Soviet split as a way 
to get the Soviets to cooperate in possible military action against the Chinese.49 In 
particular, a perceived sudden Soviet interest in completing a Partial (Nuclear) Test Ban 
treaty, when China had still not exploded its first nuclear device, was taken by the 
                                                 
47 This was a recollection of Walt Rostow, cited in Chang, Gordon, “Friends and Enemies, The United 
States, China and the Soviet Union”,1990, pp. 229 (JFK, China and the Bomb) 
48 The topic was a center-piece of White House deliberations early in the Kennedy Administration, with the 
earliest one on record held on February 11, 1963, where the Soviet Union’s attitude towards China’s 
nuclear program was discussed. Source: Chang, Gordon ibid. pp. 229-230. 
49 Kennedy Advisor Averell Harriman is reported to have tentatively broached the subject to Nikita 
Khrushchev during talks on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, without a promising response. See Foot, 
Rosemary, “Practice of Power”, Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 180. 
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Americans as an expression of Soviet interest in curbing the Chinese nuclear program. 
Kennedy’s advisors pursued the possibility of joint Soviet-U.S. military strikes against 
China’s nuclear facilities, though without much success. 
This was the situation inherited by Lyndon Johnson when he ascended to the 
Presidency following the assassination of Kennedy in November 1963. Johnson also 
inherited most of Kennedy’s foreign policy staff and, as evidence on record suggests50, 
also Kennedy’s policy of wooing the Soviet Union to gauge its interest in jointly striking 
the Chinese. Johnson and his senior advisors including National Security Advisor 
McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, all of whom were deeply involved in China Policy under Kennedy, debated 
military action against China in the weeks leading up to the Chinese nuclear test in 
September 1964. While overtures continued to be made to the Soviet Union, it was 
increasingly clear that however much antipathy the Soviet Union under Khrushchev 
harbored towards the Chinese Communists, taking action against a fellow traveler would 
have seemed to be a leap too far for the Soviet Union.51  In fact, the premium placed by 
Johnson and his advisors on the inadvisability of taking unilateral action against the 
Chinese nuclear program may have betrayed not just their understanding of the limited 
success such action against the Chinese might have, but perhaps also a debate within the 
Johnson Administration about whether America should undertake a more accommodative 
policy towards China in the long-term52, a debate which was then still very much in its 
infancy. 
                                                 
50 Burr and Richelson, ibid. pp. 79 discuss how principals in the Kennedy-Johnson policy establishment 
such as National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy continued the preparation of plans to attack China’s 
nuclear facilities even as Johnson was still to take any firm policy positions on the subject. 
51 Khrushchev himself was removed from power by the Soviet Communist Party Politburo, a decision 
partly attributed to his handling of the Chinese nuclear tests (Chang, Gordon, ibid. pp. 250) 
52 China specialists in the Johnson Administration, such as James Thompson Jr. proposed a ‘two-China’ 
policy that would allow the U.S. flexibility in dealing with the mainland Communists (Source: Chang, 
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Such doubts came to the fore in the months leading up to China’s nuclear test in 
October 1964, as well as in the days and weeks immediately after the test. There were in 
essence two parallel debates. One was about the merits of taking immediate military 
action against China, as well as a more fundamental debate over whether or not a nuclear 
China represented a catastrophic threat for American interests. A prime example of both 
of these was a set of dueling memos. The first was by Robert Johnson in the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff written in April 1964, where he argued53 in essence 
that China would treat its nuclear weapon status with more responsibility than some of 
the statements by its leaders indicated or that some in the Johnson Administration 
feared.54 He also argued that a strike against China’s nuclear program would only have 
limited success.  In contrast, memos55 directed by Henry Rowen, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense and written by George Rathjens56 from the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA) just prior to and immediately following the Chinese nuclear test argued 
the opposite. Rowen and Rathjens made the case that China’s nuclear weapon capability 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gordon, ibid. 218). While probably not determinative, they likely ‘seeded’ the policy initiatives that would 
come later.  
53Johnson’s memo was an early example of contrarian pressures from lower to mid-tier officials in the 
Johnson Administration to reconsider the alarmist tone that had come to represent American policy towards 
China and its nuclear program. Committee on Non-Proliferation, Committee Files, Box 5, Folder 2. State 
Department Memo, 4/64, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
54The same Johnson memo, forwarded to the President’s Senior Staff by Walt Rostow, was critiqued by 
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy as having “diffused” the problem of China’s nuclear weapons, 
Memorandum of Record, National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Chairman's Staff Group, 
April 1964. Prepared by NSC staff member Colonel William Y. Smith, USA, from FRUS 1964-68, 
“China”. 
55 Titled "China as a Nuclear Power (Some Thoughts Prior to the Chinese Test)", the memo is tentatively 
attributed to Rowen by researchers from the National Security Archive. In tone, it appears to be a reflection 
of hawkish Administration officials such as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security 
Advisor McGeorge Bundy., Source: National Security Archives’ FOIA request to State Department, 
10/07/1964 
56 Titled “Destruction of China’s Nuclear Weapons Capabilities”, Rathjens memo was part of the ACDA’s 





represented such a danger to American foreign policy goals, as well as to the more 
general cause of non-proliferation, that the U.S. would be justified in taking military 
action against it. While this internal debate went on, the Administration privately 
continued to draw up plans to thwart the Chinese nuclear program, by force if necessary. 
In addition to the approaches to the Soviet Union, plans were drawn up that included 
using Taiwanese (Republic of China) forces parachuting into and attacking Chinese 
nuclear facilities, or using American and Soviet bombers to target these locations57. 
Publicly, the Johnson Administration continued warning the Chinese against conducting 
a nuclear test while not clearly specifying whether there would be any military 
consequences. Part of the Administration’s ambivalence came from the fact that Johnson 
realized that there were no good military options. Therefore, the Administration’s stated 
policy continued to be one of ‘Active’ Rollback, as evidenced by the military 
contingencies evaluated and specifically due to the high degree of Strategic Liability that 
the U.S. felt it would incur. Rathjens’ memo addressed the possibility that a nuclear 
China would cause other states hostile to China to pursue their own nuclear programs, 
and for the potential for China itself to pose a threat to the U.S. in the medium to long-
term. On the diplomatic side, the United States continued to oppose Chinese admission to 
the United Nations and refused to recognize the Communist Government, even though 
other Western states such as France were moving in that direction, a development that 
rang alarm bells in the White House.58 The Administration did so even in the face of 
pleas from the Diplomatic Corps for more flexibility, as we have seen previously. 
                                                 
57 Burr, Richelson, ibid. pp. 72, 81 and Chang, Gordon, ibid., “JKF, China and the Bomb”, pp. 145 
58 France’s recognition of China in January 1964 was a major blow to America’s strategy of presenting a 
unified front against the Chinese and their nuclear program. See  “Telegram from Taipei”, National 
Security File, Country File,  China, Box 237, Folder 1, Volume 1, 12/67-964, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Presidential Library Archives. 
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Economic Pressure: From the perspective of my second independent variable, 
Commercial Value, the lack of any financial ties meant that the U.S. could not bring any 
additional pressure to bear on the Chinese, though it continued to maintain strict controls 
over the export or sale of goods and services to China. This policy often put it at odds 
with European allies who were more inclined to develop trade ties with the Chinese59. 
The concern that increasing trade between Europe and China would constrain America’s 
freedom of military action was discussed among White House officials John McLoy and 
Allen Dulles in the weeks after the Chinese nuclear test when American retaliation still 
seemed to be a possibility. This concern meant that there was great reluctance to do 
anything but keep the American trade embargo on China intact60. However, China 
remained a largely insular economy against which the U.S. and the rest of the West had 
few economic threats to wield. Having overcome a major food crisis in 1962 during the 
‘Great Leap Forward’ at a cost of millions of lives, it was unlikely that the Chinese would 
modify their nuclear trajectory due to the limited economic pressure that the West could 
employ. Nevertheless, the main economic weapon in the American arsenal was the total 
trade embargo which it had maintained since the Korean War. While there were cursory 
deliberations on humanitarian trade with the Chinese during the Kennedy administration, 
the official attitude towards the issue continued to be one of hostility, and the fear that 
any opening would prove advantageous to China and detrimental to American interests in 
Taiwan and elsewhere.  The U.S. continued on this course through 1964-66, even while 
its European and Asian allies pursued expanded trade relationships with the Communists. 
The American government offered to sell humanitarian items to China, but only if it 
                                                 
59  Pressure from allies such as France and Britain, who were increasing trade ties with China is cited by 
some scholars as exerting a moderating (as well as irritating) influence on the Johnson Administration in 
this period.  See  Lumbers, Michael, “Piercing the Bamboo Curtain”, 2008, pp. 88-89 
60 Notes of McLoy, Dulles meeting, 12/13/1964, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 1, Folder 2, 
Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
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modified its “hostile” behavior towards American interests. Predictably, this offering was 
rejected by the Chinese, an outcome expected and anticipated by those on the U.S. side 
who viewed this as a way of illustrating Chinese intransigence61. With tensions high over 
the Chinese nuclear program, and the absence of any domestic economic lobby for trade 
with China, there was little motivation to change this policy.  
To recapitulate, I had postulated previously that a strategy of Active Roll-back 
includes the following elements. 
- Overt as well as covert military threats or actions, not limited to nuclear 
infrastructure. 
- Coercive financial and economic measures backed by threats of force. 
- Diplomatic sanctions including attempts to expel or prevent the aspirant from 
joining any international institutions. 
In the approximately one year period between his ascent to the Presidency and China’s 
nuclear test, the evidence reviewed above clearly shows that covert and overt military 
actions against Communist China were seriously considered by President Johnson, and 
specifically because of concerns that it would restrain America in Vietnam and lead to 
further proliferation by China’s neighbors and competitors. For the specific question of 
whether or not to try and prevent a Chinese nuclear test by military means, a combination 
of doubts about the effectiveness of military action and the political risks that such 
unilateral action would entail resulted in the Johnson Administration abjuring military 
action against China. 62 The administration also continued its strict China trade embargo, 
                                                 
61 This (uniquely at this stage) American attitude was exemplified by Chester Bowles, Kennedy’s Special 
Representative for Asian affairs, who argued that even minimal humanitarian trade with China should be 
predicated on Chinese behavior in Taiwan, Korea and other areas. This attitude was unchanged until the 
last years of the Johnson administration. See Foot, Rosemary (1995, pp. 72-74). 
62 McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the Record, 09/15/1964. Bundy specifically says that unilateral 
action would be “unprovoked” and not favored. He still leaves open the possibility of joint action with the 
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even though it had limited utility against China. China’s membership in the United 
Nations also continued to be blocked by the United States, which still recognized the 
Nationalist government in Taiwan as the true Chinese government. In the long-term 
however, negotiations toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as a host of 
other factors, such as the stalemate in the Vietnam War, increasing European 
rapprochement with China and the Sino-Soviet split entered the strategic calculus of the 
Johnson Administration vis-à-vis the China’s nuclear weapon capabilities. I explore this 
topic in depth in the next section.  
2.6.2 Janus Faced? Explaining post-Nuclear American Policy towards the Chinese 
nuclear program  
Following China’s nuclear test on October 16, 1964, President Johnson 
established a Committee on Nuclear Proliferation chaired by Roswell Gilpatric, the 
recently retired Deputy Secretary of Defense. This Committee (which I shall refer to as 
the Gilpatric Committee in the following sections) was tasked with formulating a 
proposal to limit or eliminate the further spread of nuclear weapons. The Johnson 
Administration’s China policy in the months and years following the Chinese nuclear test 
is also to a large extent the story of the construction of an America policy towards nuclear 
proliferation. The entrance of a hostile new power into the league of nuclear weapon 
states forced the United States to examine what its long-term approach to nuclear 
proliferation should be. In my examination of documents from the Gilpatric Committee’s 
deliberations and those from the National Security Files of the Johnson Administrations, 
the tensions between the imperative of preventing further proliferation and creating a 
policy tailored to America’s changing relationship with China are evidently clear. I find a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Soviets in the future, if that country was “interested”, though it is clear from other accounts that the Soviets 
weren’t very keen on the idea. Source: Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library archives via National Security 
Archive.   
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widening difference between the status-quo American policy of actively rolling back 
China’s nuclear program and forward looking policy goals of stabilizing the spread of 
nuclear weapons and dealing with the reality of China’s rise in Asia. 
The Chinese nuclear test did not result in any significant change in America’s 
public posture as far as the acceptability of China’s nuclear weapon status went.  Having 
been unsuccessful in stopping the Chinese test, the Administration tried to minimize its 
importance publicly, as President Johnson did in his first public comments about the 
test.63 However, there was deep disquiet within the Administration and in Congress over 
this event. The Chinese nuclear test in October 1964 occurred as America’s involvement 
in Vietnam was deepening. One of the key worries for officials in the Johnson 
Administration was that a nuclear China would be seen by American allies in South 
Vietnam and around Asia as a deterrent to further American involvement in the region. 
Operation “Rolling Thunder”, the intensified American campaign in early 1965, was in 
many ways a response to such fears.64 On the domestic front, the Administration faced 
pressure from Congress and the media to respond forcefully to the Chinese nuclear test65. 
Within the Administration too, hawkish voices continued to agitate about the dangers of 
China’s nuclear weapons for American interests in Vietnam and held out the possibility 
of using future Chinese actions, such as a violation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (of 
which China was not a signatory) to attack and destroy Chinese nuclear facilities.66 While 
                                                 
63 Johnson called this a “tragedy” and dismissed the Chinese bomb as a crude weapon. (See Seymour 
Topping, The New York Times, 10/16/1964). 
64 See Gavin, Francis, “Nuclear Statecraft. History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age”, Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs, 2012, p.75, for an example of the pressures faced by the Johnson administration 
to show its commitment to Vietnam and Asia in general following the Chinese nuclear test.  
65 Chang, Gordon, ibid. pp. 228 for an example of pressure from influential conservative commentators 
such as William Buckley of the ‘National Review’ to take military action to “liquidate” China’s nuclear 
weapon capability. 
66 Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 2, Folder 1, Problem 3, page 2, Packages and Problems, 
“Chicom capability elimination”. Source: Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library. 
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the hawkish posture adopted by Congress towards China put pressure on Johnson, the 
absence of significant economic ties between the U.S. and China left the Congress 
without meaningful tools by which to make its influence felt. 
This was the backdrop for the formation of the Gilpatric Committee in late 
October 1964. Its mission was to recommend an overarching policy for the United States 
to deal with nuclear proliferation as well as to provide recommendations on dealing with 
the nuclear programs of individual states such as China. While tasked with coming up 
with a recommendation for America’s counter-proliferation strategy, the Gilpatric 
committee’s brief was not limited to necessarily providing a recommendation on stopping 
proliferation, but rather, was to also provide options that could include providing states 
such as India with nuclear weapons to balance against China.67 Several of the 
committee’s deliberations hinted at a more conciliatory stance towards China than the 
Administration publicly allowed. For example, even though the public posture of the 
Administration was unyielding in its opposition to China’s nuclear weapon status, 
Committee principals, including long-time Administration insiders such as John McLoy 
and Allen Dulles, discussed the possibility of a détente with China as a means of bringing 
it into the emerging non-proliferation framework and prevent further proliferation68.  
Indeed, one of the main concerns of the Committee was that China would use its 
influence to dissuade other states from signing onto a global non-proliferation treaty.69 
These inklings of an opening went further than the public American policy of having an 
                                                 
67 Defense Secretary McNamara specifically requested the Gilpatric Committee to reconsider the 
assumption that its task was to recommend ‘non-proliferation’ options as opposed to ‘counter-proliferation’ 
options that may include enabling allies of the United States to obtain nuclear weapons. Source: Committee 
on Nuclear Proliferation Box. 6, Folder 8, “Memorandum for the Chairman, by John McLoy. 
68 Notes of McLoy, Dulles meeting, 12/13/1964, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 1, Folder 2, 
Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 




‘Open-Door’ to China70. Historians have noted that the Committee evaluated at least four 
different counter-proliferation options ranging from an aggressive policy of rolling back 
proliferation (using military means against countries like China if necessary) 71, to a 
policy of proliferating weapons to friendly powers such as India and Israel72. The tone 
and tenor of the Committee’s actual deliberations indicate however that an intermediate 
policy of collaborating with the Soviet Union to develop a global non-proliferation treaty 
was one that found favor from the beginning of the discussions73. This is not to discount 
the fact that there were still hawkish voices arguing for a punitive response to China, both 
to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon capability as well as to send a signal to 
other potential proliferators. However, these recommendations stayed out of the final 
report made to President Johnson74. When it delivered its recommendations in January 
1965, the Gilpatric Committee eventually came to the conclusion that even though China 
may not initially accede to a Non-Proliferation Treaty, the best course of option it could 
                                                 
70 Johnson Advisor Roger Hilsman made the famous “Open Door” speech in San Francisco in December 
1964, following the Chinese nuclear tests. In practice, the Open Door policy was not much more than a 
weak attempt to keep open a channel for dialog with China. Hilsman himself argued in an interview that it 
was an opportunity wasted by President Johnson. Source: National Security Archive. George Washington 
University.  
71 Final report of the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 15, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library 
Archives 
72 This was Option 1, where the U.S. would essentially cede the anti-communist leadership in Asia to India 
and allied nations by helping them develop nuclear weapons. See Gavin, Francis, “Blast from the Past”,  
 Source: International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter, 2004/2005), pp. 100-135 
73 Notwithstanding the fact that the committee religiously developed a number of policy options, including 
ones that would have encouraged proliferation by friendly powers, the dominant theme of the committee’s 
deliberations was one couched in the idea of discouraging further proliferation, even if it meant coopting 
China. An example is a letter from Chairman Gilpatric to fellow committee members Dean, McLoy and 
Watson where he argues that “U.S. policy should be to discourage all states from nuclear proliferation. 
(No) exceptions.” Source: Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 1, Folder 2, Document 5a. Lyndon 
Johnson Presidential Library Archives.  
74 This alludes to the hawkish memo from G.W. Rathjens of the ACDA, cited previously, which did not 
make it into the final committee report. 
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recommend was one centered on a global treaty based non-proliferation regime, with the 
possibility and even necessity of China acquiescing at some point in the future.75  
It would however take until the end of the Johnson Administration for the White 
House to come around to that view. Within the circle of Johnson’s advisors, China’s 
nuclear weapon capabilities were increasingly seen through the prism of the conflict in 
Vietnam, as we have seen previously. While suggestions to liberalize ties with China 
mostly came from career officials, the inner circle of Johnson’s advisors still hewed to a 
hard line. Throughout 1965 and 1966, the relationship with China was therefore still one 
of high Strategic Liability from an American perspective. The increasing support from 
the Chinese side for the North Vietnamese was a primary factor, with officials constantly 
updating plans to attack China and its nuclear facilities to deal with contingencies in 
Vietnam. Proliferation worries due to the ‘China effect’ were another factor, with 
concerns about India, France and even West Germany76 coming to the fore, as the U.S. 
sticking to a policy of circumscribing China’s ambitions. Administration officials worried 
that West Germany would see the Chinese nuclear tests (and perceived American 
reluctance to stop them) as a permissive signal for its own nuclear program. Alongside 
these factors, Regime instability was another major concern as the Chinese Cultural 
revolution that started in 1966 threw large parts of the country into chaos and led many to 
question whether there was anyone on the Chinese side that the Johnson Administration 
                                                 
75 The report is quite explicit about the need for an opening to China. It says that “(the Committee) believe 
it will prove difficult over the long term either to halt nuclear proliferation or obtain worldwide peace and 
stability until China has joined the society of nations and is willing to participate responsibly in arms 
control measures. In view of the complexity and difficulty of the problem, we recommend that the 
Government undertake a major high-level reexamination of our policies toward China.” Source: 
Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 15. Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library. 
76 Discussed as a possibility in a meeting between Gilpatric, McLoy and Dean. Source: Committee on 
Nuclear Proliferation, Box 1, Folder 2, 12/09/1964. Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
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could work with77. Finally, even as the Sino-Soviet split sharpened, a period of relative 
détente with the Soviet Union following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 meant that the 
Johnson Administration still viewed the gap between the two states as a wedge to use 
against the Chinese. Throughout the major part of the Johnson Administration, these 
concerns manifested themselves in the form of public hostility to China’s nuclear 
ambitions, a campaign to deny it admission to international bodies such as the United 
Nations and restricting trade between it and America’s European partners. America also 
allowed the Nationalist Government of Taiwan to at least entertain ambitions of 
conducting military operations against the Mainland and its nuclear facilities with 
American help, even as the U.S. evaded any concrete military actions.78  
The discussion so far paints a portrait of a relatively uncompromising policy of 
Active Rollback followed by the Johnson Administration against the Chinese nuclear 
program due to concerns about Strategic Liability. However, there was another opposing 
dynamic to this issue which played out primarily in debates within the Administration 
and led to discreet but intermittent conciliatory signals emanating from the Johnson 
Administration to China. It may be tempting to brush off these signals as inconsequential 
based on the public record of hostility and the escalating shadow war between the U.S. 
and China in Vietnam. In fact, with few exceptions (Goh, 2004), much of the scholarly 
                                                 
77 Even administration officials who were otherwise in the vanguard of initiatives  towards China, such as 
Alfred Jenkins, “China watcher” in the State Department under Secretary of State Dean Rusk, professed 
uncertainty about the possibility of reciprocal actions by the Chinese government, given the chaos 
enveloping it. Source: Jenkins, Alfred “Memorandum for Mr. Rostow”, 08/20/1967, National Security File, 
Country File, “China”, Box 241, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
78 Throughout the major part of the Johnson Administration, Republic of Taiwan emissaries would present 
and discuss detailed plans for attacking Communist targets on the mainland to White House officials.  
Source: National Security Files, Country Files, China, Boxes 241, 243, multiple Memoranda of meetings 





work cited above does just that. However, I believe that this duality is important not for 
what it did not prevent, but for the fact that this back-channel of moderation may have 
been the basis for the eventual de jure recognition of China’s nuclear weapon status by 
the U.S. (by virtue of the American ratification of the NPT), the foundation it laid for the 
Nixon opening to China and ultimately, America’s strategic acquiescence with China’s 
nuclear program in the form of the Sino-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement under 
President Reagan. 
The origins of this dual-natured policy can be traced back to the realization in the 
Gilpatric Committee that a global non-proliferation agreement could only work with at 
least the tacit acquiescence of China. An illustration of this dichotomy was the fact that 
an early internal administration draft of the NPT listed China as a recognized nuclear 
power even though the same draft was edited to remove any mention of China when it 
was shared with Soviet delegates.79 Even as the United States developed military 
contingency plans to deal with the expanding Chinese involvement in Vietnam, it opened 
preliminary discussions with Chinese diplomats in Warsaw and worked to delicately 
convey to General Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government in Taiwan that it was not 
really interested in doing much more than listening to its plans for invading China.80 
During the throes of the Cultural Revolution, America maintained an ‘Open-Door’ policy 
towards China, and started to signal that it could offer a new relationship with the 
                                                 
79 Discussions regarding the problem of Chinese non-adherence to the NPT appear to accept the nuclear 
weapon status of China. The tone appears to indicate that if and when China signs the NPT (perhaps on 
developing more friendly relations with the U.S. Draft NPT document explicitly refers to "People's 
Republic of China" as a "Nuclear Party". This version was not shown to the USSR. The version shown to 
the USSR omits mention of China. Source: Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 2, Folder 1, Problem 
3, Value and Feasibility of NPT, Report from ACDA. Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Archives. 
80 The realization finally seems to have dawned on Taiwanese leaders in 1965, even as the Vietnam War 
expanded that the U.S. was no longer interested in the “overthrow” of the Communists on the mainland. 
See Taylor, Jay, “The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan”, 
Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 273. 
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Chinese that could help them deal with an increasingly hostile Soviet Union.81 Finally, 
the U.S. accepted China’s nuclear weapon status in 1968, even if that was because it was 
forced into a decision by the imminent signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. 
This duality presents an interesting challenge to my model. I predicted that the 
high degree of Strategic Liability would lead the U.S. to pursue an “Active Rollback” 
model, and it appears to have done so. However, the parallel but subdued tack of 
conciliation and a trend towards a “Weak Acceptance” of China’s nuclear program needs 
to be explained, and I will argue that it can be by taking recourse to factors that are 
already present in my model. American policy towards China’s nuclear program evolved 
during an exceptional period when the global nuclear non-proliferation framework was 
being negotiated. As such, the signing of the NPT was a singular event that influenced 
American policy towards China; an achievement for which Johnson was willing to 
sacrifice even his cherished Multilateral Force Initiative (MLF) that would have given 
West Germany and France a degree of joint ownership in a western nuclear force82. 
Given that getting the NPT into place would in theory have greatly reduced the Strategic 
Liability incurred by the United States, I argue that this structural change allowed the 
U.S. to become more amenable to accepting the Chinese nuclear program than it 
otherwise would have been. Essentially, the Johnson administration adopted a framework 
where a world-wide non-proliferation regime required the acceptance of a nuclear China. 
                                                 
81 Memo from Alfred Jenkins, ibid. as well as a State Department memo on policy initiatives to China 
suggested the liberalization of trade and travel linkages. However, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, a relative 
hardliner when it came to relations to China, continued to contradict his more moderate career subordinates 
by proposing a go-slow approach to China to avoid the appearance of caving to the Communists. Source: 
National Security File, Country File, China, Box 243, Memos 1 of 2. Vol. XII. Lyndon Johnson 
Presidential Library. 
82 The Gilpatric Committee came to that conclusion very quickly during its deliberations. See “Tentative 
thoughts on Nuclear Proliferation”, NSF Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 1, Folder 2, Doc. 5a, 
12/4/1964. Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library. 
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This ‘framing’ of the issue had the added merit of tying China policy to the NPT, a treaty 
that won wide support in Congress83.  This contributory effect is consistent with my 
overall causal framework. Another major factor that started the United States down the 
road of reconsidering policy towards China was the gradual realization that it could 
leverage the Sino-Soviet rivalry to eventually draw China closer to it and divide the 
Communist world. This ‘Common Threat perception’, which I have argued mitigates the 
Strategic Liability incurred by the United States, came to work to the advantage of the 
U.S.-China relationship. Lastly, as the Vietnam imbroglio deepened and the conflict there 
became increasingly unpopular domestically, there was a realization in the Johnson 
Administration that Chinese cooperation could help in the search for a solution there, 
further reducing the ‘primary conflict’ sub-variable’s contribution to Strategic Rivalry.84 
This strategic discourse was bolstered by ‘Revisionists’85 within the Johnson 
administration who had long argued for increased engagement with China as a way of 
boosting reformers within the Chinese communist party. This group of officials, 
sympathetic to China’s civilizational traditions and its quest to be recognized as a great 
power and authentic representative of the Chinese people, had long argued, with little 
success, for a policy of rapprochement towards the mainland86. However, the changing 
                                                 
83 Ratification of the NPT was approved by the U.S. Senate by an overwhelming 83-15 margin. 
84 A “Long Range Study” conducted by a Johnson appointed committee proposed a plan for a “Partial 
détente” in relations with China to mitigate the Vietnam conflict. Source: National Security File, Country 
File, China, Box 245, pp. 95, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. The U.S. also appears to 
have come to an understanding with China on certain red lines (to use contemporary terminology) in 
Vietnam to prevent direct conflict between the two. 
85 See Goh, Evelyn (2005, pp. 56) for an exposition on the role of ‘Revisionist’ officials such as Ed Rice,  
the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong, who argued for a relaxation in America’s isolationist policy 
towards the Chinese leadership so as to bolster the reformers there.  
86 Goh (ibid. 57) argues that the Revisionists were helped by changing public attitudes towards China and 
Johnson’s “toughness” in Vietnam policy, which helped him take a more conciliatory approach towards the 
Chinese. While these advocates of liberalization appear to have helped move forward the rapprochement 
process with China, the changes were extremely modest in practice. President Johnson articulated a 
modified policy of containment in July 1966, with a relaxation in sanctions on medical trade occurring in 
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geo-strategic circumstances in the latter part of the Johnson administration strengthened 
their hand.  
From an economic perspective, though trade ties between the two states remained 
practically absent, though there was some liberalization in the trade of essential foodstuff 
and pharmaceuticals87. The widening trade ties between Europe and China led to pressure 
on America officials to relax trade sanctions against companies that operated in the U.S.88  
The beginnings of an economic thaw had been long advocated by a minority of Johnson 
administration staffers who viewed it as a means to strengthen reformers in China and 
move the Chinese away from a uniformly anti-American position. It was also one of the 
harbingers of future liberalization in ties89. Taken together, these disparate elements 
clearly indicate a Johnson Administration slowly moving to reconcile its policy towards 
China and its nuclear weapons with changing perceptions of Strategic Liability, in a 
manner consistent with my model. The unique exigency of needing to complete and ratify 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forced the Administration to acknowledge China’s 
nuclear weapon status towards the end of the Johnson Administration in 1968. The 
possibility that the Sino-Soviet split could be leveraged to America’s benefit and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
April 1967 (Foot, ibid. 74), when the Sino-Soviet split had hardened and the Vietnam War was becoming 
increasingly unpopular. 
87 Once again, James Thompson on Johnson’s NSC Staff was at the forefront of this advocacy, arguing in 
an August 1966 memorandum for a relaxation in the trade embargo. This time, the administration appeared 
amenable to the change, with a “Long Range” study by the State and Defense Departments concurrently 
suggesting similar action.  This resulted in Johnson’s relaxation of pharmaceutical and medical trade with 
China. See Memorandum from James Thompson, August 4, 1966, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1964-68, Volume XXX China, Document 173 and Study prepared by the Special State-Defense Study 
Group, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXX, China, Document 161. 
88 See Rusk covering letter for State Department’s China Policy options memo.  Source: National Security 
File, Country File, China, Box 243, Memos 1 of 2. Vol. XII. Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library 
Archives. 
89 There were also hints of a split in the bipartisan domestic political coalition that favored a hard line 
towards China. Prominent Democrats such as Senator William Fulbright expressed opinions which 
suggested that a thaw in relations with China, if not imminent, was in both countries’ best interest. See 
Lumbers, ibid. pp.76 
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looming necessity of ending the Vietnam War - which necessitated discussion, if not 
cooperation with China - provided additional impetus. However, a major change in the 
U.S.-China relationship would occur only during the Nixon Administration, with the 
Sino-Soviet border conflict forcing the U.S. to decide where it stood between the two 
Communist powers. The origins of this change can be traced back to tentative initiatives 
within the Johnson Administration that, even if they did not result in concrete policy 
changes during most of Johnson’s term, certainly resulted in policy recommendations and 
discreet initiatives that were at variance with the public posture of the Administration, 
which was a policy of Active Rollback driven by perceptions of high Strategic Liability.  
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 In summary, my model accurately predicts the nature of the Johnson 
Administration’s policy response to China’s nuclear weapons program90. The portrait is 
somewhat more complicated by the fact that in addition to its public posture of Active 
Rollback against the Chinese nuclear program, the administration followed a parallel 
track of moderation and compromise in the latter part of its term, tentative and ephemeral 
though it was. This presents a challenge to my model, but I have argued that this dynamic 
can be explained by singular events such as the necessity to conclude a nuclear non-
                                                 
90 Another example of Active Rollback is the case of South Africa in the dying days of the Apartheid 
regime. the United States under Presidents Reagan and Bush adopted a policy of ‘Active Rollback’ towards 
the South African nuclear program in the late 1980s as it became increasingly clear that the Apartheid 
government would have to cede power to an African National Congress regime, which was suspected to 
have Communist sympathies. With harsh economic sanctions already in place due to the South African 
government’s race based discriminatory policies, the administration ratcheted up pressure on the South 
African government to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The heightened sense of Strategic Liability 
was as significant factor here, though the pre-existence of severe economic sanctions and the voluntary 
decision of the South African government to give up its nuclear weapons capability in 1989 makes the 
detection of a full basket of ‘Active Rollback’ measures difficult to accurately measure. See van Wyk, 
Martha S., “Sunset over Atomic Apartheid. United States-South African Nuclear Relations, 1983-91”, Cold 




proliferation agreement. Further, the effects of events such as the signing of the NPT, 
which led to the United States’ grudging concurrence with China’s nuclear program and 
reduced the Strategic Liability incurred by America, are within the scope of my model’s 
causal framework. In the next section, I examine other cases of High Strategic Liability 




Chapter 3:  Weak Acceptance  
I posit that a combination of low Strategic Liability and low Commercial value 
between the United States and the nuclear aspirant state will lead to the United States 
adopting a policy of ‘Weak Acceptance’ or tolerance of the state’s nuclear weaponization 
program. Fundamentally, I will show that the lack of significant strategic liability biases 
U.S. policy towards tolerating the aspirant’s nuclear weapons program, while the absence 
of significant commercial linkages or ‘commercial value’ in the bilateral relationship 
hinders a full-fledged Acquiescence or support of the aspirant’s nuclear industry. The end 
result is a ‘Weak Acceptance’ of the aspirant’s nuclear program, where the U.S. does 
little in the way of directly or indirectly aiding the aspirant’s nuclear ambitions, curbing 
any nuclear or strategic collaboration with it. Normative American preferences for non-
proliferation persist, leading to limited sanctions against the nuclear aspirant. However, 
the lack of a significant strategic liability will mean that broader strategic and economic 
actions that could actually deter the state’s nuclear weapon goals will remain 
unimplemented. It would appear that the lack of strategic liability and low commercial 
value would provide wide leeway to the Administration in choosing policy options. 
However, the U.S. has latent/baseline preferences for non-proliferation because of the 
inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the possibility - even in cases where liability is 
low - for the advent of a new nuclear power to send permissive signals to other states 
who may be more dangerous proliferators. This would imply that unless there are 
compelling reasons to embrace the nuclear capabilities of a state, the U.S. will retain a 
certain level of opposition. On the other hand, while the direct economic costs of 
imposing economic sanctions may be low in this quadrant, marshalling extensive 
sanctions can rupture the bilateral relationship with the nuclear aspirant imposes 
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compliance costs on both the U.S. and perhaps more importantly on U.S. allies that may 
have more extensive ties with the proliferating state This explains why the U.S. generally 
sticks with limited sanctions unless its strategic interests are threatened. 
In this chapter, I analyze cases of nuclear aspirants whose relationship with the 
United States fall into the low Strategic Liability/ Low Commercial Ties quadrant. The 
major case that I test here is of India in 1974 when the United States under Presidents 
Nixon and Ford grappled with the question of how best to respond to that country’s 
nuclear program and its ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ (PNE)91 on May 18, 1974. Even 
though evidence indicates that India had intended the nuclear test as a technology 
demonstrator rather than as the starting point towards full-fledged weaponization, the 
archival record shows that the administrations of President Nixon and his successor, 
Gerald Ford, concluded that India had essentially developed and tested a nuclear weapon. 
I argue that the administrations of both of these Presidents, with essentially the same 
foreign policy team led by the powerful Henry Kissinger, virtually reconciled themselves 
to the idea that India would conduct further nuclear tests and become a nuclear weapon 
power. Importantly, their focus would be on making sure that India would not proliferate 
its nuclear know-how to other, less friendly powers. This specific difference between 
what the Indian government intended to do with the nuclear program after the PNE and 
what the United States concluded would happen is important because it speaks to the 
distinction between the actual policy intent of the nuclear aspirant and the intent as 
perceived by the United States.  Since the scope of this dissertation is on the latter, the 
                                                 
91 As a supporting or ‘shadow’ case, I briefly examine China in the same period when it was expanding its 
nuclear weapon capabilities, because of the parallels it offers to the Indian case from the standpoint of my 
independent variables - even though the specific circumstances of China were notably different from that of 
India during the same period. 
 
 68 
Indian case is worth addressing and testing in detail. The decision by India twenty-eight 
years later to conduct nuclear tests and declare itself a nuclear weapons power in May 
1998, and the ultimately limited American reaction then, offer parallels that support my 
argument. In the instance of the Indian PNE in 1974, I will show that the United States 
reacted mildly, imposing weak and limited sanctions against India. While restricting 
cooperation with the Indian nuclear program, the United States nevertheless focused on 
improving ties with India and refrained from taking any broad coercive economic or 
military measures to try and influence India’s nuclear calculus. The Nixon and Ford 
administrations signaled tacit acceptance of an Indian nuclear weapons capability, even 
while remonstrating with India about the inadvisability of such an eventuality. I argue 
that structural conditions in the mid-1970s reduced the strategic liability that would 
otherwise have induced American administrations to pursue a more aggressive strategy 
towards India’s nuclear program. On the commercial front, ties between the United States 
and India were extremely abridged, with the Indian economy oriented towards domestic 
‘self-sufficiency’, limiting investment and trade ties between the two states. During this 
period, India was still a recipient of large amounts of aid from the United States, and 
deliberations in the U.S. Executive branch on matters related to the Indian economy were 
primarily centered on aid related programs, rather than on bilateral trade or investment 
issues. I argue that this lack of strong commercial incentives, or low commercial value, 
dampened any impetus for the Nixon and Ford administrations to embrace India’s nuclear 
program, directly or indirectly. Instead, I argue, the U.S. policy remained one of ‘Weak 
Acceptance’ of India’s de facto nuclear weapon capabilities. In this chapter, I first use 
archival material from the Nixon and Ford administrations to support the location of the 
U.S.-India relationship in the Low Strategic Liability / Low Commercial Value quadrant. 
Next, I use these archival sources and secondary material to show that the Executive 
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pursued policies towards India’s nuclear program that were consistent with ‘Weak 
Acceptance’, as defined in Chapter 1, and did so for reasons of low strategic liability and 
commercial value. I will show that America’s policy towards India in the crucial years 
leading up to the nuclear test in 1974 were significantly influenced by the policy 
preferences of actors in the White House, including President Nixon and his powerful 
National Security Advisor, later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. These preferences 
were often at odds with those of the bureaucracy and Congress. When the U.S. tilted 
towards Pakistan in the 1971 war, it was over the objections of the State Department and 
many members of Congress. Likewise, when India conducted its nuclear test in 1974, 
Kissinger was instrumental in fashioning a much more moderate response than that 
envisioned by non-proliferation advocates in the bureaucracy and in Congress. The 
unusual mid-term transition in administrations in August 1974 as a result of the 
resignation of President Nixon and his replacement by Gerald Ford meant that Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger, trusted advisor to both, dominated American foreign policy 
towards India’s nuclear program, allowing us to treat both administrations as essentially 
the same entity for the purposes of our analysis. While the majority of my emphasis will 
be on the American response to India’s nuclear program in 1974, I will briefly examine 
the Clinton administration’s response to India’s nuclear test in 1998 which, I will argue, 
proceeded in very similar fashion to the Nixon-Ford administrations’ in 1974, and was 
informed by both the original assessment of the Nixon-Ford administrations and many of 
the same set of considerations that those administrations took into account.  
The following section details the background of the Indian case. Following that, 
using evidence from deliberations within the Nixon and Ford administrations, I construct 
the basis for classifying this as a case of low strategic liability and low commercial value. 
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Next, using evidence from the same sources, I test the validity of my hypothesis that the 
United States pursued a policy of Weak Acceptance towards the nuclear program of India 
in the mid-1970s. Finally, I briefly review contemporary evidence from 1998 to show 
that the U.S. under President Clinton adopted a similar policy of Weak Acceptance when 
India declared itself a nuclear weapon power, adopting tepid and short-lived sanctions, 
which were rolled back quickly for the most part as the Administration attempted to 
convince India to revert to its previous policy of maintaining an undeclared nuclear 
weapon capability. 
3.1 BACKGROUND – NIXON, FORD AND INDIA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
The years leading up to India’s ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)’ in 1974 had 
seen some of the lowest points in the U.S.-India relationship. The 1971 India-Pakistan 
war which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh saw the U.S. ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan92, a 
strategic maneuver that set back U.S.-India relations for most of the remainder of the 
Nixon administration.  Part of the reason for this tilt was the importance of Pakistan to 
Nixon’s attempts at reconciliation with China, for which Pakistan acted as a back-channel 
conduit. Though the conflict ended on India’s terms, the American intervention in the 
form of uncritical support of the Pakistani position in international fora and the stationing 
of an American aircraft carrier off the Bay of Bengal weakened Washington’s standing in 
India, a country which was viewed favorably by a significant portion of the American 
political elite in spite of its non-aligned status in the cold war. As India moved closer to 
the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, the U.S. set about mending 
fences with the Indian government led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The relationship 
                                                 
92 Kux, Dennis “Estranged Democracies”, National Defense University Press, 1992, pp. 306. The tilt was 
driven in large part due to the perception by Richard Nixon of the Bangladesh crisis as a theater in the Cold 
War, whereas India perceived this as a South Asian conflict. 
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between the two countries was strained by Washington’s sale of arms to Pakistan and 
India’s continuing policy of non-alignment, which in practice placed it closer to the 
Soviet Union than to the United States when it came to conflicts between the two cold 
war superpowers. However, there was a perception that the Nixon administration had 
overly strained its ties with a fellow democracy. The American government had been a 
supporter of India’s nuclear energy program, and continued to supply heavy water and 
fuel for India’s research reactors even after India opted not to join the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which had come into effect only a few years earlier.  On the 
economic front, India was still dependent on American food aid, which, while greatly 
reduced from its peak in the 1960s, was still a significant factor in U.S.-India relations at 
a time when the ‘Green revolution’ that gave India self-sufficiency in food production 
had not yet taken place. Trade between the two countries was weak, with India 
embarking on a path of heavy state involvement in the economy and significantly 
curtailing foreign investment.  
India’s nuclear program had a long history going back to before independence 
from Great Britain. It had developed under the direct supervision of India’s first Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and had remained under total civilian control93. By 1966, 
incoming Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had inherited a nuclear program that was 
relatively well developed, with Indian scientists mastering many of the aspects of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. Unlike many other nuclear powers that had taken the leap towards 
weaponizing their nuclear programs, India continued to resist doing so. Further, India’s 
history of non-violent agitation and perceived capacity for moral suasion added a unique 
                                                 
93 Perkovich, George “India’s Nuclear Bomb”, University of California Press, 1999, pp. 33. India’s nuclear 
program was, from the outset, controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office, working directly with the leaders 
of India’s nuclear program, such as its founder, Homi Bhabha. 
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moral dimension94 which Indian Prime Ministers felt constrained by as they forswore a 
nuclear weapons program. Nevertheless, India’s progress towards the ability to exercise 
the ‘nuclear option’ was something that American Presidents since at least Johnson paid 
close attention to. At the time the NPT was being negotiated, analysts and principals in 
the Johnson administration judged India to be the most likely state95 to cross the nuclear 
threshold, because of its tense relationship with China and the lack of a security 
guarantee from either of the superpowers against Chinese aggression. The fact that India 
rejected the NPT as legitimizing an unfair division between the nuclear haves and have-
nots, further led credence to this possibility. 
This is the historical background against which I analyze the American response 
to India’s first nuclear test. While there is a significant amount of literature on the long-
term evolution of the U.S.’ non-proliferation policy following India’s PNE, relatively 
little analysis has been done on the aftermath of the test and the Nixon and Ford 
administrations’ reaction to it, and their rationale for these policies. I focus my study on 
the strategic and economic aspects of the U.S.-India relationship in the periods prior to 
and following India’s first nuclear test, and their bearing on American policy towards the 
Indian nuclear program. This analysis is complicated by the fact that the United States 
underwent an abrupt Presidential transition in the aftermath of India’s nuclear test. 
However, this is mitigated by the fact that the Nixon’s foreign policy apparatus led by the 
formidable Henry Kissinger, transferred over to the Ford administration. I look to 
                                                 
94 Perkovich, George, ibid. pp. 34. India’s legacy of non-violent protest dating back to the Independence 
struggle was a powerful factor, if not always a deciding one, in foreign and defense policy. 
95 “Problems of Nuclear Proliferation”, working paper, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (Gilpatric 
Committee), Box 1, Problem 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library Archives. Also see “National 
Intelligence Estimate Number 4-2-64, “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next 
Decade”,” October 21, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA Mandatory Review 




evidence primarily from the Nixon and Ford archives, to establish whether (and how 
much) these Presidents and their advisors considered the Strategic Liability of India’s 
nuclear program, and the Commercial Value of this relationship, as defined in Chapter 1,  
into account as they framed a response to India’s nuclear test. I use this contemporary 
data to test my hypothesis that these two independent variables provided the causal 
framework for my posited policy response of ‘Weak Acceptance’ that was eventually 
adopted. 
3.2 CODING U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA’S STRATEGIC LIABILITY– 1974 
I operationalize the first of my two independent variables, Strategic Liability, by 
analyzing and coding each of its constituent sub-variables – Primary Conflict, Secondary 
Conflict, Regime Instability and Common threat perception. I have argued previously 
that an elevated level of Primary Conflict, Secondary Conflict or Regime Instability will 
result in a Coding of the Strategic Liability variable as ‘High’.  
Taking the first, Primary Conflict into consideration, the U.S. and India, though 
not cold-war allies, shared several commonalities that eased ties between the two. Both 
shared a tradition of democracy, the English language and the experience of British rule. 
India’s non-violent transition from British rule and its (rare) example of a successful 
transition from colonialism to liberal democracy fascinated the American elite, and the 
Indian political and economic elites were equally enamored by America’s technical 
advances and its status as the epicenter of intellectual and scientific creativity. Even 
during the low points of the Bangladesh war there was no serious suggestion that the U.S. 
would intervene militarily to aid Pakistan96. The decision by the Nixon administration to 
                                                 
96 The closest the two states came to a confrontation was in the dying days of the Indo-Pakistan war over 
Bangladesh, when the U.S. sent an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate American 
personnel in East Pakistan, but interpreted in India as a threat, which was in line with Nixon and 
Kissinger’s intent. See FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 
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side with Pakistan in that conflict actually highlighted the support India had among the 
political elite in the U.S. There was a split between the administration on one side and 
much of Congress and the State Department bureaucracy; the latter two viewing the 
Indian position much more favorably97.  I code the Primary Conflict variable as ‘Low’, to 
indicate the absence of a direct conflict between the United States and India. 
 
Secondary Conflict – The secondary conflict sub-variable indicates the existence 
of an ongoing conflict between the nuclear aspirant and other states that had the potential 
to either develop nuclear weapons of their own or significantly enhance such a capability. 
At the beginning of 1974, India’s primary geostrategic rivalries were with Pakistan and 
China. Of the two, Pakistan was a major ally of the U.S. and a catalyst in the U.S.-China 
rapprochement that had started with Kissinger and Nixon’s visit to China in 1971. In fact, 
one of the reasons attributed for Nixon’s siding with Pakistan in the 1971 conflict was to 
preserve the Pakistani back-channel to China.98 By 1974 however, the relationship with 
China had matured enough to obviate the need for an intermediary, reducing one 
incentive to prioritize one state over the other. Further, India and Pakistan had signed the 
landmark Shimla Accord, which created a framework for bilateral negotiations to solve 
outstanding issues. While these developments mitigated the potential for an immediate 
                                                                                                                                                 
165, where Nixon and Kissinger discuss the plan to send the U.S.S. Enterprise carrier battle group to the 
Bay of Bengal and encourage the Chinese in parallel to make threatening moves on the border with India – 
all towards getting India to slow down or stop advancing further into Pakistan. 
97 The idea that the State Department Bureaucracy and Congress were much more sympathetic to India 
than merited was a recurrent theme of Nixon and Kissinger’s discussions in 1971. Kissinger and Nixon 
raged against India and the fact that prominent Democrats such as Senator Edward Kennedy, and even their 
own Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating were sympathetic to the Indian cause in the Bangladesh War. 
See FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, Document 150. 
98 Pakistani President Yahya Khan was instrumental in facilitating the back-channel communications 
between the U.S. and China. This was one of the reasons that the U.S. was careful not to criticize Pakistani 
actions in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in the run-up to the war with India. See Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Document 1. 
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conflagration, which would have made any significant development in India’s nuclear 
capabilities dangerous from Washington’s perspective, there still remained the question 
of whether Pakistan would be provoked by an Indian nuclear test into starting its own. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it would appear evident that this would have been a major 
concern for the Nixon and Ford administrations, given Pakistan’s security –centric 
preoccupations with India.99 However, ex-post evidence from the archival record 
indicates that to the extent Nixon/Ford advisors were concerned about the impact of 
India’s nuclear test on Pakistan, it tended to be a distant concern.100 This is 
understandable when viewed from the standpoint of a contemporary observer. In 1974, 
Pakistan was a much diminished version of its former self, having lost about half its 
territory and a majority of its population to the newly created state of Bangladesh, a clear 
military defeat at the hands of its arch-enemy and facing a long decade of rebuilding. 
Washington played a major role in this rebuilding as a principal supplier of arms and 
ammunition to the country. As the principal international supporter of Pakistan, there was 
also a belief that the United States had the ability to influence a future Pakistani nuclear 
pursuit.101 Therefore, one can postulate that for all of these reasons, the U.S. viewed the 
                                                 
99 The American Embassy in Pakistan reported that Pakistan was requesting security guarantees from 
‘major powers’ and a renewal of arms supplies from the U.S., following India’s nuclear tests in May 1974. 
See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–
1976, Document 167. 
100 The above mentioned Embassy cables from Pakistan were silent about the possibility that Pakistan 
might itself start a nuclear weapons program. This attitude was a piece with the assessment of the American 
strategic community. In a major CIA study on the prospects of further nuclear proliferation where each 
potential proliferator merited its own section, Pakistan was relegated to secondary status, with its nuclear 
capabilities deemed ‘inferior to India’ and ‘limited’, and a nuclear weapon capability deemed distant.  See 
Special National Intelligence Estimate 4-1-74, “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
August 23, 1074, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mandatory declassification review 
request; release by the CIA. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research 
Update #4, pp. 36. 
101 It was a longstanding American perception that Pakistan’s recourse to an Indian nuclear weapons 
capability would be to turn to the U.S. for psychological, material and political support with the implicit 
view that the U.S., as a provider of such assistance being in a position to shape the Pakistani reaction. This 
was the consensus view of the American intelligence community, going back to an Intelligence estimate 
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risk of India’s nuclear test having an aggravating effect on Pakistan as a manageable one, 
mitigating the Secondary conflict effect.  
The other major power on which India’s nuclear test could have an effect was 
China. By 1974, Sino-American relations were advanced enough to a point, where even if 
not an ally, China was viewed by Nixon as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union 
and an important future trade partner. China was also the country with which India had 
fought a border war in 1962 and maintained frosty relations since. China had come to 
develop strong ties with Pakistan following that war. China’s own nuclear program was, 
at that stage, significantly more advanced than India’s. Having fought a brief border war 
with the U.S.S.R in 1969, the orientation of China’s nuclear forces was towards a Soviet 
threat, rather than an Indian one, a factor recognized by actors in the Nixon 
administration102. While the United States had explicitly communicated to India that it 
would not be able to come to its aid in a conflict with China – unlike in the case of the 
1962 border conflict – the chances of such a conflict had diminished by 1974. The 
decision by the Chinese not to intervene on the side of Pakistan, in spite of entreaties by 
Pakistani President Yahya Khan, solidified the impression that China was not interested 
in renewed Sino-Indian confrontation. Given this constellation of factors, it was unlikely 
that an Indian nuclear test would lead to any major repercussion on the Chinese nuclear 
program – a judgment made by the United States as well. The saliency of the Secondary 
conflict variable in my framework is that if elevated, it creates the potential for nuclear 
proliferation in states that are involved in an ongoing conflict with the aspirant, which in 
                                                                                                                                                 
prepared in August 1972, when Pakistan was still recovering from the Bangladesh conflict. “Special 
National Intelligence Estimate 31-72, “Indian Nuclear Developments and their Likely Implications”,” 
August 03, 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume E-7, Documents on South 
Asia, 1969-1972, Document 298, pp. 11. 
102 The U.S. judged that China would “...feel little concern about Indian nuclear developments…” because 
its margin of superiority over India’s capabilities would be overwhelming and its principal concern would 
be the USSR, not India. Ibid. 11. 
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turn aggravates the strategic liability of the United States. As the above analysis shows, 
‘hot’ conflicts between India and Pakistan on one hand, and India and China on the other 
had cooled down, with hints of rapprochement in the former case. I argue that this 
mitigated the secondary conflict effect, which I code as ‘Low’ for this case. 
Regime Instability: The third component of Strategic Liability is Regime 
Instability. My model postulates that if the U.S. perceives the regime of the nuclear 
aspirant to be unstable and at risk of collapse this aggravates its strategic liability because 
of the perceived risk that the nuclear weapons of the aspirant state fall into the hands of 
‘bad actors’. In the Indian case however, the fact that the nuclear program was under the 
complete control103 of the civilian leadership of a stable democracy, to a level 
unprecedented in other states, meant that this was not a substantive factor. Even as India 
was rocked by famine and political unrest through 1974, the possibility that there would 
be a fundamental change in the integrity of India’s nuclear program was considered 
remote.104 Therefore, I code Regime instability ‘low’. 
Common Threat perception: The final component of strategic liability is a 
‘Common Threat Perception’. In contrast to the previous three components, the existence 
of a common threat is a mitigating factor in strategic liability, because it creates the basis 
for the U.S. to leverage the military capabilities of the nuclear aspirant - which would 
presumably be fortified by the addition of a nuclear element- against the common threat. 
In the Indian case however, the post-1971 removal of China from the list of American 
                                                 
103 One of the unique features of India’s nuclear explosive program was the limited role of the military. 
Indeed, the military services were rarely consulted about the usefulness or otherwise of a nuclear weapon 
capability in the years leading up to the 1974 PNE. See Perkovich, pp. 177. Ibid. 
104 Even while painting a gloomy picture of India’s economic and political prospects for the next decade, a 
CIA analysis of India’s long-term prospects released in June 1974 did not posit any scenarios where India’s 
nuclear weapons would present a danger to its neighbors or countries beyond South Asia. See Foreign 




enemies meant that the only plausible common threat disappeared from America’s 
strategic calculus. This was in stark contrast with the situation during the Johnson 
administration when administration officials contemplated the possibility of aiding the 
(potential) Indian nuclear weapons program as a hedge against the Chinese one. This 
reversal meant that that there was no real strategic imperative to actively encourage or 
even indirectly assist India’s nuclear program in 1974. I therefore code the Common 
threat perception sub-variable ‘low’. 
In sum, the three main aggravating components of strategic liability – Primary 
conflict, secondary conflict and regime instability – are all coded ‘low’, which indicates 
that the Strategic liability of India’s nuclear program to the U.S. in 1974 was ‘low’. The 
common threat perception is low, which meant that even in the absence of significant 
strategic liability, there was no impetus for the United States to embrace India’s nuclear 
program. 
3.3 CODING COMMERCIAL VALUE IN THE U.S.-INDIA RELATIONSHIP- 1974 
While united in their form of government, India and the United States in 1974 
followed extremely divergent economic strategies. Whereas the U.S. was and continues 
to be the leading capitalist state in the world, in the 1970s, India was embarking on a 
program of nationalization that increased the already significant socialist orientation of 
the economy. Already anemic foreign investment was curtailed as a result and this meant 
that there was very little in the way of an India trade lobby in the United States105. 
American allies such as Great Britain, whose companies had engaged in business in India 
                                                 
105 Kissinger’s view was that with India, “…the economics are not so fruitful”. This was also the view of 
other officials in the State Department who were part of the India Joint Commission tasked with improving 
economic, cultural and scientific ties. See ‘Foreign Relations of the United States’, 1969–1976. Volume E–
8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 186. 
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during colonial rule, were significantly more invested in an economic relationship with 
the latter106. Starting with the PL-480 program under Lyndon Johnson, the United States 
had been a major donor of food-aid and other development assistance to India, and this 
continued under Nixon. Discussions on India related economic policies in the Nixon and 
Ford administrations centered on the topics of aid and food technology assistance rather 
than access to markets or export/import policy.107 There was a modest amount of 
government to government arms sales to India, which was controversial due to the U.S. 
insistence on an ‘even-handed’ approach of simultaneously selling weapons to 
Pakistan108. Consequently, commercial ties between the two states were anemic, with no 
Indian ‘trade lobby’ in Congress or elsewhere. This lack of significant commercial ties 
implies that the Commercial value of the U.S.-India relationship in 1974 can be coded 
‘low’.  
In summary, the U.S.-India relationship at the time of India’s nuclear test in 1974 
was clearly in the Low Strategic Liability/ Low Commercial Value quadrant. The state 
most affected by India’s nuclear test, Pakistan, was judged too weak to pursue a serious 
                                                 
106 India had a trade surplus with Britain in 1974, and this year also saw India and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) sign a Commercial Cooperation Agreement with heavy British support. This 
dramatically expanded trade between India and Europe, with Britain at the vanguard. See “The European 
Union and India. Rhetoric or Meaningful Partnership” Winand, Pascaline et al, Edward Elgar Publications, 
2015, pp. 138, 343. 
107 Clear evidence of this can be seen from transcripts of conversations between Indian Ambassadors and 
the White House in 1974 where the primary economic topics discussed were aid and debt relief, with India 
expressing the desire to wean itself off aid from the West but still needing a significant amount in the short-
term. See Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Indian 
Ambassador T.N. Kaul, for an illustrative example. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 172. 
108 While India and the U.S. attempted to keep relations on an upward trajectory, the resumption of arms 
sales to Pakistan in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests led to the cancelation of the visit of the Indian 
Foreign Minister. While India was viewed as the stronger power in South Asia militarily, its sclerotic 
economy meant that economic repercussions were a non-factor when the U.S. decided to take an ‘even-
handed’ approach between India and Pakistan in the 1970s. ‘Even-handedness’ is evident in President 
Ford’s memo authorizing the sale of arms to ‘Pakistan and India’. See National Security Decision 
Memorandum 289, March 24, 1975, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Files, 
Presidential Country Files for South Asia, Box 27, Pakistan (5). 
 
 80 
nuclear weapon program. There was no immediate danger of proliferation among the 
most likely candidates with a majority of the potential nuclear proliferators acceding to 
the NPT or in the process of doing so.  These factors and the relatively placid relationship 
between the U.S. and India at this time meant that the perceived strategic liability for the 
United States due to India’s nuclear program was low. The state directed orientation of 
India’s economy meant that trade ties between the two states were limited resulting in the 
U.S. perceiving the commercial value of the relationship to be low.   
3.4 THE EVIDENCE – DID THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A POLICY OF WEAK ACCEPTANCE 
TOWARDS INDIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM?  
The Nixon and Ford administrations’ policy towards India’s nuclear program is 
the primary focus of this section. I will seek to answer the following question 
- Did the U.S. follow a policy of weak acceptance towards India’s nuclear 
program in the lead up to and in the aftermath of the ‘Peaceful Nuclear Test’ 
in 1974 
I address the evidence starting with key events in the U.S.-India relationship under 
President Nixon. The Indian nuclear program was under heavy scrutiny by the United 
States at least since the time of Lyndon Johnson. A significant portion of the American 
debate around the finalization and ratification of the NPT was around the impact it would 
have on India, which had gone from being a staunch votary of international efforts to 
curb the development of nuclear weapons to a vocal critic of the NPT as a discriminatory 
device.109 Johnson administration officials concluded that the lack of a credible security 
                                                 
109 India’s Foreign Minister M.C. Chagla framed India’s long-standing position that the NPT should be 
non-discriminatory and was not acceptable to India in its current form during debates in the Indian 
Parliament at the time of the NPT’s ratification in 1968. See “Rajya Sabha Q&A on the India's Objectives 
Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” May 30, 1967, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (ISDA), Rajya Sabha Q&A 
Documents. This continued to be India’s position following the PNE in 1974. 
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guarantee to India against Chinese aggression made an Indian nuclear weapons program 
likely.110 The fact that no such development occurred in the subsequent years of the 
Johnson administration allowed the issue to recede somewhat from the strategic 
discourse. 
Significant interest in India’s nuclear program among the American strategic and 
intelligence community picked up again following the India-Pakistan war over 
Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in December 1971. The war brought about a significant 
strategic realignment for India through its signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which enjoined the two states to ‘consult’, when one 
of them faced aggression.111 The conflict set the tone of the relationship between the 
Nixon administration and India. As a leader in the non-aligned movement, India had a 
mercurial relationship with the United States characterized by clashes in international 
fora on issues such as the Vietnam war, and cooperation and military support (by the 
United States) during India’s war with China in 1962. India’s chief strategic rival at the 
time, Pakistan, had cast its lot with the United States in the Cold War, and was a member 
of the SEATO and CENTO military alliances against the Soviet Union. In spite of this, 
the U.S. had previously adopted an equidistant approach between the two states in prior 
conflicts. However, the 1971 conflict occurred at a time when the U.S. was approaching a 
rapprochement with China, and Pakistan was acting as the intermediary inn this effort. 
(The Indo-Soviet pact was seen by some scholars as a hedge against the de-commitment 
                                                 
110 An NIE after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964 concluded that India would be the only state to 
develop nuclear weapons in the next ten years. See “National Intelligence Estimate Number 4-2-64, 
“Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade”,” October 21, 1964, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA Mandatory Review Appeal. Obtained and contributed by 
William Burr.  
111 The treaty said that the two states would consult each other in the event of a crisis and would abstain 
from supporting a third party state against the other. See Kux, Dennis, pp. 295. Ibid. 
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of the U.S. to support India in any potential conflict with China112). This, and the 
increased U.S.-Soviet, Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Asia affected the 
strategic calculus for Nixon113, who decided to prioritize the political unity of Pakistan 
over the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan. A distinct chill descended on relations 
between India and the U.S. as the Nixon administration sided with Pakistan at the United 
Nations and cast India as the guilty party in the conflict. While the war ended on India’s 
terms with the creation of Bangladesh, the split with the United States and the continuing 
tension with China increased the probability (as perceived by the American intelligence 
community), that India would exercise the nuclear option and conduct nuclear tests as a 
harbinger of weaponization. As a spate of classified intelligence analyses114 debated the 
likelihood of Indian nuclear tests, Kissinger and Nixon appear to have ignored the 
possibility that India might become the next nuclear weapon power115. Remarkably, as 
                                                 
112 Henry Kissinger is reported to have told the Indian ambassador to the United States that the United 
States would be unable to come to the aid of India in the event of a Chinese intervention in an India-
Pakistan conflict, though Kissinger disputed this characterization after the end of the war, saying that this 
statement was limited to situations where India had initiated a conflict, which given that there was 
disagreement between India and the U.S as to who had ‘initiated’ the Bangladesh conflict, was probably 
not a reassuring clarification. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, 
Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 225 for Kissinger’s conversation with Indian 
Ambassador Jha on this topic. 
113 Nixon and Kissinger perceived the crisis between India and Pakistan over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) 
as another theater in the Cold War, going as far as discussing the cancelation of Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union if it did not ‘restrain’ India, even though there was little evidence to 
suggest that the crisis was instigated by the USSR or that it played a role in restraining India strategically 
once the conflict broke out. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976Volume E–7, 
Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 166 for Nixon and Kissinger’s discussions on this 
subject. 
114 Following the Bangladesh war, the U.S. State Department’s Intelligence estimate concluded that there 
was a strong possibility of India going nuclear. This was followed by other reports that speculated about the 
possibility and timing of an Indian nuclear test. See “State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?' January 14, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, National Archives, Record, Group 59, SN 70-73, Def. 18-8 India. Obtained and contributed by 
William Burr and included in NPIHP, Research Update #4.  
115 Kissinger requested that Nixon order a National Intelligence Estimate on India’s potential nuclear 
weapon program, but there was no recorded discussion between Kissinger, Nixon or any of their Indian 
counterparts, See “Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, “Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian 
Nuclear Test,” with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy,” July 04, 1972, History and Public 
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these alleged Indian preparations for a nuclear test were underway in 1972-73, the U.S. 
set about repairing its ties with India, with Kissinger and Nixon resuming high-level 
engagements with India and appointing a ‘pro-India’ liberal Democrat, Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan to the post of Ambassador to India. Moynihan proved to be a moderating 
influence on Nixon’s India policy, and was at the helm at the American embassy in New 
Delhi during India’s nuclear tests in May 1974. Moynihan was instrumental in resolving 
the question of Indian debt repayments that had stymied efforts to move relations 
between the two states beyond a donor-recipient status116. Several scholars have argued 
that the subject of nuclear proliferation was in itself not a significant priority for the 
Nixon administration, due to which India’s nuclear program did not merit much 
attention.117 However, the Nixon administration and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
in particular were not blind to the strategic implications of nuclear weapons, having 
discussed their utility extensively as scholars have shown118, which implies that if they 
underplayed India’s developing nuclear weapon capability, it was not simply because of 
indifference to the possibilities of such an eventuality. Concerns within the U.S. State 
Department that India would test nuclear weapons diminished in 1973 as the two 
countries worked to resolve major stumbling blocks in their relationship, such as Indian 
                                                                                                                                                 
Policy Program, Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 
box H-192, NSSM-156. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research 
Update #4. 
116 Nixon’s appointment of Senator Moynihan, a fierce critic of American policy towards India during the 
Bangladesh war, as Ambassador to India in January 1973 could not but have been seen by India as a signal 
of rapprochement following the tumult of 1971. Moynihan convinced Nixon to settle the question of U.S. 
owned Indian currency debt repayments on terms that were favorable to India. See Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 154. 
117 Burr, Aaron, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 367. 
118 Nixon’s attitude towards nuclear weapons seems to have been his willingness to treat them like any 
other ‘regular’ weapon of war insofar as his willingness to contemplate using them. See Gavin, Francis J, 
“Nuclear Nixon” in ‘Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age’, Cornell 
University Press, 2012, pp. 116.  
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repayment of debt to the United States and American arms sales to Pakistan. Despite the 
early predictions of a nuclear test by India in the aftermath of the 1971 war with Pakistan, 
the issue had gradually receded from the American intelligence community’s view too as 
relations between the two states gradually warmed. The extent of its unimportance can be 
gauged by the fact that the nuclear issue was not brought up119 in a wide ranging meeting 
in April 1974 - just a month prior to the nuclear test - between the Indian Foreign 
Minister and Henry Kissinger, who had by then become the Secretary of State in a Nixon 
administration weakened by the Watergate scandal. 
The May 18, 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Test’ or PNE conducted in the Pokhran 
region of Thar Desert of Rajasthan caught the United States by surprise. Informed about 
the nuclear test by India, one of the first actions of the U.S. was to convey its 
understanding that there was no distinguishing a peaceful nuclear test from the test of a 
nuclear weapon, 120 illustrating that the Nixon administration viewed this as the start of 
an Indian weapons test program. However, in an intervention from Damascus that set the 
stage for the subsequent American response to India’s nuclear program, Kissinger 
personally modified the initially strong State Department response to the test, substituting 
it for a milder version121. While other countries such as Canada, which had supplied the 
                                                 
119 Conversation between Kissinger and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on April 15, 1974. See 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976.Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, 
Document 160.  
120 This was the response of U.S. Charge d ’affairs in the American Embassy in New Delhi Schneider  to 
Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh when informed of the nuclear test. Telegram 6591- From the 
Embassy in India to the Department of State and the Embassy in the United Kingdom, May 18, 1974. See 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, 
Document 161.  
121 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–




reactor from which the plutonium used in the test was produced, reacted much more 
harshly to the test, the United States, which also supplied the heavy water used in the 
very same reactor, restricted its rebuke to more general concerns about the effects of the 
Indian nuclear test to global non-proliferation efforts. Indeed, in the months following the 
Indian PNE the United States policy appeared to treat the Indian nuclear weapon program 
as a fait accompli. In the turmoil that followed the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s exit 
from the White House, Henry Kissinger was the face and power behind both the 
incoming and outgoing administrations’ foreign policy operations. In his meetings with 
Indian officials following the nuclear tests, he essentially conceded the point that India’s 
nuclear weapon capability could not be undone and that the U.S. was more interested in 
making sure that further proliferation did not occur122. He went so far as to assure Indian 
officials directly that it would be treated as a nuclear (weapon) power in upcoming 
negotiations on non-proliferation123. In public however, there were no hints that it was 
prepared to accept an India with nuclear weapons. While the Executive branch adopted a 
somewhat accommodative policy towards India, there was a furious reaction in the 
American Congress, with non-proliferation advocates pressing for sanctions against 
India. One concrete example of this divergence between the Executive and Congress was 
the ‘Long’ amendment, which passed Congress and mandated that the U.S. vote against 
any development aid to India from the World Bank. Ultimately however, the 
administration (now under President Ford after Nixon’s resignation) was able to mitigate 
                                                 
122 Meeting the Indian Foreign Secretary in August 1974 after the Indian nuclear test, the first high level 
engagement on U.S. soil, Kissinger said that the U.S. would be treating India as a nuclear (weapon) power 
while discussing nuclear proliferation with other states on a general proliferation policy. He suggested a 
‘private conversation’ to discuss means of preventing further proliferation (by India) to third parties.  See 
‘Foreign Relations of the United States’, 1969-1976 Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976, 
Document 171.  
123 Kissinger specifically said that in his “…discussions with other countries on this, India would be 
treated as a nuclear power.” Ibid. 
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the effects of this mandate by ensuring that the effects of the American vote at the World 
Bank remained symbolic rather than substantial124. The U.S. attempted to keep relations 
with India on the mend in other ways, increasing aid assistance to India in the aftermath 
of the nuclear tests. All of the actions were consistent with an administration that 
appeared to tacitly accept the Indian nuclear program, regardless of the opposition among 
many in Congress. 
The main sticking point in U.S. India relations following the PNE was a matter 
directly related to the nuclear test itself, and that was the supply of heavy water to the 
Tarapur nuclear power plant125. While this became a focus and target of non-proliferation 
activists in the United States, the U.S. continued to ship fuel to the plant, including in the 
months immediately following the nuclear test, with an agreement that India would only 
use the output for peaceful purposes. 126 However, the nuclear test would continue to 
hamper the supply of fuel to Tarapur, with deliveries held up or deferred127 over disputes 
                                                 
124 One way the Ford Administration did this was by abstaining from voting when requests for India came 
up in the World Bank and IMF. It also did not lobby against India with other voting members. Both of 
these actions, specifically alluded to by Ford in his conversations with the Indian Foreign Minister, were 
part of the Administration’s policy of soft-pedalling efforts to punish India’s nuclear program. See Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 
175. 
125 When the Indian nuclear test was conducted, the U.S. had denied that the heavy water supplied by it to 
the plant was used or played a role in any way in the development of the nuclear device that was tested by 
India in May 1974. American fuel supply to Tarapur continued to be a source of contention throughout the 
Ford administration and was a campaign issue during the Presidential election, where Jimmy Carter argued 
that Ford had been too soft on India. There was greater opposition to India’s nuclear program from 
Democrats than Republicans. See Kux, Dennis, ibid. 
126 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–
1976, Document 172, for an aide memoire from India agreeing to this stipulation. 
127 The question of whether India violated the terms of the India-U.S. agreement by using the processed 
fuel from Tarapur towards a ‘peaceful’ nuclear test was at the core of the disagreement. Later, the passage 
of the NNPA affected a ban on the supply of reactor fuel to states that had not signed the NPT. India 
protested that this was an illegal and retroactive violation of the India-U.S. agreement for Tarapur. See 
"Telegram No. 115, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," May 17, 1978, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL). XIX-J-1-j 
India, 1978, 62. Doboz, 60-5, 003496/1978. Obtained and translated for NPIHP by Balazs Szalonta for an account of 
this argument based on  conversation with the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Sethna 
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regarding its eventual use. Indeed, this episode displayed the divergent priorities of the 
Executive and Congress. The Nixon and Ford administrations viewed the issue of India’s 
nuclear program as a fait accompli128, and focused instead on repairing the relations 
damaged by the Bangladesh war. In Congress however, non-proliferation concerns were 
at the fore, leading to attempts to curtail any assistance to India. The Ford administration 
was able to resist this pressure in the interim, but fuel supply to Tarapur continued to 
remain a topic of controversy between the two states. Eventually, the U.S. under 
President Jimmy Carter would bar the supply of fuel to India in 1978 after the passage of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, or NNPA, which prevented the supply of fuel or other 
nuclear related materials to states that had not accepted full-scope International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, the U.S. and India were able to formalize 
an arrangement where France would take over the responsibility of supplying fuel to 
Tarapur, ensuring its continuing operation. Once again, this demonstrated the limits to 
American opposition towards to India’s nuclear program. 
I have postulated previously that when the U.S. is confronted with a nuclear 
weapon aspirant whose relationship with the United States falls under the Low Strategic 
Liability/ Low Commercial Ties variable, its policy towards the aspirant’s nuclear 
weapons will devolve into one of ‘Weak Acceptance’. The chief characteristics of this 
policy are an absence of any military coercion of the nuclear aspirant by the United 
States, and 
- Limited Economic sanctions 
                                                 
128 Kissinger told the visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister that, “We haven't said a great deal about the 
explosion. I'm strongly allergic to placing the full weight of American prestige against an accomplished 
fact.” Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 
1973–1976, Document 166 
 
 88 
- Non-cooperation with civilian nuclear and dual-use programs in an effort to cap 
further nuclear weapon development or stockpiles. 
- Technology denial, especially in military and nuclear areas. 
The evidence above clearly illustrates the existence of actions consistent with such a 
policy. Following the Indian PNE, the United States Congress passed a law mandating 
that the U.S. vote against aid programs to India in international organizations such as the 
World Bank, which was signed into law by President Ford. However, the effects of such 
a law were muted because the U.S. did not lobby with other states to pursue a similar 
policy – allowing its negative votes to be overridden. The supply of nuclear fuel to the 
Indian reactor in Tarapur, while not initially stopped, was disrupted significantly by the 
United States following of the test. While the Ford administration eventually cleared the 
sale of arms to India, the decision was primarily symbolic since Pakistan was the 
intended beneficiary of renewed arms sales (with India being included on the list for 
balance). The U.S. did not intend to sell sophisticated weaponry to India, again to 
maintain the balance of forces in South Asia129. All of these actions are consistent with a 
policy of a weak or grudging acceptance of India’s nuclear weapon capability, which the 
U.S. assumed would inevitably lead to the production of nuclear weapons. The actions 
and sanctions demonstrated an American ambivalence towards India’s nuclear program – 
worth some punitive measures directly affecting the nuclear and strategic efforts of the 
proliferator but not sufficiently threatening to the degree that actions damaging the wider 
relationship would be merited.  
                                                 
129 President Ford’s National Security Decision Memorandum specifically alluded to the need to maintain 
the defensive capabilities of India and Pakistan as justification for arms sales, but given that the sale of 
arms was primarily intended for Pakistan, this move was seen as an attempt to maintain Pakistan’s security 
position with regard to India. 
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The reasons for the Indian government putting its nuclear weapons program on 
hold for several years following the PNE have been debated by several studies, with 
some of the more persuasive ones arguing that the reasons were primarily domestic, and 
having relatively little to do with the effects of the sanctions. In fact, scholars have 
argued that the test itself was a one-off event intended not with any broader strategic or 
long-term purpose in mind130, but rather as a technology demonstrator intended to 
demonstrate India’s capabilities and options. My analysis, however, does not attempt to 
address that question. Rather, my first question attempted to ascertain the nature of the 
policy the U.S. followed towards India’s nuclear program in the PNE. The study above 
finds that the U.S. reached a grudging acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons capability, 
characterized by limited efforts to curtail or slow future weapons development, while 
continuing to improve the overall bilateral relationship. The next section will explore the 
reasons that the U.S. adopted this policy of weak acceptance 
3.4.1 The Indian PNE and a Weak American Acceptance – Low Liability and 
Limited commercial ties 
In the previous section, we have seen that the Nixon and Ford administrations, in 
both internal deliberations as well as in engagements with Indian officials, appeared to 
accept the inevitability of India’s entry into the club of nuclear weapon states, even in the 
face of protestations by Indian government officials that the nature of the test was 
‘peaceful’ and the intent to develop nuclear weapons absent. Was the policy of weak 
acceptance due to perceptions of low strategic liability and low commercial value among 
principals in the Nixon/Ford administrations? This section interrogates the archival 
record to answer this question, and concludes that consistent with my hypothesis, low 
                                                 
130 Perkovich, George, p. 177, quotes senior members of the Indian establishment to argue that the PNE 
was not a ‘defense project’ and that there were no military considerations attached to it. Ibid. 
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strategic liability and weak commercial value attributed to the relationship were indeed 
the primary reasons for the United States under Nixon and Ford adopting a policy of 
‘Weak Acceptance’ of India’s nuclear weapon capabilities. 
Accounts from within the Nixon administration in the aftermath of the India-
Pakistan conflict in 1971 show widespread concern at the bureaucratic level that India 
would move forward with nuclear weapon testing and development, though there was 
disagreement over the time-frame over which this would happen.131 However, 
conversations between Nixon and Kissinger in the same time period about India barely 
touched on the nuclear question132, even as it occupied the minds of several officials in 
the lower echelons of the administration. While scholars have speculated that a general 
disregard for the issue of nuclear proliferation may have contributed to this inattention, an 
important clue lies in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) commissioned by Kissinger 
in 1972 which argued that India’s nuclear test in itself would not have a decisive policy 
impact on any of the other potential nuclear aspirants, which importantly from the 
report’s perspective, did not include Pakistan.133 Informed by input from several agencies 
                                                 
131 While the American Ambassador to India was of the opinion that India would not test in the near-term, 
intelligence assessments from the State Department were of the opinion that a near term nuclear test was 
much more likely due to the strategic realignments of the Bangladesh War and America’s rapprochement 
with China. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976,Volume E–7, Documents on South 
Asia, 1969–1972, Document 211 for the Aerogram from Ambassador Keating and “State Department 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?',” January 14, 1972, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, SN 70-73, Def. 18-8 
India. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #4. 
132 Under Secretary of State William Nutter suggested in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in 
February 1972 that an Indian nuclear test would set off further proliferation and other far-ranging negative 
repercussions for the United States but the absence of any expressions of concerns by Kissinger or Nixon in 
conversations with Indian officials that year indicates that this was not shared by senior White House 
officials. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 
1969–1972, Document 222. 
133 Ironically, even as the American intelligence community raised the possibility of an Indian nuclear test 
due to idiosyncratic reasons specific to India, the very same uniqueness of the Indian situation appeared to 
be the reason that the Nixon administration was unconcerned about a general proliferation threat due to an 
Indian nuclear weapon capability. The NIE summary argued that the strategic significance of India’s 
nuclear test would be ‘negligible’. See “State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
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and departments within the Nixon administration, the report argued that Pakistan – while 
provoked by India’s nuclear test – was incapable of launching its own nuclear 
development program in the foreseeable future. This report, and a follow up to the NIE, 
argued that while China was the principal focus of India’s nuclear program its advanced 
nuclear capabilities compared to India’s meant that China would not be greatly alarmed 
by an Indian nuclear test134. This perspective, that essentially argued that India’s nuclear 
program could be viewed in a type of strategic isolation, is in keeping with my hypothesis 
that the U.S. would perceive a significantly low level or strategic liability from an Indian 
nuclear program. There is no evidence in the archival record that the NIE analysis led to 
concerns being expressed by principals in the Nixon administration to their Indian 
interlocutors. Indeed, there appears to have been recognition by the administration as the 
tensions over Bangladesh receded, that India had emerged as a strategically important 
actor in South Asia following the 1971 conflict, and that the U.S. was loathe to cede 
further influence to the USSR by letting relations with India drift.135  
This ambivalence towards India’s (no longer theoretical) nuclear weapon 
capability carried over to the aftermath of the Indian nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974. 
The decision by Kissinger to ‘tone down’ the strong response to the PNE initially 
suggested by the State Department was indicative of this attitude.136 It was also consistent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?' January 14, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, SN 70-73, Def. 18-8 India. Obtained and contributed by 
William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #4. 
134 The NIE argued that notwithstanding the China specific focus of India’s nuclear program, an Indian 
nuclear test would “…would cause China some concern, but we cannot foresee any major changes in 
Chinese policies that would ensue from such a development”. Ibid. 
135 Kissinger told the departing Indian Ambassador in January 1973, a year after the Bangladesh war that 
the U.S. “….recognize(d) India as a major power in South Asia...” These comments coincided with the 
appointment of a known India supporter and Democrat, Daniel Moynihan as the U.S. Ambassador in India 
with a view to improving ties between the two states. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976 Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 104.  
136 Henry Kissinger intervened to remove critical language in the State Department’s initial response to the 
Indian nuclear test. The intensity of the initial language did not match those of the wider intelligence 
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with the views of strategic analysts within the Nixon administration137, who argued in a 
detailed memo in the months following the nuclear test that the two states with ongoing 
or open conflicts with India and therefore most affected by an Indian nuclear test, China 
and Pakistan, would, for very different reasons, abstain from destabilizing actions in the 
region. Undergirding the American approach was the perception of the American 
strategic community that India existed in ‘Strategic Isolation’ from other major geo-
strategic conflicts138. Another factor that moderated the American response was the U.S. 
recognition of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government firm control over the nuclear 
program in the context of a stable democratic regime, which meant that the set of actors 
and their intentions were unlikely to change radically.139 This lack of a strategic threat as 
perceived by administration officials influenced the decision of the Nixon White House 
to adopt a policy of passivity towards a potential Indian nuclear arsenal, as evidenced by 
Kissinger’s decision to engage India primarily on the question of how India could help 
prevent further proliferation rather than on India’s own nuclear weapon plans, which, 
                                                                                                                                                 
community or the White House itself, which tried to assuage the concerns of countries such as Pakistan that 
a nuclear India would be a threat to them, Ibid. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 164 for President Ford’s conversation 
with the Pakistani Defense Minister Ahmed where Ford tried to calm Pakistani fears about India’s nuclear 
weapons. 
137 China’s nuclear capability was judged far superior to India’s and oriented against the USSR, whereas 
Pakistan was relegated to the category of states that were in no immediate danger of pursuing a serious 
nuclear program because of its limited capabilities. See “Special National Intelligence Estimate 4-1-74, 
"Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons",” August 23, 1974, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, Mandatory declassification review request; release by the CIA. Obtained and 
contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #4. 
138 A major long-range CIA study on India’s prospects specifically argued that India’s ability to influence 
geopolitics was limited with it being in an area “…considerably isolated in a strategic sense from the US, 
Western Europe, and Japan.” This sense that the consequences of India’s strategic moves would be limited 
to its immediate neighborhood, and of not much consequence provide further evidence that the Nixon and 
Ford administrations’ perceived little strategic  liability from India’s actions. See Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 165. 
139 While the CIA study on India’s long-term prospects painted a dire economic and political picture, and 
visited several hypothetical scenarios of instability, there was no expression of concern about the fate of 
India’s nuclear program. Ibid. 
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even in the face of an Indian disavowal of intent, was assumed by the U.S. to be a fait 
accompli140.  
I have postulated previously that a low degree of strategic liability from an 
aspirant state’s nuclear program mitigates the possibility that the U.S. would strongly 
oppose such a program. My framework listed three sub-variables that contributed to the 
perception of strategic liability. I show here in the Indian PNE case that the probability 
that the aspirant’s rivals would be provoked into nuclear arms race was diminished, the 
stability of the aspirant’s regime was high and the aspirant (India) was not in conflict 
with the U.S. The preceding section shows that each of these variables played their 
hypothesized role in the formulation by the Nixon-Ford administrations of a policy of 
weak acceptance of India’s nuclear weapon capability. 
3.4.2 Economic irrelevance and American ambivalence 
The structural considerations recounted in the previous section were but one 
aspect of the U.S.-Nixon relationship. I have postulated that while the perceived absence 
of strategic liability was crucial to the Nixon-Ford’s acceptance of India’s nuclear 
capability, the absence of strong commercial linkages limited this to an ambivalent or 
‘weak acceptance’ that manifested itself in the form of limited punitive measures against 
India and a refusal to endorse India’s status as a nuclear weapon capable power or 
support India’s civilian nuclear program. In this section, I examine whether the evidence 
exists to support my claim that weak commercial ties was the causal factor behind this 
                                                 
140 In his first direct conversation with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi following India’s nuclear test, 
Kissinger conveyed the American view that “ …(the U.S.) not interested in recriminations but in how to 
prevent further proliferation.” Kissinger said that he took India’s promise not to develop nuclear weapons 
seriously, but it is clear from this encounter and his previous ones that what he was really after was an 
assurance that India would not pass on nuclear know-how to other potential proliferators. See Foreign 




ambivalence, and specifically, the reason behind the U.S. not adopting a whole-hearted 
approval of India’s nuclear weapon capabilities.. 
As discussed previously, the U.S.-India economic relationship during the Nixon 
and Ford administrations was primarily a donor-recipient one. The United States was a 
major donor of food-grains and monetary assistance to India starting with the PL-480 
program in the 1960s, with this dynamic accounting for the major portion of the bilateral 
economic relationship. The Bangladesh conflict resulted in a drastic curtailment of the 
aid flow, and the aftermath of the war saw the two states attempt to slowly revive a 
relationship that was damaged by the conflict. 
The clearest evidence that the lack of a strong economic relationship between the 
United States and India in the 1970s stymied a stronger or strategic acceptance of India’s 
nuclear ambitions is the diminished role economic considerations played in Nixon-Ford 
administration policy documents and internal deliberations141. The 1972 National 
Intelligence Estimate commissioned by Kissinger to gauge the strategic implications of 
Indian nuclear weapons program had no mention of any impact to the American economy 
from American economic sanctions on India that could result from an Indian nuclear 
program – with any potential damage limited to an aid shortfall induced risk to the Indian 
economy itself142. The implication of this was that in the absence of extensive trade ties 
between the two states -trade with India in this time-period accounted for a miniscule 
portion of overall U.S. trade, with India still more than twenty years away from being 
                                                 
141 Henry Kissinger articulated this in his characterization of India as one among several underdeveloped 
countries (albeit the largest one) in his discussions with State Department officials 
142 In line with the primarily aid based relationship that existed between the U.S. and India in the early 
1970s, the National Intelligence Estimate forecast a very limited economic impact from the imposition of 
punitive sanctions by the United States following an Indian nuclear test, and that impact was limited to 
Western aid programs which the Estimate judged would be tolerated by India. Remarkably, there was no 
mention of any trade related adverse effects, either to American companies or those of allied states. This 
speaks to the domestic orientation of India’s economy in that period. Ibid. 
 
 95 
among the top twenty trading partners of the U.S.143 – there were no substantial U.S. 
trade or commercial interests at risk if the U.S. adopted a less than welcoming attitude 
towards India’s nuclear program. This lack of commercial interest meant that structural 
considerations dominated American engagements with India, with principals within both 
the Nixon and Ford administrations continuing to argue for a ‘balance’ between 
American rapprochements towards India on one hand and relations with China and 
Pakistan on the other- the former of the two rivals to India starting to open up its markets 
to American entities, and the latter a bulwark for America against Soviet expansion in 
Central Asia. Indeed, trade related discussions between the India and the U.S. were 
omitted from much of the high-level dialogue between the two states, with the U.S. 
resigned to the prospect of continued Indian resistance to American investment144. At 
around the same time as India successfully tested its nuclear device, American policy-
makers were painting a picture of India as a barely functioning anarchy, with an economy 
always teetering on the edge of collapse. This strengthened the narrative of India as an 
aid-dependent supplicant, even as the two countries struggled to broaden their 
relationship beyond aid and residual ‘democratic’ affinity145. The relegation of the 
                                                 
143 By 2003, when the Indian economy had started its rapid growth and trade between the U.S. and India 
had grown sharply, India was still only the 24th largest export market and the 18th largest source of imports 
for the United States. Source: Congressional Research Service report on U.S.-India Trade Relations, 2003. 
144 Deputy Secretary of State Alfred Atherton summarized the American position succinctly during a 
discussion between American members of the U.S.-India Joint Commission and Henry Kissinger when he 
said that “The Indians have been objecting to foreign investment for a long time”, in the context of general 
resignation towards the prospect of significant trade ties between the two states. Education and culture were 
the areas of promise with aid still the central component of economic ties between India and the U.S. See 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, 
Document 186. 
145 The idea that for two states that shared strong democratic traditions, relations were much more 
antagonistic than should have been the case was recognized by Principals in both India and the U.S. such as 
Henry Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha. This shared tradition of democracy may not have 
qualitatively affected disputes such as the one over Bangladesh and India’s nuclear program, but was 
frequently cited by Principals both in the Administration and Congress as a reason for caution and 
moderation when estrangement was at its peak. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 104 
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economic aspect of the relationship to irrelevance also meant that the possibility of 
pursuing commercial opportunities presented by India’s purported desire to expand 
nuclear power production went untested. In one instance that demonstrates this dynamic, 
when the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi broached the subject to the American 
Ambassador, Daniel P. Moynihan in a conversation following the nuclear test, there was 
no attempt by the Administration to follow-up, either to discuss the potential for 
American investment in civilian nuclear power plants in India, or even the energy sector 
in general146. As noted earlier, the main remaining link between the United States and 
India’s nuclear program- the agreement to supply uranium that would fuel the Tarapur 
reactor- eventually fell victim to Congressional and bureaucratic opposition. This stood in 
contrast to the consideration American officials were giving to China and its own nuclear 
program at roughly the same time, as China gradually began to open up its economy.  
Taken together, it is clear that the absence of a commercial motive, ordinarily a 
significant part of bilateral discourse between states, limited the discourse between India 
and the United States. The decision by the Ford administration to resume arms sales to 
Pakistan in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear test, and Kissinger’s admonitions to his 
envoys to ensure that China’s strategic concerns were taken into consideration for even 
modest American assistance to India147, typified the administration’s attitude that the 
                                                 
146 This was the first conversation between Prime Minister Gandhi and Ambassador Moynihan following 
the nuclear tests. Indira Gandhi specifically cited energy as a compelling reason for India’s nuclear test but 
neither Moynihan in this conversation nor any other American interlocutor took up this opening to try and 
make progress either on nuclear or economic matters. This contrasts with the discussions thirty years later 
where nuclear energy provided the justification for the India-U.S. nuclear agreement. The difference was 
the change in American perceptions towards India’s economic potential, going from a supplicant state in 
the 1970s to that of a major economic powerhouse. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 168. 
147 In his conversation with Ambassador designate to India William Saxbe, Kissinger instructed Saxbe to 
refrain from promoting better Sino-Indian ties at the expense of making China nervous, the implication 
being that the U.S. should not try and get China to be overly accommodative towards India if that meant the 
Chinese would start to worry about an American bias or tilt towards India. See Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Document 187. 
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strategic ambitions of an underdeveloped country like India did not merit more than a 
grudging acceptance. 
The divergent priorities of the Executive and Congress were displayed in sharp 
relief during debates over international aid to India and the continuing supply of fuel to 
India’s Tarapur nuclear reactor, which was the source of material for the Pokhran tests. 
While the lack of strategic liability reduced the imperative for the Nixon and Ford 
administrations to try and curtail fuel supply following the tests, the lack of a strong 
‘India lobby’ in Congress meant that traditional advocates of non-proliferation in the 
bureaucracy and Congress148 were able to influence the debate over this issue leading to 
attempts at curtailing nuclear cooperation with India. However, the successful efforts of 
the Ford administration in reducing the impact of actions to block international aid and to 
continue fuel supply (intermittent though it was) to Tarapur shows the importance of the 
Executive in shaping foreign policy debates and outcomes. Likewise, the decision by 
Henry Kissinger to countermand the strong protests planned by the State Department 
against the Indian nuclear tests in favor of a less critical response brings the ability of the 
Executive to decisively frame foreign policy issues into strong relief. In this instance, 
absent strong domestic counter-pressures, the Nixon and Ford administrations were able 
to chart a middle-path that balanced non-proliferation objectives against its perception of 
low strategic liability from India’s nuclear program. 
In summary, the evidence from the Nixon-Ford administrations clearly indicates 
that the U.S. adopted an ambivalent attitude towards India’s nuclear program, both in the 
run-up to and in the aftermath of the ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ of May 18, 1974. 
Influenced by a lack of strategic liability, the United States under Presidents Nixon and 
                                                 
148 The Long amendment that attempted to shut off International development assistance to India was an 
example of this narrative at work.  
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Ford essentially accepted India’s nuclear test and the eventual likelihood of India’s 
developing a full-fledged nuclear weapons program. With a donor-recipient dynamic 
dominating the U.S.-India relationship during this period, the lack of strong commercial 
ties between the two states meant that this remained a grudging acceptance, with attempts 
to stymie further development in India’s nuclear capabilities by denying it access to fuel 
for its nuclear reactor and restrict access to sophisticated armaments but preserving and 
building broader economic and strategic ties that improved the overall relationship. 
3.5 POST-SCRIPT: POKHRAN-II, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN 
AMBIVALENCE 
The ambiguous construct of India’s nuclear weapons program was spectacularly 
demolished on May 11, 1998 when a series of nuclear tests were conducted in the 
Pokhran region of the Thar Desert, the site of the original nuclear tests in 1974. These 
tests were completed under the leadership of Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee who 
belonged to the Bharathiya Janata Party (BJP), a party which had pledged to ‘exercise’ 
the nuclear option. Nevertheless, the tests and India’s subsequent declaration of nuclear 
weapon status was greeted with shock and anger in the Clinton administration. Unlike the 
Nixon administration’s low key response the United States reacted furiously to this set of 
tests and imposed sanctions on India shortly afterwards, sanctions that were triggered by 
laws enacted  by the U.S. Congress after India’s original nuclear tests in 1974149.  
However, the sanctions with the potential to inflict the most damage on the Indian 
economy were soon relaxed, and the United States settled into a grudging acceptance of 
the new status quo. In this section, I briefly examine this chapter of the India-U.S. nuclear 
                                                 
149 The so-called ‘Glenn amendment’ mandated American sanctions against ‘non-nuclear’ (as defined by 
the NPT) states that conducted nuclear tests even if they had not signed the NPT. This led to the imposition 
of sanctions on India in defense and military financing but also, importantly in the areas of export-import 
bank loan guarantees financing World Bank funding. See Talbott, Strobe “Engaging India: Diplomacy, 
Democracy and the Bomb”, Brookings University Press, 2004, loc. 654. 
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relationship and argue that the ultimate similarities between this episode and American 
policy in 1974 reinforces the notion that the United States had converged on a policy of 
‘Weak Acceptance’ of India’s nuclear weapon capabilities. 
3.6 STRATEGIC LIABILITY AND COMMERCIAL VALUE IN THE U.S.-INDIA 
RELATIONSHIP, 1998 
By 1998, the end of the cold war had seen India and the U.S. draw closer 
following the collapse of India’s traditional ally, the Soviet Union. India’s economic 
liberalization had been underway for a few years with its Information Technology 
industry starting to develop links with its American counterparts. India was viewed as a 
country with promising economic potential, but still accounting for a relatively minor 
portion of U.S. international trade. American policy towards India at this time was 
dominated by concerns around tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which 
had acquired dangerous overtones in 1990 when the two states were widely perceived to 
have come close to open and by some accounts, nuclear, conflict. Both India and Pakistan 
were widely assumed by then to have undeclared nuclear munitions, with the U.S. tacitly 
accepting this reality and trying to maintain this ambiguity about the two countries’ 
nuclear programs150. 
The imposition of sanctions by the U.S. following the Indian nuclear tests in May 
1998, as required by law, and their almost immediate relaxation 1998 (of those sanctions 
that had the most import) in November soon after,151 serves to clarify an important point. 
                                                 
150 American intelligence estimates from 1982 discuss India’s “desire to maintain and improve its nuclear 
weapons options…” which underlines the fact that the U.S. perceived India to have a nuclear weapon 
capability. Likewise, American attempts to thwart an Indian nuclear test in 1995 also betray the fact that the 
U.S. knew about India’s nuclear weapons program. See Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of 
Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States', December, 1982, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CREST, National Archives. Obtained and contributed 
by William Burr and included in NPIHP, Research Update #11. 
151 Some of the sanctions that had the most impact, including the Export-Import Bank, were relaxed in 
October 1998, just three months after their imposition and before they had any tangible impact. The U.S. 
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America under Presidents Nixon and Ford has essentially accepted that India was a 
nuclear weapon capable state, and indeed that it would deploy nuclear weapons. While 
the American Congress responded to India’s nuclear tests with sanctions on nuclear 
cooperation with states like India that were non-NPT signatories, broader trade and 
economic ties remained undisturbed. India observed a self-imposed moratorium on 
inducting nuclear weapons through the 1980s, but continued to develop nuclear weapon 
technology without encountering significant resistance from the United States. While the 
United States officially maintained a policy of non-recognition of India’s nuclear weapon 
status, accounts by officials within the Clinton administration clearly indicate that the 
U.S. had reached a de facto acceptance of such a status, attempting primarily to ‘cap’ 
such a capability rather than actually eliminating it. The fairly prompt reversal of the 
most punitive sanctions before the start of a meaningful dialog process between the two 
states confirms this understanding. While the Clinton administration had to respond 
initially with sanctions against India due to Congressional mandates, the ones with the 
most salience were quietly withdrawn just three months after their imposition. Indeed, 
even though the public rhetoric of the United States following India’s nuclear weapon 
declaration was to ‘cap, reduce and roll-back’, private discussions between India and the 
U.S. centered on getting India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and 
the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and capping its arsenal of nuclear weapons. 
There was a tacit understanding that eliminating India’s nuclear weapons program was 
not a feasible or practical option, based on both the knowledge and acceptance of India’s 
nuclear capabilities going back to 1974.152 This was not a new formulation. Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
also released the hold on World Bank loans to power projects in India in early1999, further diluting any 
remaining impact. Talbott, Strobe, ibid. Loc. 1617, 1670. 
152 While the American government publicly said that its goal was to ‘cap, rollback and eliminate’ India’s 
nuclear weapon capabilities, negotiations between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and the 
Chairman of India’s Planning Commission, Jaswant Singh, Talbott made it clear that America’s real goal 
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Clinton Administration’s principal complaint with India was not that it had developed 
nuclear weapon technology or even that it had actually weaponized it; it was that India 
had conducted a nuclear test and declared itself a nuclear power, an unwelcome precedent 
that other potential proliferators may find useful. Notwithstanding these concerns, by 
1998, most states that the U.S. perceived to be proliferation threats had either acceded to 
the NPT or, as in the case of Pakistan and Israel, become de facto nuclear weapon powers 
whose nuclear capabilities were an open secret. Even though the declaration by India, 
followed by Pakistan, that it was a nuclear weapon state posed the aforementioned 
problems for the U.S., it posed little strategic liability since India’s major antagonists and 
the states most concerned by its nuclear capabilities, Pakistan and China, themselves 
possessed nuclear weapons. Pakistan had developed its own nuclear weapons program 
the 1980s during the time when it was a major strategic partner of the United States in the 
Cold War, when India already had an advanced (though undisclosed) nuclear 
weaponization capability. There is no evidence to indicate that United States entertained 
a stronger push against India’s nuclear program in the 1980s in reaction to the likelihood 
of an arms race with a Pakistan that, for the first time, appeared to be realistically capable 
of developing a nuclear weapon. Given that we have evidence that demonstrates 
America’s de facto acceptance of India’s nuclear capabilities over the previous decade, 
this is unsurprising, especially considering the lack of a ‘break-out’ action by India such 
as another nuclear test, and the fact that India’s nuclear program was well established and 
deeply rooted. A more realistic option would have been to try and prevent Pakistan from 
                                                                                                                                                 
was to get India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and cap its arsenal of nuclear weapons. There 
was no serious effort to get India to eliminate its nuclear weapon capabilities or even its war-head stocks. In 
fact, Henry Kissinger suggested that the U.S. go further and recognize India as a nuclear power in exchange 
for it signing the NPT. See Talbott, Strobe, ibid. Loc. 689 
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developing its own nuclear weapon capabilities, but strategic priorities interfered153, 
preventing the United States from pursuing an activist policy in the Pakistani case.   The 
immediate threat following an Indian nuclear test was the danger that Pakistan would 
follow suit, and it did on May 28, 1998 just over two weeks following India’s tests, 
reliving the pressure on India. Other factors helped, such as the ‘special’ status of India as 
a state that never acceded to the NPT which meant that it could not be easily cited as a 
precedent by other states such as Iran or North Korea who were suspected to be pursuing 
their own nuclear weapon programs.  In a sense, India was in the same ‘strategic 
isolation’ for the Clinton administration that it existed in for the Nixon and Ford 
administrations in the 1970s154, and the imposition of weak sanctions on India and the 
U.S. reluctant acceptance of India’s nuclear weapon status was a recognition of that fact.  
                                                 
153 Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program mirrors (and lags) India’s in many ways. Contrary to American 
estimates in 1974, Pakistan was able to kick-start its nuclear weapons development in the years following 
the Bangladesh war, by many intelligence estimates with Chinese assistance. The fact that India already 
had a nuclear weapons program, and the presence of a common threat faced by Pakistan and the United 
States in the form of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan reduced the strategic liability of the United 
States, leading to the same ambivalent policy of weak acceptance by the United States towards Pakistan’s 
nuclear program as in the Indian case, with the result that by the end of the Cold War, both India and 
Pakistan had a widely acknowledged but unannounced nuclear weapon capability. At the time when 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was most vulnerable – the mid to late 1980s – the reduction in 
strategic liability and the increased common threat of the USSR played a role in thwarting any serious 
consideration of strong coercive action to block the Pakistanis. See “Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR,” 1983, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Department of State FOIA release, copy courtesy of 
Jeffrey Richelson. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #6 
for a “recognition” by the United States of Pakistan’s perceived security dilemmas. The United States’ 
options to curtail Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities were themselves circumscribed by the need to co-opt 
Pakistan in the struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as Secretary of State George Schulz 
acknowledged in a memorandum to President Reagan. See “Secretary of State George Shultz to President 
Reagan, 'How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Weapons Activities',” November 26, 1982, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
CIA Records Search Tool [CREST]. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP 
Research Update #6.  
154 The U.S. perceived the most tangible impact from an Indian nuclear test to be a matching one by 
Pakistan and possibly an arms race between the two. This was balanced by the fact that Pakistan conducted 
a nuclear test almost immediately following the Indian one, reducing any pressure on India and by the fact 
that Pakistan had already developed a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons.  
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Commercial ties between India and the U.S. were much more extensive in 1998 
than in 1974. India’s Information Technology industry had emerged as an important 
provider of services to American companies, and several American multinationals had 
entered the Indian market following the gradual opening up of the Indian economy to 
foreign investment in the early 1990s. However, the Clinton Administration still 
perceived much of India’s economic potential to be in the future155, as President Clinton 
put it in his conversation with his advisors. While India’s economy was growing, it was 
not yet, as the administration perceived it, in the same category as states such as China, 
South Korea or the European powers from the standpoint of importance to American 
trade and commercial interests. It was still a substantial recipient of aid from international 
organizations156 and in need of foreign investment for critical infrastructure development. 
Also, unlike in the case of allied states such as South Korea, whose success as a capitalist 
economy was vital in itself to American interests in the 1970s and 80s due to the example 
it set during the cold war, there was no such compelling American interest here that 
elevated India’s Commercial Value. As a result, while the lack of strategic liability 
allowed America to weakly accept an Indian nuclear program and relax those sanctions 
that affected American commercial interests, the lack of significant commercial ties 
meant that the U.S. could afford to continue selective sanctions against India’s nuclear 
and strategic industries with little incentive to relent or fear retaliation towards its trade 
                                                 
155 Clinton believed that the U.S.-India relationship had potential as the Indian economy started to 
liberalize, but the implication was that there was still some way to go before that became a reality. Talbott, 
Strobe, ibid. Loc. 726 
156 Pakistan, which was also under U.S. sanctions, was adjudged by the Clinton administration to be in 
such bad economic straits that the U.S. relaxed World Bank and IMF sanctions on it, while the restrictions 
on India continued through 1998. Even though India’s economy was much stronger, the World Bank 
funding holds blocked important projects leading to friction between the two states. See Dugger, Celia, 
“India’s Testing Issue”, The New York Times, December 5, 1998. 
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interests157, in effect trying to restrain India’s nuclear weapon program even while 
pursuing improved economic ties. Given the lack of significant commercial ties, the U.S. 
would have been hard pressed to find effective ways to impose wide-spread economic 
sanctions on India. Further, lacking the strategic incentives to do so, it is unlikely that the 
Ford administration would have been willing to incur compliance costs and risk angering 
allies such as Britain who would be affected by commercial sanctions that would affect 
wider international trade with India. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
administration considered that possibility. 
As the section above shows, the U.S. adopted a formal stance of opposing India’s 
nuclear weapons program while imposing only selective sanctions on nuclear and 
strategic interests. In negotiations with Indian interlocutors the U.S. pressed for a cap on 
India’s nuclear arsenal rather than a rollback or abrogation of India’s nuclear arms. This 
was consistent with a policy of weak acceptance that was induced by a combination of 
low strategic liability and weak commercial value. This policy both paralleled and was 
predicated by the Nixon/Ford administration’s policy towards India’s original nuclear test 
in 1974 and was similar to the American reaction to the nuclear programs of both  China 
and Pakistan at specific points in time158. 
                                                 
157 Defense and dual-use technology exports continued to remain sanctioned until the Bush administration 
eliminated them. See George W. Bush: "Memorandum on Waiver of Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India 
and Pakistan," September 22, 2001. Posted online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73551. 
158 American attitudes towards the Chinese nuclear program during the Nixon administration paralleled 
those towards the Indian one. The ratification of the Nuclear (non) Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 by 
the United States constituted a de jure acceptance of China as a nuclear weapons state. However, from a 
strategic standpoint, China was still viewed as a rival that was aiding the enemy - North Vietnam - in the 
intractable Vietnam conflict. Its nuclear program was viewed as a grave danger to the interests of the 
United States according to numerous classified studies from the U.S. intelligence community. However, the 
realization by Nixon that he would need Chinese help to extricate the United States from Vietnam softened 
this image of China. Moreover, the hardening of the Sino-Soviet split and the border conflict between the 
two states provided an opportunity for the U.S. under President Nixon to open a pathway to the 
normalization of relations with China and the cultivation of this relationship as a counterweight to Soviet 




The U.S. followed an ambivalent policy towards India’s nuclear program from the 
late 1960s and following India’s ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ or PNE in 1974. Even 
though India formally declared itself a nuclear weapon power in 1998 after conducting a 
second round of nuclear tests, the analysis in this chapter clearly demonstrates that the 
U.S. under Presidents Nixon and Ford had essentially accepted that India would retain a 
nuclear weapon capability. While the U.S. pursued targeted sanctions on India’s nuclear 
and strategic industries, these were neither intended to nor did they rollback India’s 
developing nuclear weapon capabilities. Rather, they were the product of an ambivalent 
approach that combined a resigned acceptance of India’s nuclear weapon capabilities 
with an effort to restrain and slow down those capabilities as much as possible without 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chinese nuclear weapons program for the United States. At the same time, the absence of any significant 
economic ties between the U.S. and China dampened any impetus for a greater embrace of China’s nuclear 
program. By 1974, Sino-Soviet enmity had hardened and the U.S. and China had normalized relations to 
such an extent as to let the U.S. entertain the possibility of assisting China’s civilian nuclear energy 
program, though formal movement on such a policy would have to wait until the Reagan administration. In 
essence, American policy towards China’s nuclear weapons settled into a weak acceptance, with the U.S. 
not pursuing any active measures to dissuade China from developing nuclear weapons, while at the same 
time refraining from selling any civilian nuclear technology or fuel that could indirectly or directly aid in 
the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Document 83 for the National Security Decision Memorandum 
(NSDM) that authorizes a communication to the People’s Republic of China expressing interest in 
negotiating an agreement to sell lightly enriched uranium and light water reactors to China under IAEA or 
U.S. safeguards. This was based on expressions of interest by American companies who wanted to pursue 
such sales with China. However, there is no evidence that indicates any progress on this topic beyond this 
memo. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, 
Document 79 for Kissinger’s memorandum to Nixon recommending such a decision following an 
Undersecretaries’ study on the matter. Kissinger expresses his opinion in a footnote to the memo that there 
was reason to think that China would not be amenable to the sort of safeguards that Washington wanted 
implemented. Indeed, the 1985 agreement concluded by President Reagan and the Chinese government 
settled on a verbal set of assurances from the Chinese government that it would not re-export nuclear 
material sold to it from the U.S. The lack of IAEA or U.S. safeguards in this agreement showed how far the 
U.S. would come in strategically acquiescing with China’s nuclear weapon capabilities in the 1980s, during 
a period of major expansion in trade between the two states. In the early 1970s under President Nixon 
however, the U.S. policy towards China’s nuclear weapon capabilities was much more ambivalent as the 
foregoing discussion shows. 




disrupting the wider relationship. This policy was a product of the perception that India 
and its nuclear capabilities did not pose much strategic liability to the U.S. due to the 
relative uniqueness and isolation of India’s geostrategic conflicts. The absence of 
significant commercial ties between the two states meant that weak acceptance was the 
farthest that the U.S. would go in recognition of India’s nuclear status. Latent American 
preferences for non-proliferation prevented a more enthusiastic embrace of India’s 
nuclear weapon capabilities. While the lack of significant economic ties between the two 
states would have afforded the administration latitude in imposing economic sanctions, 
this would have come at the cost of improving Indo-U.S. ties that had ruptured following 
the Bangladesh war. It could have also led to difficulties with American allies such as 
Britain that had significantly stronger economic interests with India for historical reasons.  
Attention to India’s conduct of nuclear tests and Washington’s subsequent 
imposition of sanctions in 1998 has obscured the fact that the United States’ under Nixon 
and Ford had accepted the eventuality of India’s nuclear weapons. This recognition 
portended the quick relaxation of punitive American sanctions in 1998 and the relapse to 
a policy of weak acceptance until India and the U.S. signed a landmark nuclear 
cooperation agreement in 2005. This agreement, signed during a period of unprecedented 
economic expansion in India, resulted in the U.S. recognizing India’s nuclear weapon 





Chapter 4: Soft Rollback 
 
In this chapter, I examine the quadrant of my framework that is a combination of 
heightened strategic liability and high commercial value. I posit that a perception of high 
strategic liability and high commercial value on the part of the United States towards an 
aspiring nuclear weapon state will lead to the American government adopting a policy of 
‘Soft-Rollback’ towards the aspirant’s nuclear weapons program. Increased strategic 
liability will lead to the U.S. applying a significant amount of pressure to stop the state in 
question from developing nuclear weapon technology. On the other hand, the fact that the 
United States highly values the economic relationship with the state will inhibit it from 
severe military or economic sanctions that may damage the economic relationship 
between the two states and by implication, hurt American commercial interests. Instead, I 
hypothesize that the U.S. will use more subtle measures intended to hinder and rollback 
the nuclear weapon program of the proliferator. I posit that such measures will include 
the denial of security guarantees (when such arrangements exist) or threats to do so, 
threats to end security alliances, and covert actions to block the aspirant’s access to 
nuclear and strategic technology. I argue that this combination of measures, which I term 
Soft Rollback, shares important similarities and differences with one of Active Rollback, 
the most punitive American strategy towards an aspiring nuclear weapon state. Both of 
these strategies are outcomes of a situation where the U.S. perceives a high degree of 
strategic liability from the progress of the aspirant’s nuclear weapons program. However, 
the presence of a valued economic relationship between the U.S. and the aspirant will 
lead to a moderation in tactics in this ‘quadrant’. This particular configuration of the two 
independent variables in my framework will lead to the United States pursuing its 
opposition to the proliferator’s nuclear program covertly and with a significant emphasis 
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on discretion so as to not damage the vital economic relationship. I will show that the 
U.S. pursues a nuanced strategy of covert and indirect threats to end alliances, block 
military partnerships and behind the scenes attempts to preclude access to nuclear and 
strategic military technology, all while maintaining a ‘normal’ bilateral relationship on 
the surface. This tack allows the U.S. to help the proliferator ‘save face’, 
compartmentalize its nuclear interdiction efforts, and prevent the disagreement from 
potentially damaging economic interests. 
The major case I examine in this chapter is that of South Korea in the 1970s when 
that state attempted to pursue an indigenous nuclear weapon capability. South Korea, or 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) as it is officially known, and the United States forged a 
military alliance born out of the 1950 Korean War, which led to the effective partition of 
the Korean peninsula into a Communist North supported by China and a right-wing 
dictatorship in the South backed by the United States. The cease-fire following the 
Korean War resulted in the establishment of a strong American military presence on the 
peninsula along the De-militarized zone (DMZ), which became the de facto border 
between the two Koreas. The American military presence was meant to deter a North 
Korean ground invasion which, given the proximity of the South Korean capital, Seoul to 
the DMZ, presented an existential threat to the South Korean state. The presence of 
thousands of American personnel on the Korean peninsula gave the American 
government significant leverage over the South Korean regime’s foreign policy, but also 
presented  challenges in the form of recurring tensions with the North Korean 
government and with China, the principal supporter of the Northern communists.  
On the economic front, South Korea went from being a war ravaged, 
economically impoverished state to an economic powerhouse, with this transition gaining 
momentum in the early 1970s. This was the period when the U.S.-R.O.K. trade 
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relationship blossomed, with trade issues coming to the forefront of the bilateral 
relationship. The economic renaissance of South Korea coincided with an authoritarian 
turn of its political system under President Park Chung-Hee. Confronted with this reality, 
the success of a capitalist economic system in the South emerged as a major strategic 
goal and distinguishing factor for the United States, faced as it was by the Communist 
systems across the DMZ.  It was in this period that South Korea attempted to orient its 
nuclear technology program towards weaponization. Arguably a response to the Nixon 
doctrine that envisioned American allies taking a greater role in their national security 
affairs, the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea engendered the 
possibility that Japan, South Korea’s pre-World War II colonizer, antagonist, and another 
state under America’s ‘security umbrella’, would interpret this as a dangerous 
development as well as a signal of the United States’ reduced security commitment to 
Asia. It also added to the risk of Chinese involvement, including a nuclear response, in 
any future conflagration on the Korean peninsula.  I will show that the risk of nuclear 
proliferation in states such as Japan, and the addition of a nuclear dimension to the 
Chinese support for North Korea, increased the Security Liability of a South Korean 
nuclear program for the United States, inducing it to strongly oppose its push to develop 
nuclear weapon capability. I will show that the threat was perceived to be sufficiently 
high for the United States to threaten to withdraw American troops from the Peninsula, 
effectively ending the American security guarantee against an attack from the North. 
Under President Ford, the United States worked hard to scuttle South Korean plans to 
procure nuclear technology and equipment from France and threatened to block the sale 
of non-nuclear military material such as missiles and delivery systems to the Park regime. 
However, the presence of strong commercial relations and a highly valued commercial 
relationship between the two states constrained the United States from pursuing policies 
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that overtly coerced the South Korean government or caused broad economic damage to 
the South Korean economy. The commercial value of South Korea, whose economy had 
seen spectacular growth in the years leading up to the nuclear crisis in 1975, was 
perceived to be extremely important by the Ford administration and its base in Congress. 
Even while adopting a hawkish strategy towards the Korean nuclear program itself, the 
United States abjured any sanctions against the South Korean economy, whose export-
fueled growth depended on access to the American economy. American pressure on 
South Korea, both direct and indirect, was covert and calculated to minimize 
embarrassment to the Park government, whose government retained a strong influence in 
Washington via a network of lobbyists and support among members of Congress. While 
ultimately successful in rolling back South Korea’s nuclear weapon push, this American 
policy is notable for its restrained and limited focus, which I label ‘Soft’ Rollback. 
 In the next section, I examine the background behind the South Korean case and 
the events leading up to an American determination that South Korea was moving 
forward with a nuclear weapons program in 1975. Next, I use archival data from the 
Nixon-Ford administrations and secondary sources to situate the South Korean 
relationship with the United States in the ‘High Strategic Liability/High Commercial 
Value’ quadrant. As I have discussed previously, the Ford administration retained much 
of the same cast of foreign policy I then show that the United States reaction to the 
perceived South Korean nuclear weapons initiative was consistent with what I have 
defined previously as ‘Soft Rollback’. Finally, I use the evidence from the archival 
material to show that this policy of Soft Rollback was adopted due to the Ford 
administration’s perception of the South Korean relationship to be one of high strategic 




4.1 BACKGROUND – THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA AND THE NUCLEAR 
BREAKOUT 
 The United States had been South Korea’s chief military and economic benefactor 
in the decades following the Korean War, which ended with a truce in 1953. American 
economic and military aid was instrumental in the rebuilding of the South Korean state, 
which had been left crippled in the aftermath of the war. South Korea’s defense was 
dependent to a large extent on American troops deployed near the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ) on the border between the North and the South and the massive American 
military assistance to the South Korean army. American military aid was coupled with 
significant economic assistance that went towards developing a capitalist economy in 
South Korea. By the early 1970s, the South Korean economy had enjoyed several years 
of spectacular growth under President Park Chung-Hee who had come to power in 1961 
following a military coup that overthrew a civilian government. The export-led 
industrialization initiated by Park’s government coincided with significant political 
repression, resulting in a dichotomy that left the American government in the 
uncomfortable position of praising the South Korea’s economic success as a rebuff to the 
Communist model in the North (and in China), even while criticizing its political record. 
While President Nixon’s administration was a strong supporter of the Park regime, the 
political record of the Park regime came in for heavy criticism in the American 
Congress.159  These developments coincided with the announcement of the ‘Nixon 
                                                 
159 The opposition to the Park regime’s action was stronger in the Democratic Party, which controlled both 
Houses of the U.S. Congress during the period the South Korean nuclear question reached a critical stage. 
An example of the Congressional opposition to Park’s suppression of the opposition was a vote by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to slash military aid to South Korea in response to what it termed 
“increasingly repressive measures..”, See The New York Times, Sept. 6, 1974.  
In contrast, President Nixon had told the visiting South Korean Prime Minister that “(he would not) lecture 
you like some do on your internal affairs. Some people here were disturbed but that's your decision…” 
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–12, Documents on East and 
Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 230. 
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Doctrine’ that envisioned American allies in Asia becoming more self-sufficient in 
matters of security. Introduced in the context of a declining appetite in the United States 
for further involvement in the Vietnam conflict, the Doctrine was nevertheless interpreted 
in Seoul as a signal that the United States was willing to, at the very least, significantly 
cut down its military deployment in South Korea, leaving the South to fend for itself in 
any future conflict with the North.160  The South Korean government’s unease was 
further exacerbated by the Nixon administration’s move towards normalizing relations 
with China, North Korea’s principal supporter and a South Korean antagonist.  
 South Korea’s worries about the developing security situation in the early 1970s 
contrasted with increasing confidence in its economic prospects. Barring a short period of 
instability following the 1974 Middle-East oil crisis which caused supply shortages and 
contributed to a Balance of Payments issue, the South Korean economy enjoyed growth 
rates in excess of 10% consistently during the latter part of Park’s rule. During this time, 
the economic relationship between the United States and South Korea went from being a 
Donor-recipient one to an equal trading relationship, with its attendant share of trade 
disputes over market access (for South Korean goods to the U.S. economy) and American 
complaints over bottlenecks to investment by the South Korean bureaucracy. American 
economic aid to the R.O.K. gradually started to taper off in the early 1970s, though the 
United States continued to be a source of significant support. Military aid in particular 
was robust, in the form of credits and loans for the purchase of American equipment by 
                                                 
160 These concerns began to be expressed directly by senior officials in the Park administration such as the 
R.O.K. Foreign Minister Kim Yong-Sik while discussing President Nixon’s trip to China with U.S.  
Secretary of State Rogers. Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XIX, Part 1, 
Korea, 1969–1972, Document 109. See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–
12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 267. This State Department telegram 
dated April 18, 1975 – which was the same time-frame that the R.O.K. was accelerating efforts to procure 
nuclear reprocessing technology from France – which attests to the shock in the Park regime at the 
capitulation of South Vietnam to the Communist North following the American withdrawal from Vietnam. 
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the South Korean military.  From a South Korean standpoint, access to the American 
economy, especially for its textile exports, was critical. The United States was the 
R.O.K.’s largest export market throughout the 1970s, while to the United States, South 
Korea represented a successful American effort to nurture a capitalist, if not democratic, 
economy whose success validated American political and economic aid and opened up 
vast opportunities for U.S. companies to invest in161.    
 South Korean efforts to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities date back to the 
1960s, with American investment played a major role in the construction of the first 
nuclear power reactors in the early 1970s. Even though South Korea was not party to the 
Nuclear (non) Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it had accepted International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards against the diversion of spent fuel towards nuclear weapons. 
As late as 1974, and despite the Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 1971 that 
exploited a perceived loophole in these safeguards, American intelligence analysts were 
generally sanguine about the prospects of a South Korean nuclear weapon capability  
given its lack of plutonium extraction capabilities162. The situation changed by 1975 
following reports of South Korean efforts to procure advanced nuclear reprocessing 
                                                 
161 The U.S. government used its diplomatic channels to advance trade interests in South Korea, sending 
government funded trade missions to scout business opportunities and putting pressure on the Park 
administration to open up the Korean market to American exports. The centrality of American commercial 
and financial interests was underlined in internal Nixon administration deliberations that cited the 
inviolability of American economic interests as a key condition of any talks on Korean reunification. 
Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, 
Document 170, Airgram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State. 
162 South Korea found scant mention in a major American study on states that were at any serious risk of 
advancing nuclear weapon development programs. Any chances that the R.O.K. would contemplate such a 
course were discounted, with Seoul finding mention last among “Other countries” that had some civilian 
nuclear programs. Source: “Special National Intelligence Estimate 4-1-74, 'Prospects for Further 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons',” August 23, 1974, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
Mandatory declassification review request; release by the CIA. Obtained and contributed by William Burr 
and included in NPIHP Research Update #4. 
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technology from France amid signs that the Nixon administration was wavering on its 
security commitments to the Park government. American rapprochement with 
Communist China and the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam aggravated this 
dynamic, with the United States perceiving the South Korean proliferation efforts to be a 
response to the possibility of an American withdrawal. The Park regime’s authoritarian 
nature and its disregard of American calls to moderate its domestic political policies 
further contributed to the perception that the R.O.K. would proceed with a nuclear 
weapons program despite public disavowals, moves to ratify the NPT, and U.S. 
objections163.  This is the background against which I explore the American reaction to 
the South Korean nuclear weapons program. While much scholarly attention has been 
paid to the more recent (and successful) North Korean nuclear weapons program, there 
has been relatively little focus on the earlier South Korean program and, as I will show, 
the intense American efforts to stop the nuclear weapons program of a close strategic ally 
and valued economic partner. These efforts contrasted with an ambiguous American 
acceptance of the nuclear weapon capabilities of states such as India that were not allied 
with the United States nor as economically advanced as the Koreans. In the following 
section, I analyze and situate the two independent variables in my framework, Strategic 
Liability and Commercial Value, vis-à-vis the United States perception of South Korea. 
Next, I examine the policy adopted by the Nixon-Ford administrations towards South 
Korea’s nuclear weapon program, and show that the approach adopted by the United 
                                                 
163 A U.S. Embassy (in Seoul) cable calls the Park regime hypocritical, arguing that it moved to ratify the 
NPT to throw the American government off its trail even as it accelerated its nuclear weapons program. 
Source: “US Department of State Cable, ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 
12, 
1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National 
Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, Korea - State 




States corresponded to a policy of ‘Soft Rollback’ as defined previously. Finally, I 
examine the archival record to provide evidence for my argument that this policy of Soft 
Rollback was adopted by the United States due to perceptions of high Strategic Liability 
and high commercial value. 
4.2 CODING STRATEGIC LIABILITY AND COMMERCIAL VALUE IN THE U.S. – R.O.K.  
RELATIONSHIP -1974-76  
I code the first of my two independent variables, Strategic Liability, based on the 
values of the four constituent sub-variables, Primary conflict, Secondary conflict, Regime 
stability, and Common Threat perception. I have argued in my introductory chapter that 
an elevated level of Primary Conflict, Secondary Conflict or Regime Instability will 
result in a coding of the Strategic Liability variable as ‘High’.  
Primary Conflict: The U.S. and South Korea enjoyed a close security 
relationship since the Korean war of the 1950s. With the United States shouldering a 
significant portion of the burden to protect South Korea’s borders, either through its own 
troop deployments or through its military aid to the R.O.K., the primary conflict variable, 
which indicates the presence of a direct conflict between the U.S. and the proliferating 
state, is clearly low. 
Secondary Conflict: I shall show that the existence of latent conflicts between 
South Korea and its neighbors was a significant source of concern to the United States, 
with the possibility that a South Korean nuclear weapon capability would engender 
further nuclear proliferation in the region and rekindle conflicts between the R.O.K. and 
its neighbors. South Korea emerged from World War II and the Korean War significantly 
dependent on the United States for its security needs. The United States enjoyed a 
singular relationship with South Korea, having led the United Nations forces in pushing 
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back the Northern Communists in the Korean War. The stationing of thousands of 
American troops on the Korean peninsula effectively put the United States in the middle 
of any major conflict that involved the South.   
The end of World War II saw the defeat of Japan, the state that had colonized and 
ruled the Korean peninsula for much of the early twentieth century. The Cold War saw 
both Japan and South Korea, allies of the United States against the Soviet Union and 
China, come under the United States’ nuclear umbrella in exchange for the agreement 
that neither would develop an indigenous nuclear weapon capability164. Japan and South 
Korea started normalizing their relations in 1965, but relations between the two states 
were punctuated by tensions, including over the Park regime’s authoritarian turn and the 
kidnapping of a South Korean dissident from Tokyo, ostensibly by the Park regime165. 
Japan was also considered technologically advanced enough that the American 
intelligence community took the prospect of a Japanese nuclear program seriously. In a 
National Intelligence Estimate conducted in 1974 following the Indian nuclear tests, 
opinion was split about Japanese intentions. However, senior Intelligence officials 
arguing that – Japanese predilections towards nuclear proliferation aside – the country 
would seriously consider a nuclear weapon option in the near future, especially if the 
American nuclear umbrella showed signs of fraying166. An independent South Korean 
nuclear weapon capability would be seen as a repudiation of faith by the R.O.K in the 
                                                 
164 This was an explicit guarantee that was discussed and understood as such by the various parties 
involved, including Japan, the R.O.K., the U.S. and China. See “Operation War Shift: Position Paper, 
Second (Revised) Edition,” 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central Connecticut 
State University Library, 951.9 O546. Obtained by Brandon Gauthier. 
165 The U.S. Embassy expressed an opinion that this was “thuggery” on the part of the Park regime. See 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 
1973–1976, Document 244. 
166 While there was dissent within the Intelligence community, key officials from the Naval and Army 
intelligence wings were of the opinion that there was a strong chance that Japan would exercise a nuclear 
option to retain its influence in the region, “Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation” p. 32. This was prior to the 
evidence of South Korean attempts to build a nuclear weapon, which would only exacerbate the situation.  
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American umbrella and consequently put pressure on the Japanese to follow in the same 
path167. The tentative state of ties between South Korea and Japan added to American 
anxieties, since a powerful nuclear-armed South Korea would imply superiority over the 
Japanese in some respects.  
The other major consequence of a South Korean nuclear weapon capability was 
the impact on China and North Korea. The gradual normalization of U.S.-China relations 
during the Nixon administration resulted in angst within the Park administration, which 
worried that the United States would be less inclined to aid the South Koreans in any 
conflict with the North that involved Chinese involvement168. On its part, China viewed 
the R.O.K. with suspicion, arguing that with the United States that the Ford 
administration needed to ‘control’ the South, even as the Chinese reined in the North169. 
All of this clearly indicates the tangled nature of American security interests in East Asia 
in the early 1970s, even as the Ford administration confronted intelligence estimates that 
the Park government had decided to move forward with nuclear weapon development. In 
this climate, it is clear that a South Korean nuclear weapon - essentially a statement of 
independence from the American umbrella - would clearly provoke the Chinese even 
more. Senior officials in the Ford administration argued that an R.O.K. nuclear weapon 
                                                 
167 When this evidence came to light, the State Department was quick to raise an alarm about the negative 
effect such news would have on Japan. Source: “US Department of State Cable, ROK Plans to Develop 
Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 04,1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and 
the Pacific, Box 11, Korea – State Department Telegrams, to SecState - NODIS (3). Obtained by Charles 
Kraus. 
168 In fact, in one of its presentations to the Nixon administration, the Park regime actually argued that the 
Chinese would prefer that the U.S. maintain an armed presence in the R.O.K. as a force for stability, since 
an alternative could be renewed Japanese involvement. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1969–1976. Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, Document 106 
169 The Chinese were quite explicit in this regard, asking President Ford to “..keep any eye on Park Chung-
Hee..” because it was the U.S. that still had troops on the Korean peninsula, not China. Source: 
Memorandum of conversation between Vice-Premier Teng and President Ford, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Document 137. 
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would anger the Chinese government. Their concern was that this development would 
provoke it into introducing nuclear weapons in a conflict between the two Koreas, a 
catastrophic development in any circumstance but even more so given the presence of 
American troops on the peninsula170.   
As the preceding section shows, the security situation on the Korean peninsula 
was a matter of vital interest to both Japan and China, both of which would be affected by 
any qualitative change in the South’s military capabilities. This linkage was keenly 
understood by Ford administration officials who worried about the prospects of a rupture 
in the American nuclear umbrella as well as the tension between South Korea and the 
Chinese supported North Korean regime.  The Secondary Conflict sub-variable indicates 
American perceptions of the risk of security crises and increased proliferation following 
the aspirant’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. Clearly, senior officials in the 
Ford administration believed that the risk of knock-on effects was greatly elevated, which 
allows us to code its value as ‘high’. 
Regime Instability: The Park regime came to power in South Korea following a 
military coup that overthrew a short-lived civilian government. Its ruthless policies 
towards the domestic opposition and suppression of dissent was matched by an ambitious 
policy of industrialization that led to unprecedented economic expansion. While elements 
in the American government, especially members of the Democratic Party in the 
Congress, were extremely critical of the Park regime’s authoritarian actions, its economic 
success allowed it to gain support in other quarters, especially in the Ford administration 
                                                 
170 A State Department memorandum signaling concerns about South Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
argued that China (and even the Soviet Union) may be tempted to support the North Koreans with nuclear 
weapons in the event of a conflict between the two Koreas. Source: “US Department of State Cable, ROK 
Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 04, 1975, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for 
East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, Korea – State Department Telegrams, to SecState - NODIS (3). 
Obtained by Charles Kraus. 
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and its Republican base in Congress171.  The suppression of domestic dissent and the 
proliferation of economic growth also implied that there was little question about the 
stability of the Park regime, or at least, the institutions of the South Korean state. 
Consequently, the chances that the South Korean nuclear program would fall into ‘rogue’ 
hands was low. This allows us to code the Regime Instability sub-variable ‘low’. 
Common Threat Perception: This sub-variable indicates the presence of a 
common threat facing the United States and the nuclear aspirant. Even after the 
reconciliation between China and the United States following President Nixon’s visit to 
Beijing in 1971, South Korea remained a bulwark in the American struggle against 
Communism in the Cold War. The Kim Il-Sung led Communist government presented an 
extreme example of the threat that the United States perceived from Communist 
ideology, and the continuing Soviet threat were examples of the common threat facing 
the two states. In fact, the need to thwart communist advances was cited repeatedly by 
both the Nixon and Ford administrations in their arguments against Congressional 
attempts to curtail military aid to the Park regime following its crackdown on the 
opposition172. Nevertheless, the existence of these common threats was not a sufficient 
                                                 
171 While Nixon/Ford administration officials defended South Korea regularly in Congressional hearings 
and praised South Korea’s economic transformation, South Korea also had many supporters in Congress, 
many of whom were lobbied extensively by South Korea in the run-up to votes on military aid to the 
R.O.K. Several Republican members of Congress (and some Democrats) were tangled in a lobbying 
scandal that led to the arrest of several Americans of Korean origin. See “Kissinger defends U.S. aid to 
Seoul”, The New York Times, July 25, 1974. Also see “Lobbying by Koreans apparently paid off”, ibid. 
December 25, 1976. 
172 One of the reasons administration officials such as Kissinger gave in defending American support to the 
Park regime was that it was the ‘realist’ thing to do. In pushing back against Congressional attempts to cut 
aid to the R.O.K., Henry Kissinger argued that the United States did not have the leverage to get the Park 
regime to moderate its ways. The interesting issue is of course that the U.S. did have leverage, it was that it 
would rather use it in instances where its national security interests were threatened, such as when the Park 
government tried to accelerate a nuclear weapon development program. See Memorandum of conversation 
between Kissinger and Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–
1976, Document 269. 
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condition to acquiescence with or even turn a blind eye towards the South Korean nuclear 
program. I have postulated previously that the presence of a common threat acts as an 
enabling function to American acquiescence (with the aspirant’s nuclear program), when 
other factors are conducive (namely the other components of strategic liability) and high 
commercial value. However, when that is not the case, an elevated common threat 
perception will have no effect, as I will show in the following section. 
The preceding analysis indicates that among the main determinative components 
of strategic liability, the Secondary conflict variable is elevated. As argued earlier, the 
elevation of any one of these factors is a necessary and sufficient condition for increased 
strategic liability. Clearly, the perception in the Ford administration that the acquisition of 
a nuclear weapon capability by the South Korean government would set off a chain of 
proliferation and conflict in East Asia is the clearest indication that the R.O.K. nuclear 
weapons program presented a high degree of strategic liability to the United States. 
Therefore, I code the Strategic liability variable ‘high’. 
4.3 CODING COMMERCIAL VALUE IN THE U.S. – SOUTH KOREA RELATIONSHIP 1974-76 
 The commercial value variable is the second independent variable in my 
framework and represents the value of the proliferating state’s economic relationship 
with the United States to the Executive. In the case of South Korea, the United States was 
vested in the entrenchment of a capitalist economic system and its success to a significant 
degree. While the period between the end of the Korean War and the early 1960s saw the 
consolidation of military led right-wing governments and economic stagnation, South 
Korea experienced spectacular economic growth starting in the mid-1960s with a policy 
of export oriented industrialization under Park Chung-Hee. This policy was encouraged 
by the successive U.S. administrations, with targeted economic aid and technical 
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support173. The United States also became the R.O.K.’s largest export market, to which a 
significant share of Korean textile and electronics exports were directed. The early 1970s 
also saw a crucial change in the economic relationship between the two states, from an 
unequal trade partnership - where aid from the United States to South Korea 
predominated -to a more equal relationship. For the first time, significant American 
investment started flowing into South Korea174. Recognizing the attractiveness of the 
South Korean market, companies from American started pushing for access to the R.O.K, 
with the United States government unafraid to use the strategic leverage it possessed (in 
the form of both military aid as well as the presence of American troops) to prod the 
reluctant Park regime into creating a more hospitable environment for American 
investment175. That the trade relationship between the two states was important enough 
that American officials were willing to do so underscored the importance that the South 
Korean economy had attained in a relatively short period of time. 
                                                 
173 By 1970, the South Korean economy had grown at a pace of more than 11% for seven years, a 
development characterized by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger as ‘spectacular’ in a note to 
President Nixon, who nevertheless recommended focused (but diminishing) economic aid to Seoul. By 
1972, economic assistance to Seoul had dwindled significantly. Source: Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969–1976.Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, Document 50. 
174 Economists who have studied trade between the two states have argued that the period following 1972 
is when economic ties between the two countries became truly bilateral and symmetric, with the last 
vestiges of the donor-recipient relationship ending. The period between 1972-76 saw prominent American 
companies such as Corning Glass starting joint investment projects in Korea, and the first Korean ventures 
startup in the U.S. Another qualitative change was the active involvement of American government 
officials in smoothening the way for American companies to invest in Korea. Source: “Incentives and 
Restraints: Government Regulation of Direct Investment between Korea and the United States, Cho, Dong 
Sung, in “From Patron to Partner, The Development of U.S-Korean Business and Trade Relations”, pp. 49, 
50. LexingtonBooks, 1984, pp. 49-50 
175 An official in the United States Embassy in Seoul told a New York Times reporter that U.S. security 
commitments were implicit in the pressure being applied on the Park government to “discriminate in favor 
of the United States and against Japan” in trade, with the unspoken assumption that if Park wanted to keep 
U.S. troops in South Korea, he needed to show preferential (or at least liberal) treatment to American 
commercial investments. Source: See “U.S. Gaining in South Korean export drive”, The New York Times, 
July 5, 1973. 
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 The Korean economic miracle was the only bright spot in the American 
relationship with the Park regime, which, at the start of the Ford administration, came 
under sustained attack from (primarily Democratic members of) Congress - fatigued by 
the highly unpopular American involvement in the Vietnam conflict - over its human 
rights record and lack of tolerance for dissent at home. One of the chief pieces of 
contention between the Republican led Executive branch and Congress was military aid 
to South Korea. Facing sustained pressure to curtail both military aid and sales of military 
hardware to the Park regime, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who dominated the 
foreign policy operations of both Nixon and Ford, defended the United States’ continued 
assistance to the Park regime on strategic grounds, arguing that South Korea was a 
crucial firewall against further Communist expansion176. An important factor that worked 
in favor of the administration’s position was the importance of the arms sales to South 
Korea to the American defense industry. The R.O.K. had emerged as one of the largest 
importers of American made armaments, with American supplied credit facilitating much 
of the trade. This was an important consideration, as well as an advantage that was used 
by the both the Nixon and Ford administrations to fend off any efforts to curtail 
American aid and credit to the South Korean military177. The South Korean government 
was further aided in Washington by the presence of a strong pro-R.O.K. lobby, which 
retained extensive influence in both the Democratic and Republican parties, but more so 
                                                 
176 Kissinger argued that South Korea’s strategic position was “very crucial to Japan” and that the United 
States agreed with the government of Japan’s assessment. Ibid. July 25, 1974, NYT 
177 The military credit program was sacrosanct to both the administration and lawmakers. Even in the midst 
of a fierce debate on the Park regime’s authoritarian actions that saw the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee voting to cut military aid to South Korea, Congress left untouched a program that let the R.O.K. 
purchase weapons from American manufacturers on favorable credit terms. Likewise, prior to the nuclear 
crisis becoming a significant concern for the White House, the administration forcefully pushed for South 
Korea to purchase warplanes and other sought after arms from American manufacturers rather than 
countries such as France or Britain. Source: Minutes of Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, January 6, 1975, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 
1973–1976, Document 261. 
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on the Republican side. The importance of the trade relationship with South Korea is 
further emphasized by the remarkable fact that even in the midst of the clamor to sanction 
military assistance to the Park regime for its suppression of the opposition, there was 
virtually no move in Congress or on the part of the Administration to take any action that 
would imperil the broader South Korean economy. With the United States continuing to 
be the largest export market for South Korea, accounting for close to 40% of its exports 
in 1975, any move to take punitive actions in this area would cripple the South’s 
economy178. However, both Congress and the Ford administration privileged the 
economic success that the R.O.K. enjoyed under Park above these considerations. In a 
stopover in Seoul at the height of Congressional protests against the human rights 
situation in South Korea, President Ford highlighted179 it as a successful example of 
American efforts to spread capitalism, and signed an agreement with President Park 
where the two states agreed that the R.O.K. government would continue and accelerate 
economic policies that had contributed to its becoming the next major Asian economic 
powerhouse after Japan. From a purely economic standpoint, a major focus of the 
American government was ensuring that American companies had access to the South 
Korean market. Even as the R.O.K. government tenaciously lobbied to exempt Korean 
textile companies from anti-dumping duties (primarily targeted Japanese firms that were 
perceived to be dumping products into the U.S.), President Park confronted lobbying by 
American industrialists and government officials who wanted him to remove extensive 
                                                 
178 See “Country Destination of Korean exports” Table 7-5 , The New Competitors: Industrial Strategies of 
Taiwan and Korea, Competing Economies: America, Europe and the Pacific Rim, Congress of the United 
States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991, p. 303.  
179Ford highlighted the ‘Korean miracle of material progress” and his admiration for “the rapid and 
sustained economic progress” of South Korea. Noticeably silent on the main topic of contention back in the 
United States – the lack of space afforded to the Korean opposition – the joint communique between Ford 
and Park instead played up the economic ties between the two states. Source: Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. LXXI, No. 1852, December 23, pp. 878. Gerald Ford Presidential Library Online archives.  
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import barriers that had been enacted to safeguard Korean manufacturers.180. That 
American political discourse had moved on from preoccupation with aiding the South to 
celebrating its economy and negotiating access to it was a testament to the see change in 
how the Ford administration valued its economic relationship with the R.O.K. Indeed, 
faced with the collapse of South Vietnam and the lack of a functioning democratic system 
in the R.O.K., the economic success story was the one major achievement that the Ford 
administration could point to in its battle against communism in East Asia. This allowed 
the Ford administration to reinforce established policy in the Korean peninsula as well as 
reap the domestic advantages wrought by its commercial success. For all of these reasons 
that were enumerated above, one can code the ‘Commercial Value’ variable as ‘high’. A 
combination of the burgeoning trade relationship with the booming South Korean 
economy and the prospects it engendered, as well as the credibility that this success 
generated at the domestic and international level for the Ford administration’s support for 
free market economies – especially in a case where the contrast was expressed in such 
stark terms on the North Korean side – contributed to this perception and boosted the 
Commercial value of the relationship on the American side. 
 Summarizing the preceding analysis, we see that the United States-South Korean 
relationship in the mid- 1970s was governed by American perceptions of high strategic 
liability and high commercial value. In the following section, I examine archival evidence 
                                                 
180 The Korean government’s position had consistently been that access to American markets, especially 
for its textile sector, was a matter of “life and death”. This position was articulated as early as 1971 by 
Korean Prime Minister Kim, to National Security Advisor Kissinger. As seen previously, the American 
market was still the largest one for Korean exports as late as 1975. Source: Letter from Kim to Kissinger. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972, Document 
112. 
 The question of Korean barriers to American investment consistently came up in conversations between 
American and Korean officials. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume XIX, Part 
1, Korea, 1969–1972, Document 111 for an early example of this dynamic. As seen earlier, the American 
embassy was not hesitant to play the strategic card to advance American commercial interests in later years, 
especially when the weakening of the American security guarantee became a possibility. 
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to determine whether this constellation of factors led to the adoption of a policy of ‘Soft 
rollback’ by the Ford administration towards the Park regime’s attempts to develop 
nuclear weapons, as my theory predicts. 
4.4 THE EVIDENCE - DID THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A POLICY OF ‘SOFT ROLLBACK’ 
IN RESPONSE TO THE SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM 
This section answers the following questions 
- Did the United States under President Ford pursue a policy of ‘Soft Rollback’ 
towards the South Korea nuclear program? 
- Did this policy flow from the perception of high strategic liability and high 
commercial value?   
The United States was caught by surprise when confronted with evidence in late 
1974 that the Park administration was planning to use sought after nuclear fuel 
reprocessing technology to advance a nuclear weapon capability. As noted earlier, major 
U.S. intelligence assessment of the prospects for nuclear proliferation following the 
Indian nuclear test in May 1974 discounted the possibility of a South Korean nuclear 
weapons program and relegated discussion on the country to an afterthought. This 
situation changed dramatically by December 1974, when confidential intelligence sources 
indicated to the American embassy in Seoul that the Park government had made a 
decision to pursue nuclear weapons181. By February 1975, an intra-agency intelligence 
                                                 
181 The intelligence reports were sufficiently worrying that (now) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked 
for a classified assessment so the U.S. could verify the authenticity of the report. Source: “US Department 
of State Cable, ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” December 11, 1974, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser 
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, Korea – State Department Telegrams, to 
SecState - NODIS (2). Obtained by Charles Kraus (Wilson Center). 
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task force released a National Security Memorandum that agreed with this assessment 
and came out with the first set of policies to deal with this development182. Acting under 
the leadership of Secretary of State Kissinger, the task force decided to pursue a policy of 
technology denial, inhibiting South Korean access to nuclear technology from the United 
States and persuading other states to stop the transfer of such technology to the Park 
government183. Additionally, the Ford administration resolved to block the sale of other 
sensitive technology such as missile systems and other sophisticated defense equipment – 
even if not directly connected to a nuclear weapons program – to send a ‘signal’ to the 
South Koreans that the United States had discovered their intent to develop nuclear 
weapons.  
Technology Denial and Disruption: A major concern for the United States was the 
R.O.K.’s plans to purchase nuclear fuel reprocessing technology from France. The United 
States pursued a multi-pronged strategy to prevent the R.O.K. from obtaining this 
capability, viewed by Ford administration officials as a stepping stone to nuclear weapon 
capability. In multiple meetings, American officials worked to persuade the French 
government not to proceed with the sale184.  On the financial side, senior officials from 
                                                 
182 This initial National Security Memorandum focused primarily on inhibiting South Korean access to 
nuclear, dual use and strategic technology, as well as pressurizing the Park government to ratify the NPT. 
Source: “US National Security Council Memorandum, ROK Weapons Plans,” March 03, 1975, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser 
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (4). Obtained by Charles Kraus 
(Wilson Center). 
183 With these actions, the emphasis was on indirectly signaling to the South Korean government that the 
U.S. was aware of its plans. There was not yet a plan to directly confront it. Ibid 6(a) pp. 4.  
184 The United States approached both the French and the Canadians (who were also in the process of 
selling a CANDU nuclear reactor) to the R.O.K. The record indicates that both of these states agreed to 
cooperate with the United States with Canada in particular coordinating closely with the U.S. government 
and following up with the Park regime. The Korean response to Canada was that the reprocessing plant was 
needed to reprocess American supplied spent nuclear fuel, which was in contradiction with the American 
stand that it would not approve any such reprocessing, the fear being that it would be used to produce 
weapons grade plutonium. Canada now threatened to cancel the sale of the CANDU reactor if it was not 
satisfied by the Korean plan. Source: “US Department of State Cable, ROKG/Canadian Negotiations on 
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the Ford administration worked with Congress to slow down proceedings to approve 
Export-Import (Ex-IM) bank credits to South Korea for the purchase of American made 
nuclear reactors185. Pressure was also applied directly on the Park administration, with the 
American ambassador to South Korea and several American officials visiting Seoul 
reinforcing the message that the procurement of reprocessing technology would setback 
relations between the two states and exacerbate tensions between South Korea and its 
neighbors186. 
Strategic pressure: The American military presence on the Korean peninsula was 
one of the United States’ greatest points of leverage with the Park administration. The 
stationing of the U.S. army behind the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that marked the de facto 
border between the North and the South was perceived by the South Korean government 
and others as being the biggest deterrent against another invasion by Communist forces 
from the North. In fact, the threat of an American withdrawal from South Korea, similar 
to what had occurred contemporarily in South Vietnam, was one of the motivating factors 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nuclear Energy,” July 08, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford 
Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 
Box 9, Korea (9). Obtained by Charles Kraus. 
185 The administration predicted serious difficulties for the Ex-IM bank proposal in Congress and in any 
case, recommended that the plan to submit to for approval be delayed until “clarifications” were obtained 
from the Park government regarding its reprocessing plans. Ibid. 2 
186 The highest level (albeit indirect) approach came when American Defense Secretary Schlesinger met 
President Park and warned him that the U.S. attached the highest importance to South Korean adherence to 
the NPT, and by implication to resist plans to reprocess fuel in violation of (the American interpretation) of 
reprocessing safeguards. The U.S. Defense Secretary also pointedly told Park that it would be the 
Americans’ responsibility to hold the line against the Soviet and Chinese threat and that any Korean 
attempt to disregard the NPT would have deleterious consequences among its neighbors and for support in 
the U.S. This came in the context of Park’s statement to a reporter that Korea would exercise a nuclear 
option if the U.S. security umbrella were withdrawn. Park was forced to disavow that statement in his 
conversation with Schlesinger. It did not appear that the U.S. took this at face value, for it accelerated 
attempts to deny the sale of reprocessing equipment to Korea. Source: “Memoranda of Conversations 
between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyongchul,” August 26, 1975, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser 
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9,Korea (11). Obtained by Charles Kraus. 
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for the Park’s push to develop an indigenous nuclear weapon capability. However, the 
fact that Park continued attempts to purchase nuclear reprocessing equipment from 
France signals that this explanation was at best, partial. While Park was indeed concerned 
about the short-term robustness of the American nuclear guarantee, one way to read his 
efforts is as an attempt to obtain strategic independence for his government187. Senior 
officials from the Ford administration advocated a stronger and more ‘direct’ approach to 
prevent the Korean nuclear weapon program starting in early 1975. Proponents of this 
approach included the American Ambassador to South Korea, Richard Sneider. What 
such an approach would entail was a topic of extreme secrecy, with much of the archival 
material still classified. However, there is clear evidence that the United States 
pressurized the Park administration using one of the most potent tools available at its 
disposal – the presence of American troops on the Korean peninsula. Declassified 
memoranda on the subject between the State Department and Ford White House officials 
show that the Park regime was cautioned that the strategic relationship between the two 
states was in danger if the R.O.K.’s nuclear program continued, a clear signal that 
American security commitments were at risk188. At the same time, American officials 
continued to reassure the Park regime that the U.S. was committed to protecting South 
                                                 
187 State Department officials were somewhat cognizant of this fact, arguing that a South Korean nuclear 
weapon program was partly an attempt by Park to reduce his dependence on America, militarily. Source: 
“US National Security Council Memorandum, ROK Weapons Plans,” March 03, 1975, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser 
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (4). Obtained by Charles Kraus. 
188 Ambassador Sneider conveyed to Vice-Premier Nam that further Korean efforts to purchase 
reprocessing technology would lead to “very adverse” implications for the relationship between the two 
states. He followed this up with a message that the broad political and security relationship between the two 
states would be affected, with negative consequences for American security support to Korea, a direct link 
to the American troops stationed near the DMZ. This was the American trump card, since Park could not 
afford to lose the American security guarantee. Source: “US Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear 
Reprocessing,” December 10, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, 
Box 11, Korea - State Department Telegrams, to SecState - NODIS (8). Obtained by Charles Kraus.  
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Korea against any attack from the North, and maintaining its military presence, as long as 
its warnings on the nuclear issue were heeded. On this crucial aspect of the American 
strategy to thwart Park’s nuclear ambitions, there was no public comment by American 
officials. When the Ford administration was finally able to persuade the French 
government to refuse the sale of nuclear reprocessing technology to the Park government, 
Ford administration officials were particularly careful to frame this as a decision by the 
South Korean government to abandon attempts to purchase this technology. Such tactics 
were consistent with the administration’s imperative to allow Park to ‘save face’189, while 
stopping him from pursuing an indigenous nuclear weapon capability.  This tactic 
however was belied by the reality that the American government was threatening the 
R.O.K. with severe consequences, a fact attested to by news reports quoting Korean 
officials to the effect that the cancelation of the French nuclear reprocessing equipment 
purchase was a direct consequence of American pressure bordering on threats190.  
Absence of economic pressure: One of the remarkable features of the American 
campaign against the Korean nuclear program was the absence of economic pressure. 
While we have seen that the U.S. threatened the South with a military aid cut-off and 
restrictions on the sales of arms and armaments, the archival record does not show any 
evidence indicating American attempts to threaten trade or economic actions beyond the 
military sector. South Korea was certainly vulnerable to American pressure in this area, 
with textile and electronic exports to the United States accounting for a significant 
                                                 
189 Sneider advocated a discreet approach that conveyed a tough message to President Park, while avoiding 
public threats that would cause a “humiliating loss of face and prestige” for the latter. Source: “US 
Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing,” January 05, 1976, History and Public 
Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser 
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 12, Korea - State Department Telegrams, 
to SecState - NODIS (10). Obtained by Charles Kraus. 
190 See “Seoul officials say strong American pressure forced cancelation of plans to purchase a French 
nuclear plant”, The New York Times, February 1, 1976. 
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portion of that country’s export oriented economy. After a period of sustained and 
spectacular growth, the Korean economy was under strain following the 1974 Oil shock, 
when Middle-Eastern states curtailed oil exports to the West (and to Western allies). 
Protectionist pressures on the Ford administration – primarily directed at the rising 
Japanese exports to the United States – were already beginning to inflict collateral 
damage on the much smaller Korean export segment, an issue that was repeatedly raised 
by visiting South Korean officials to Washington (and heard with sympathy)191. In such a 
situation, any attempts to curtail access to the lucrative American market would certainly 
have appeared extremely threatening to the Park regime. The absence of such pressure 
highlights the fact that the Ford administration privileged the economic relationship with 
South Korea and the success of the capitalist experiment there. Whether it was attempts 
by the Ford administration to sanction South Korean nuclear and military technology to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or attempts in Congress to force the Park 
administration to reduce the suppression of dissent, economic sanctions on the R.O.K. 
clearly appeared to be off-limits. The sacrosanct status of the Korean economic 
relationship across issues rebuts a potential counter-argument for the omission of 
economic measures in the Ford administration’s response - that it was a tactical choice. In 
this narrative, considering that one of the Park regime’s primary reasons for developing a 
                                                 
191 President Park was particularly forthcoming about South Korea’s economic troubles in the context of 
the 1974 Arab oil embargo in his conversations with President Ford with Ford promising to work with the 
former to mitigate the problems being faced by the R.O.K. Source: Memorandum of Conversation, 
November 22, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 Volume E–12, Documents on East 
and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Document 258. 
Even as the Ford administration moved to curtail the sale of missile technology to the R.O.K. in the context 
of the nuclear reprocessing issue, there was little discussion on other broader punitive economic measures 
such as targeting South Korean textile and electronic imports. All of this occurred in the context of furious 
American lobbying to enhance American access to the South Korean market. See “Us Department of State 
Memorandum, Sale of Rocket Propulsion Technology to South Korea, ”February 04, 1975, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser 
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9,Korea (3). Obtained by Charles Kraus. 
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nuclear weapon capability was the lack of faith in the American nuclear and conventional 
military umbrella, this perception engendered a reactive response that targeted the 
strategic pressure points of the Park regime. As we have shown earlier, American policy-
makers abjured economic sanctions in other disputes with South Korea as well, 
diminishing the salience of this argument. 
I have argued that a policy of soft-rollback includes strategic pressure in the form of 
threats to deny military assistance, covert (and discreet) technology denial and disruption 
activities, attempts to deny the aspirant the benefits obtained from membership of 
international institutions, and crucially, the absence of economic pressure. As we have 
seen in the preceding discussion, the United States pursued a determined policy of rolling 
back the South Korean government’s nuclear weapon capability. However, the tools used 
in this strategy were deliberately crafted to avoid any damage to the R.O.K.’s successful 
and growing capitalist economy and its ties with the United States market.  While the 
Ford administration pressurized the South Koreans using its military deployment on the 
peninsula as leverage, the pressure was discreet, applied over a year-long period in such a 
way as to avoid embarrassment to the Park government. There was no evidence of 
economic sanctions, but there were clearly attempts to deny South Korea access to 
nuclear and strategic technology. While the U.S. did not threaten South Korea’s 
membership of international institutions, the Ford administration attempted to preclude 
the technology cooperation that the R.O.K. would obtain from its accession to the NPT, 
by lobbying France and Canada to stop nuclear cooperation with the Park regime. 
Together, these tactics were substantially consistent with a policy of soft rollback as 
enunciated earlier. The motivation for such a policy can be ascertained from the 
discussions within the Ford administration following the determination that the South 
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Korean government was set on a course that would lead to the development of a nuclear 
weapon capability. Early deliberations on the prospect of a South Korean nuclear weapon 
program highlighted the risk that Japan would view this as a repudiation of faith by the 
R.O.K. in the American nuclear umbrella, prompting it to follow down the same path. A 
State Department analysis that concluded that South Korea was pursuing its own nuclear 
weapons program - beginning with the procurement of reprocessing capabilities - also 
concluded that Japan would be directly and negatively affected by this development192. 
As discussed previously, Japan’s continued presence under the American nuclear 
umbrella was no longer a forgone conclusion in the minds of some members of the Ford 
administration. The State Department analysis noted that a nuclear South Korea would 
present, at minimum, an urgent impetus to Japan to consider its own nuclear weapon 
status. Another potential concern for the United States was the reaction of China. China 
considered South Korea a disruptive state that needed to be ‘controlled’ by the United 
States. Indeed, as the archival record previously reviewed demonstrates, that Ford 
administration was extremely concerned about the knock-on effect of the R.O.K. nuclear 
program on China. American officials were extremely concerned by the possibility that 
the advent of a South Korean nuclear arsenal would ignite latent conflict in the region or 
lead to further nuclear proliferation due to the security dynamics at work between South 
Korea and its neighbors. The reasons for this linkage are evident from a perusal of the 
discussions between the Ford administration and Chinese officials at the time the U.S. 
was secretly resisting the Park government’s nuclear weapon push. ‘Managing’ South 
Korean behavior was a topic of repeated conversations between the U.S. and China 
                                                 
192 Ford’s National Security Council explicitly called a South Korean nuclear weapon capability a tipping 
point as far as Japan’s nuclear direction went. Any such eventuality would, in this opinion, push Japan to 
develop its own nuclear weapons, which it was technically capable of doing. Source: National Security 
Council Memorandum from John Froebe to Henry Kissinger for propagation to other Departments. July 11, 
1975. Ford Presidential Library Archives. 
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during both the Nixon and Ford administrations, with the American side repeatedly 
stressing that they would not tolerate any aggression against the South, while stressing 
that it would do its best to make sure Chinese security concerns were assuaged. Even as 
relations between United States and China started to normalize, the potential for South 
Korea to take unilateral steps in the areas of defense was a threatening prospect for the 
Chinese, who repeatedly expressed the opinion that the Park regime was responsible for 
continued “provocations and attacks” on the peninsula, while the North Korean 
government was trying to advance peaceful reunification193. Clearly, the elevated 
strategic liability perceived by Ford administration officials between the R.O.K.’s nuclear 
weapon program and the negative effects it would have on Japan and China demonstrates 
informed the strong American efforts to roll it back. 
While the perception of high strategic liability explains the American 
determination to roll back South Korea’s nuclear weapon program, we have seen that 
U.S. efforts were significantly circumscribed. While efforts to deny access to not just 
reprocessing material but also non-nuclear related strategic armaments such as missiles 
are consistent with the elevated strategic liability perceived by the U.S., the limits placed 
by the U.S. on its response, such as the significant absence of threats to sanction Korean 
commercial interests, clearly need further explanation. The United States valued the 
success of the South Korean economy and the burgeoning trade relationship between the 
two states, a fact underlined by the absence of any serious attempts by opponents of the 
                                                 
193 Well into the “normalization” phase of Sino-American relations, the Chinese government referred to 
President Park of South Korea as a provocateur who had aggressive designs on the North, while the U.S. 
was careful to say that it was responsible for restraining the South as long as China kept the North Koreans 
in check. A representative example can be found in the conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger 
and Ambassador Huang of the Chinese liaison office in Washington on May 9, 1975. There is no evidence 
to suggest that the Korean nuclear program was discussed, which is understandable given American 
concerns about Chinese reaction at that time while it was still working to stop the Park government. 




Park regime in Congress, much less the Ford administration, to threaten action against the 
R.O.K.’s economy in the hope of pushing it in a more democratic direction194. Even as 
the President Ford’s advisors debated measures to curb the South Korean nuclear 
program, they were deeply involved in discussions to further open up the Korean market 
to American manufacturers. As described earlier, one of the highlights of President 
Ford’s visit to Korea was a joint communique that privileged the economic relationship 
of both countries. The record also shows that while Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
defended (and was defensive about) the continued American military support to a regime 
that many in Congress considered repressive and unworthy of such assistance, there was 
no such ambiguity about the economic aspect of the relationship. American trade ties 
with South Korea enjoyed unqualified and public support from the top echelons of the 
Ford administration, and even from Congress. Apart from the purely economic benefits 
this growing relationship promised, it also offered the one tangible and credible success 
that the Executive Branch could show for its efforts in the Korean peninsula. Given this 
narrative, it is clear why the United States eschewed economic threats in its campaign 
against President Park’s nuclear weapon program, even as it brandished the threat of a 
military withdrawal and worked to stifle South Korean access to nuclear technology and 
missile delivery systems. While the administration fought a covert battle to dissuade the 
Park administration from developing nuclear weapons using its strategic ties as a 
bargaining chip, domestically it used the same strategic ties and the economic success of 
the R.O.K to frame the question of U.S.-Korean relations as one that afforded the United 
                                                 
194 This was a time of economic malaise in the United States, with high inflation being one of the primary 
problems. Cheap Korean imports were important to the Korean economy and the American one. 
Contemporary evidence of this dynamic can be found in newspaper reports of the time that praised Korean 
imports for keeping the price of consumer durables down. See “Park’s shining Korean Camelot”, The New 




States a strategic and economic advantage in the Cold War. In that it was successful in 
using Congressional reluctance to tie the hands of the Executive on foreign policy matters 
to win support for its policies195. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
I have previously argued that when the United States faces a nuclear aspirant that 
presents a high degree of strategic liability but is in a bilateral relationship that can be 
characterized as having high commercial value to America, it will pursue a policy of 
‘Soft Rollback’. This is characterized by military and strategic pressures short of the 
threat of actual conflict or the threat of action, sustained efforts to deny the nuclear 
aspirant access to military and civilian nuclear technology; but lacking any significant 
economic sanctions or the curtailment of financial assistance. I distinguish this set of 
measures, which I have termed ‘Soft Rollback’, from the basket of tactics adopted as part 
of an ‘Active Rollback’ strategy where the United States pursues coercive military and 
economic pressure when it perceives high strategic liability and low commercial value. In 
the South Korean case, I have shown that the United States pursued a circumscribed 
policy towards the South Korean government’s nuclear weapons program, threatening to 
end military cooperation and blocking financing and the sale of military equipment. This, 
while advocating continued economic cooperation and trade with a country whose 
economic success was valued by the Ford administration, both for its intrinsic value as a 
credible example of America’s endeavors to advance capitalism during the Cold War, 
                                                 
195 The Ford administration was ultimately successful in beating back efforts in Congress to cut military 
aid to the R.O.K. crucially, even that limited effort would not have entailed any economic sanctions against 
the Park regime. This was not the case with other countries. For example, Congress tried to impose trade 
sanctions on the Soviet Union in opposition to its immigration policies, an effort it was more successful in.  
Kissinger actually argued that Congress was interfering in the day to day foreign affairs functions of the 
Administration, a charge Congress was sensitive to. See “Kissinger asks Congress not to limit his 
flexibility”, The New York Times, January 8, 1975. 
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and for the commercial opportunities it engendered. The archival record shows that the 
American government weighed the perceived negative effects of a South Korean nuclear 
weapon on Japan and China before deciding to pursue an aggressive approach towards 
the Park regime’s efforts. President Ford and his advisors worked hard to grow the U.S.-
R.O.K. trade relationship even while abjuring the suggestion of economic sanctions as a 
means to slow the latter’s nuclear progress196. Importantly, this discussion also shows that 
the intent of the nuclear aspirant is only one (and not necessarily the most important) 
among several factors that the United States considers in evaluating a response to the 
former’s nuclear program. In the R.O.K.’s case the fact that South Korea intended a 
nuclear weapon as a measure of strategic independence and not a threat to the U.S. or its 
neighbors was of little comfort to the U.S. and can only partially explain the liability 
perceived by the latter, which arguably was most concerned about the impact of this 
development on China and North Korea. In this case, the strategic intentions of the 
R.O.K. offered some insight into its vulnerabilities, the discussion here shows that the set 
of options that the U.S. exercises (or threatens to exercise) against the proliferator are 
typically bounded by the perception of strategic liability and commercial value. 
This substantially supports my case that the strategy adopted by the American 
government under President Ford towards the South Korean nuclear weapons program 
was shaped by the perception of high strategic liability and high commercial value, 
leading to the basket of measures that together constituted a policy of ‘Soft Rollback’, 
                                                 
196 Another example of Soft Rollback would be France in the late 1950s and 60s when the U.S. under 
President Eisenhower was confronted with the possibility that a French nuclear capability would alarm the 
Soviet Union, destabilize NATO and potentially jump-start a West German nuclear weapons effort. The 
administration pursued tactics in this case that included efforts to deny technology to France, warn it about 
the loss of American protection even while abjuring any economic sanctions. In this case however, the 
French government called the American bluff. See Baum, Keith W., “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: 
The Eisenhower Administration, France, and Nuclear Weapons”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, 
No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 315-328 
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which in this case was successful in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the 
Korean peninsula.  
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Chapter 5:  Strategic Acquiescence 
In this chapter, I examine the United States response to nuclear aspirants who 
present a combination of low strategic liability and high commercial value from the 
standpoint of the United States. I posit that this combination of independent variables will 
lead to the adoption of a policy of Strategic Acquiescence by the American government 
towards the state that is acquiring or advancing its nuclear weapons program. The lack of 
strategic liability will relax the constraints on the American government that would 
typically have forced it to adopt an adversarial approach to the nuclear program of the 
state in question. This will allow not just tacit but de jure acceptance of the legitimacy of 
the aspirant’s military and civilian nuclear programs. Additionally, I propose that the 
elevated commercial value of the relationship will mean active participation of the United 
States in nuclear facilitation and trade with the aspiring state’s nuclear energy sector. 
Insofar as the United States retains a latent interest in its nuclear weapon superiority and 
in non-proliferation, I do not expect that this acquiescence extends to trade or assistance 
in nuclear armaments directly. The significance of the commercial value variable is that it 
counteracts opposition to nuclear trade that may otherwise arise from traditional non-
proliferation advocates and engenders trade linkages between the nuclear aspirant and the 
United States. These create incentives for the American Executive to legitimize the 
nuclear status of the former and reduce the threshold for the Executive’s acceptance of 
(further) non-proliferation commitments made by the aspirant. In this chapter, I will show 
how this specific combination of low strategic liability and high commercial value will 
lead to a permissive nuclear policy by the United States, where it actively promotes the 
sale of civilian nuclear know-how, equipment and fuel to the state in question, leaving the 
latter free to pursue a military nuclear program unconstrained by American sanctions. 
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This strategic acquiescence with the nuclear goals of the partner state is the most liberal 
of the four different policy actions that my model postulates. 
The major case I examine in this chapter is that of China in the early to mid-1980s 
when President Ronald Reagan of the United States confronted the prospects of a China 
whose nuclear program had grown to an unprecedented level of sophistication. This, even 
as the United States and China had developed close strategic and economic relations, 
building on the opening during the Nixon administration more than a decade earlier. 
While still a Communist state, China had grown estranged from the Soviet Union to a 
point where the United States now viewed the Chinese as essentially a partner in the Cold 
War. The relationship between the two Communist giants never recovered from the Sino-
Soviet split of the early 1960s and the border conflict in 1969. American relations with 
the Soviet Union were particularly fraught in this period, as the Reagan administration 
fought proxy battles with the USSR in areas such as Afghanistan, and adopted a tough 
public posture against what President Reagan described as the ‘evil Empire’197. The 
Chinese enjoyed reasonably warm relationships with Western European allies of the 
United States, many of which had preceded the United States in normalizing relations 
with the Chinese. Trade and commerce between the rapidly industrializing Chinese 
economy and a stagnant American one was one of the top priorities of both President 
Reagan and previous administrations. The Chinese economy had registered strong growth 
following the end of the Cultural Revolution and the program of economic liberalization 
that started in the 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, and the United States was eager to take 
advantage of the economic opportunities that this afforded. 
 
                                                 
197 Reagan first made this statement in March 1981 after he had taken office as President of the United 
States and provoked angry backlash from Russia. See “Gromyko rejects Reagan arms plan”, New York 
Times, April 3, 1983. 
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 In the following sections, I will show that the United States perceived low 
strategic liability from the Chinese nuclear program and a high degree of commercial 
value from this relationship. Structural conditions at this time, such as the presence of a 
significant common threat in the form of the Soviet Union and the low probability that 
American nuclear cooperation with an already nuclear capable China would qualitatively 
influence the Soviet or Indian nuclear programs, contributed to the lack of perceived 
strategic liability. The potential of greatly expanded trade and commerce with China 
further engendered nuclear cooperation. This combination allowed the American 
government under President Reagan to pursue an agreement for the sale of nuclear 
reactors and material to China’s civilian nuclear sector, with no restrictions on China’s 
ability to further develop its military focused nuclear program. Below, I first examine the 
strategic and economic background of the American-Chinese relationship during the 
Reagan administration. Next, I examine archival evidence from this period to understand 
how the United States perceived the strategic liability arising out of China’s nuclear 
program. Using contemporary data and records from the Reagan administration, I present 
an argument to mark the Chinese economic relationship as one having high commercial 
value for the Reagan administration. Finally, I examine the archival evidence to 
understand the nature of the policies adopted by the U.S. towards the Chinese program, 
and whether these policies were affected by the American perception of strategic liability 
and commercial value. In addition to the Chinese case under Reagan, I also briefly 
examine the American engagement with India during 2004-2006 when India emerged as 
a significant economic partner and potential strategic ally of the United States. This 
occurred at a time when India had embarked on a program of modernization and growth 
in both its civilian and military nuclear capabilities. The United States was in a position 
where it had to make a choice between its previous policy of weak acceptance of India’s 
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nuclear weapon capabilities and a more full-throated embrace of the reality. I will argue 
that, much as it did in the Chinese case, it chose the latter leading to an unprecedented 
nuclear cooperation agreement with the Indian government that recognized India as a 
nuclear weapons power outside the framework of the NPT. 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
The signing of the Sino-American nuclear cooperation agreement between the 
U.S. and China in 1984 and its subsequent ratification was the culmination of efforts that 
began in the first year of the Reagan administration. Its most proximate cause was the 
decision by the United States to become a player in the rush to feed China’s burgeoning 
demands, of which nuclear power was a key component, with the Chinese planning to 
build up to ten nuclear plants by the year 2000198. However, this decision needs to be 
seen against the backdrop of the U.S.-China relationship in the Cold War and the larger 
U.S.-China trade relationship. 
 During the Nixon-Ford and Carter administrations, the United States began to 
view China as a key element in its strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Indeed, the 
Chinese government was opposed to the Soviet backed Communist government in 
Afghanistan, one of the latest flashpoints in the Cold War; China is purported to have 
assisted the Americans in training the Mujahedeen fighters who were fighting to 
overthrow the Afghan communists199. While many in the Reagan administration viewed 
China as a natural partner in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, strategic cooperation 
between the two countries became more viable only after tensions with China over 
                                                 
198 See Tan, Qinshang, “U.S. Nuclear Technology Transfer to China”, in The Making of U.S. China Policy, 
From Normalization to the Post-Cold War era, Lynne Riener Publications, 1992, p. 118. 
199 See Snetkov, Agalya and Stephen Artis, Introduction in “Regional Dimensions to Security: The other 




Taiwan early in the Reagan administration had dissipated. While the Soviet Union and 
China began to take tentative steps towards reconciliation in 1982, the United States 
embarked on an aggressive approach towards the U.S.S.R., supporting right-wing 
movements and governments around the world in their struggles against their Soviet 
backed left-wing opponents. The Reagan administrator saw China as a valuable partner, 
if not an ally, in the struggle against the Soviets.  In China’s own neighborhood, tensions 
with China following the 1962 border war between the two and subsequent tensions over 
Pakistan gradually started a process of easing. Crucially, India had not followed through 
on American expectations that it would weaponize its nuclear weapon capabilities 
following the nuclear test of 1974. It had instead chosen to slowly refine its technology, 
even as China built up its nuclear arsenal. To the extent that American concerns existed 
with China’s nuclear policies, they were around the proliferation of nuclear technology to 
states such as Pakistan, a Chinese (and American) ally which was suspected of 
developing its own nuclear weapons program with Chinese assistance. This was a 
contested issue, with senior officials within the Reagan administration doubting the 
credibility of intelligence that pointed in this direction, even as some in Congress raised 
concerns200. 
On the economic front, the Chinese program of economic liberalization that began 
in 1978 had opened up vast opportunities for Western companies to pursue. While 
American allies in Western Europe had well established trade links with China, the 
United States raced to catch up following the normalization of ties in the 1970s. By the 
                                                 
200 Initial concerns about China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program arose at the end of the 
Carter administration. A 1983 National Intelligence Estimate said that China would probably not reduce its 
low-key technical support in the foreseeable future. Source:  “Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 
13/32-83, 'Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers',” January 20, 1983, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in 
NPIHP Research Update #11. 
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time the Reagan administration had come to power, American exports to China 
constituted a small but growing share of overall American exports and importantly, were 
projected to grow significantly in the future. This perception was reflected in the 
American decision to upgrade China to the same status as its European partners for the 
purposes of trade in high technology items201.  Even as China’s nuclear weapons program 
achieved self-sufficiency by the late 1970s, and the Chinese nuclear deterrent coalesced 
into a force of warheads that the American government deemed sufficiently advanced as 
to deter China, its growing economy and its thirst for energy led to significant foreign 
investment in China’s energy sector. Nuclear energy in particular was an area where 
European companies competed to fulfil Chinese needs, while American companies had to 
watch from the sidelines due to existing American restrictions on nuclear trade with 
states that had not signed on to the Nuclear (non) Proliferation Treaty. 
As the preceding discussion shows, the United States perceived China to be a 
strategic asset in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the gradual 
warming of relations between the USSR and China and the already formidable Chinese 
nuclear weapon arsenal would imply that there was little threat of further proliferation if 
American engagement legitimized the Chinese nuclear program and bolstered its civilian 
nuclear capabilities. Further, the economic opportunities afforded by the liberalization of 
the nuclear energy sector of the Chinese economy and the growing trade and investment 
relations between the two states elevated the value of their commercial relationship. In 
the next section, I analyze archival material from the Reagan era to show that the 
administration’s perception of strategic liability in the Chinese case was low based on the 
                                                 
201 Early in his term, President Reagan decided to liberalize export controls on dual-use technology to 
China, setting the stage for significantly expanded trade between the two states in the area of high 
technology. The memo also removed China from the list of embargoed countries for military trade, 
allowing for a case by case decision as in the case of other friendly countries. Source: National Security 
Memorandum, June 6, 1981, Digital National Security Archive. 
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factors described above. Next, I evaluate the Commercial Value variable and show that it 
was ‘high’ based on the administration’s perception of the Chinese economy’s potential 
for growth and the opportunities it engendered. Finally, I will attempt to find evidence for 
my hypothesis that these two factors played a decisive role in the advancement of an 
American policy of strategic acquiescence towards the Chinese nuclear program. This 
culminated in a deal that opened up the Chinese market to American nuclear power 
companies and offered China access to American technology and fuel, even as it 
continued unhindered in its nuclear weapon program. 
5.2 EVALUATING STRATEGIC LIABILITY – AMERICA AND THE CHINESE NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM, 1981-86 
In this section, I estimate the position of the strategic liability variable. As 
elucidated in earlier sections, this variable’s value is a function of its four constituent 
variables, Primary conflict, Secondary Conflict, Regime Stability and Common Threat 
Perception. As I have argued previously, the elevation of any one of the first three is a 
sufficient condition for strategic liability to be high. The last one, Common threat 
perception, has a functional impact only when strategic liability is already low, further 
relaxing strategic liability and allowing a more permissive policy to be adopted by the 
United States. 
Primary Conflict: I start with this first sub-variable, which describes the 
existence of direct military conflicts between the United States and the nuclear aspirant, 
and therefore the possibility that a qualitative improvement in the latter’s nuclear 
capabilities would damage the U.S.’ standing in such conflicts. In the Chinese case, 
conflicts in Vietnam, Taiwan and South Korea were historical flashpoints where the 
United States and China had clashed, either directly, or through their proxies. In addition, 
American defense commitments to Taiwan and South Korea made it likely that the U.S. 
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would have to intervene militarily in any conflict that threatened these two allies. With 
China maintaining its right to forcibly reincorporate Taiwan, the chances of a military 
escalation that ensnared the United States and brought it into direct conflict with the 
Chinese was high throughout the 1970s and the first years of the Reagan administration. 
One of the crises that beset U.S.-China relations at the beginning of the Reagan 
administration was the sale of American weapons to Taiwan. Uncertainty over American 
plans to sell fighter planes and other advanced technology to Taiwan, - treated by China 
as a renegade province - and China’s bellicosity towards the Taiwanese government 
dominated the strategic discourse between the two states. The possibility of a U.S.-China 
clash over the Taiwan question receded in late 1982 following an agreement by the U.S. 
to cap its sales of weapons to Taiwan. In turn, China agreed to use peaceful means to deal 
with the question of Taiwanese reunification with the mainland202.  
The other theater where there was a potential for a direct clash between the U.S. 
and China was South Korea, where a significant number of American troops were 
stationed as a buffer against an invasion from the Chinese supported North Korean 
Communists. When President Reagan took office in 1981, South Korea and China lacked 
formal diplomatic ties and shared mutual suspicions about each other’s goals in the 
region203. As we have seen in a previous chapter, the normalization of relations between 
the U.S. and China during the 1970s had raised concerns in South Korea that the United 
States’ security commitment to the former would be weakened. This fear had receded by 
                                                 
202 This was known as the August 17 communique (issued jointly on August 17, 1983). It allowed both 
sides to claim that their position would be respected, allowing them to move beyond the irritant of 
American arms sales to Taiwan. Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald 
Reagan:1982, Best Books On, pp. 1053-1054. 
203 Even while generally agreeing on major strategic issues around the world, the U.S. and China differed 
in their perception of the South Korean government, as Secretary of State Alexander Haig acknowledged in 
a speech to his Chinese counterparts in 1981, the first visit by a U.S. Secretary of State to China since the 
establishment of full diplomatic ties. Source: Opening presentation, Strategic Overview, June 1981, Digital 
National Security Archive 
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the time Reagan came to office as the U.S. reiterated its resolve to keep American forces 
on the peninsula, though it left open the theoretical possibility that the U.S. and China 
could stumble into a clash over the Koreas. By 1983, even that small possibility 
diminished as China and South Korea expanded unofficial contact and indirect trade 
relations between the two grew in volume. While the 1970s had seen disagreement 
between the U.S. and China over the American military deployment in South Korea, the 
issue largely faded from their strategic discourse, and American intelligence analysts 
judged that the China would stay reconciled to the presence of American troops on the 
peninsula as a stabilizing force204. 
The gradual dissipation of the potential for direct U.S.-China conflict in Asia also 
meant that the expanding Chinese nuclear weapon capability and a corresponding 
increase in its civilian nuclear projects presented a smaller threat to the United States than 
it had done in the 1960s. By the time the Reagan administration had started engaging 
China in the early 1980s, much of China’s focus was on countering the Soviet threat, a 
fact officials in the administration were keen to leverage for strategic purposes205. Given 
this dynamic, we can code the Primary Conflict variable, which is a measure of the threat 
of conflict between the U.S. and China, low. 
Secondary Conflict – The secondary conflict sub-variable measures the potential 
for an expanding Chinese nuclear capability to cause further proliferation or military 
conflict in the region around it. If this potential were to be high, it would exacerbate 
American perceptions of risk from a Chinese nuclear advance.  
                                                 
204 See China’s Perception of External Threat, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1984, p.4, 
Obtained from Digital National Security Archive. 




By the early 1980s, China had begun a gradual process of rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union, with which it had an antagonistic relationship for almost twenty years 
following the Sino-Soviet ‘split’ and the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964. Since 
the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, much of the Chinese nuclear weapons program 
through the 1970s was aimed at establishing a credible nuclear deterrent against the 
U.S.S.R. By 1984, American Defense Intelligence Agency analysts were estimating that 
China had built close to 165 nuclear warheads, much smaller than the Soviet arsenal, but 
sufficient – according to the DIA - to protect Chinese interests. The United States 
perceived that China would not try to match the Soviet nuclear stockpile, but would cap it 
at the current level, even though it had the capacity to build more206. The U.S.S.R. 
meanwhile, was attempting to improve relations with the Chinese and had essentially 
reconciled itself to China as an established nuclear power. Given this, it is logical to 
presume that any Chinese attempts to upgrade its civilian nuclear technology and gain 
access to fuel and other nuclear know-how would not be taken as a significant threat by 
Moscow, at least to the American analysts who had produced this analysis.  
The other major power that had the potential to be affected by the burgeoning 
Chinese nuclear capability was India. Having fought a war with China in 1962 and 
conducted its own nuclear tests in 1974, India’s relations with China remained frosty, 
with the latter developing a close strategic relationship with Pakistan, India’s rival and 
long-time adversary. However, India had defied American estimates that it would go on 
to develop a full-fledged nuclear weapons program. Instead, the late 1970s and early 
1980s saw India quietly refining its nuclear technology without any moves to develop 
                                                 
206 See Intelligence Appraisal: China Nuclear Missile Strategy, March 13, 1981, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Obtained from Digital National Security Archive. 
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warheads or weapon delivery systems207, even as China leapt further ahead in both 
civilian and military nuclear arenas. Further, the early 1980s saw links between the two 
countries gradually start to thaw, with the resumption of high-level official visits. Given 
that India appeared to accept the overwhelming Chinese dominance in the nuclear arena 
at this stage, it was unlikely that further Chinese gains in the field would have a 
qualitative impact on India’s nuclear weapon plans208. This conclusion was arrived at by 
American officials as well, who forecasted that India would continue this gradual process 
of improving its nuclear capabilities. 
Besides the Soviet Union and India, smaller states such as Japan and South Korea 
had historically fraught relations with China and were considered sufficiently advanced 
in nuclear technology that the impact of any Chinese advancement in the nuclear arena on 
them would need to be assessed carefully. The scars of Japanese occupation during 
World War II had left a bitter legacy of mistrust in China, and diplomatic relations 
between the two had been reestablished only in 1973. South Korea and China were on 
opposite sides during the war that led to the creation of a Communist North Korea and a 
military led south. With no formal diplomatic ties between them, China and the R.O.K. 
were yet to move beyond the legacy of the Korean War. Both Japan and South Korea had 
lived under the American ‘nuclear umbrella’ following the end of World War II and their 
transformation into American allies. Japan’s experience as the only country to suffer a 
nuclear attack put it in a unique position; its government and polity had maintained a 
                                                 
207 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that India continued to refine its technology and look 
to import required material and know-how when possible. There was no mention of a plan to weaponize 
warheads or conduct any other ‘threshold crossing’ activity.  “Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of 
Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States',” December, 1982, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CREST, National Archives. Obtained and contributed 
by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #11.  
208 Defense Intelligence Agency officials predicted that China would accelerate attempts to wean away 
India from Soviet influence to reduce the latter’s influence in Asia. Ibid. 3 
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consistent policy of opposition to nuclear weapons and their proliferation. It was also a 
signatory to the Nuclear (non) Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. 
From an American perspective, the greatest threat of a Japanese nuclear weapon program 
was not during the Reagan administration, but rather in the early 1970s, when the 
Chinese nuclear program gathered pace and reports emerged of a South Korean nuclear 
weapons program. Given that Japan did not follow in the footsteps of the Chinese and the 
South Koreans in the 1970s, it was unlikely that it would view the Chinese bid to gain 
legitimacy for its nuclear project with great alarm, a perception shared by the United 
States209. In the case of South Korea, its nuclear weapons project had been successfully 
stalled by the United States in 1975-76, when the U.S. under President Ford pressurized 
the R.O.K.’s government into abandoning plans to purchase reprocessing equipment from 
France. While South Korea had not completely given up ambitions to develop nuclear 
weapon capabilities210, the possibility had receded significantly. Moreover, South Korean 
concerns over an American withdrawal of its security umbrella, one of the motivations 
for the former’s nuclear weapon push, had also been assuaged, as seen in previous 
chapters. Finally, given the already vast gulf that separated the Chinese and South Korean 
nuclear capabilities, the Chinese bid to bolster its nuclear program would have made little 
material difference to South Korean defense strategy. Indeed, South Korea does not 
                                                 
209 In fact, the Americans were sufficiently confident that Sino-Japanese ties at the time were mutually 
non-threatening that the visiting Secretary of State, Alexander Haig recommended an increased Japanese 
self-defense capability as a positive development in the region, allowing it to deter Soviet expansionism. 
Ibid.16  
210 The South Koreans were advancing their technical capabilities to develop nuclear weapons even though 
they had abandoned a plan to move towards producing weapons grade plutonium. See “Report, Embassy of 
Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” May 22, 1979, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Dél-Korea, 1979, 81. doboz, 82-5, 003675/1979. Obtained and 




appear to have figured significantly in American discussions on the Chinese nuclear 
program during the Reagan era. 
The preceding discussion indicates that the knock-on effects of a bolstered 
Chinese nuclear capability in the form of international support to its civilian nuclear 
program and the legitimacy that it consequently bestowed on its nuclear arsenal were not 
perceived to be significant by the United States. China’s strategic competitors were in 
various stages of rapprochement with it, and further, were not in a position that would 
force them to view the Chinese advance as an impetus for a reevaluation of their own 
nuclear plans. Given these reasons, I code the Secondary conflict variable low. 
Regime Instability: This sub-variable estimates the possibility that the 
government of the nuclear aspirant will become sufficiently weak or unwilling to comply 
with its own laws or commitments that its nuclear weapon know-how will fall into the 
hands of rogue regimes or groups through acts of omission or commission. I have posited 
that if the United States perceives this possibility to be high, it then increases America’s 
strategic liability from the nuclear program of the aspirant state.  
The possibility of further nuclear weapon proliferation was perhaps the most 
controversial aspect of the United States’ dialog with China during the Reagan 
administration. While not a signatory to the NPT or (until its accession to it in 1984) the 
IAEA during the first Reagan administration, China nevertheless made a public 
commitment to avoid proliferating nuclear weapons technology to third party states or 
groups211. However, the beginning of the Reagan administration had brought with it 
possible evidence that its sought after strategic partner was secretly proliferating nuclear 
                                                 
211 In a visit to Washington in January 1985, Chinese Premier Zhao said “ ..we do not engage in nuclear 
proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons”, a pledge used by the 
Reagan administration to vouch for China’s reliability. Source: Chin, Benjamin M., An Analysis of the 
U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Maryland Journal of Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, Article 7, 
1986, pp. 326-327. 
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weapons technology to states such as Pakistan. At least in the beginning of President 
Reagan’s first term, these concerns were of sufficient credibility that the American 
Secretary of State at that time Alexander Haig, brought up this concern directly with his 
Chinese counterpart212. However, the Reagan administration’s public posture on the issue 
of China’s support to Pakistan was different. Throughout 1983 and 1984, even as press 
reports of Chinese collaboration with a purported Pakistani nuclear weapons program 
continued to emerge, it appears to be the case that the Reagan administration did not 
believe that whatever evidence there existed to support the claim that China was helping 
Pakistan’s nuclear program was credible213. There was also another aspect to the issue of 
China’s support for Pakistan. While the U.S. claimed that any Pakistani nuclear program 
was a great concern because of the possibility of an arms race with India, an even more 
important and possibly overwhelming factor affected America’s attitude towards that 
state. This was the stated American imperative to strengthen Pakistan so it could act as 
the staging ground for the American supported forces that fought the Soviet backed 
Communist Afghan government. Indeed, making Pakistan ‘strong’ was, according to 
senior members of the Reagan administration, its top goal for South Asia, an objective 
that the U.S. shared with the Chinese on more than one occasion214. Given this, it is 
probable that there was little incentive for the American government to probe very deeply 
into China’s interactions with Pakistan.  
 
                                                 
212 The initial references were oblique, with visiting Secretary of State Haig telling his Chinese 
counterparts that a Pakistani nuclear test would be dangerous. Source: Secretary’s talking points” U.S. 
China Relations, June 4. 1981, pp. 4-5. Obtained from Digital National Security Archives.  
213 See Tan, Qingshan, ibid. 138. Tan points to sources who believed that the U.S. discounted this 
intelligence because the original source (Britain) itself was skeptical about these reports.  
214 Pakistan was touted as a key strategic partner where American and Chinese efforts to bolster Pakistan 
against Soviet aggression to its west (in Afghanistan) were paying off.  Pakistan was also China’s largest 
arms client and a key state in its strategy to counter Soviet influence, goals which were similar to that of the 
United States. See “China’s Perception of External Threat” ibid. 3-4. 
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With the Reagan administration discounting any evidence that China was covertly 
supplying nuclear material to third party states, the Regime instability variable can be 
coded low. This is not without controversy, for there was a significant outcry within 
Congress and the Press about Pakistan’s nuclear program and China’s alleged support. 
However, the Reagan administration was able to overrule such objections. It gave little 
importance publicly to the allegations that popped up. The administration also pointed to 
public and confidential statements from Chinese officials that vouched for China’s 
‘innocence’. Given that the intelligence community operated under the Executive branch, 
the weight assigned by White House officials to various pieces of evidence was important 
to Congress, as it sifted through often conflicting evidence. In this case, the perception 
that China was not a proliferator of nuclear technology appears to have won the day, 
within and eventually outside the Executive branch215. Therefore, I code the Regime 
Instability variable low. 
Common threat perception: I have argued previously that the presence of a 
common threat further reduces an already depressed perception of Strategic liability and 
allows the United States to be more amenable to cooperation or acquiescence with the 
nuclear program of an aspirant state. In the preceding discussion I have presented 
evidence that components of strategic liability such as the Primary conflict, Secondary 
conflict and Regime stability variable are low, therefore making the Common threat 
perception variable a potentially decisive actor, if it were elevated. Here, I shall show that 
                                                 
215 The Reagan administration used verbal Chinese assurances such as these and other classified ones that 
came out of negotiations with the Chinese government on the U.S.-China nuclear deal to claim that China 
had provided sufficient assurances against non-proliferation. This ran counter to the expectations of many 
in Congress who saw this as an inappropriate departure from formal safeguards that other states had agreed 
to. This was the key area of contention between the Administration and Congress in the run-up to the 
ratification of the nuclear deal.  The administration was able to win approval for the deal by agreeing to a 
need for Presidential certification that China was not engaged in nuclear proliferation. See Tan, Qingshan 
ibid. pp. 122. 
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the United States perceived that it and China faced a significant common threat in the 
form of the Soviet Union. Indeed, even as a newly confident China was pursuing a 
gradual policy of rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., the United States was moving 
steadily to co-opt China as a partner in the Cold War. China stood to play a key role in 
furthering President Reagan’s aggressive approach towards Moscow’s policies in 
Afghanistan and other areas around the world. 
As argued previously, a (and perhaps the) major irritant in strategic cooperation 
between the United States and China early in the Reagan administration was the question 
of American arms sales to Taiwan and the possibility of a forceful attempt by China to 
retake Taiwan. The resolution of this issue (at least for the medium term) meant that a 
key obstacle to cooperation between the U.S. and China was removed. American officials 
viewed China as a key force in limiting the advance of Soviet military power in Asia, an 
objective that they believed was shared by the top Chinese leadership. However, there 
was also an appreciation on the American side of the possibility that China would attempt 
to distance itself from the U.S. because of its wariness about American ambitions in 
Asia216. Nevertheless, American officials were keen to reiterate a message of cooperation 
against the Soviet Union in meetings with the Chinese. In one of his first meetings with 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, the new American Secretary of State, George Shultz was 
tasked with reminding the Chinese leadership about the danger of the Soviet threat and 
the necessity to fight it in areas such as Afghanistan217. The eagerness of the United 
States to enlist Chinese collaboration against the Soviet Union was to be a continuing 
                                                 
216 American intelligence analysts argued that China was wary about the long term utility and reliability of 
the American security guarantees and presence in Asia and its deterrent effect on the U.S.S.R. It was also 
wary about being too closely associated with the U.S. for fear of losing the ability to chart its own course as 
a leader of the Third World. Source: “China’s external threat perception”, Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) ibid. pp. 1. 
217 See “Your meeting with Deng Xiaoping”, Secret Briefing Memorandum, January 26, 1983. Obtained 
from Digital National Security Archives. 
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theme throughout this period, with the U.S. making the strengthening of China’s ability 
to fend off ‘Soviet aggression’ a key policy objective. In a National Security Decision 
Directive on the eve of his visit to China in 1984, President Reagan made this point 
explicitly, calling for “expanding U.S.-P.R.C. cooperation against the common threat 
posed by the U.S.S.R.”218 Clearly, the U.S. government believed at the highest level that it 
and China faced a compelling threat in the form of the Soviet Union that necessitated 
strategic cooperation. I therefore code the Common threat perception variable ‘high’. 
In this section, I have shown that the Primary conflict variable can be coded low 
based on the understanding reached by both sides on the one contested issue, the status of 
Taiwan. Similarly, I show the Secondary conflict variable to be low based on the fact that 
the propensity of Japan and South Korea - two state that were engaged in a conflict with 
China, and the ones with the technical nuclear capability - to start or escalate their own 
nuclear weapon program was diminished during this period. More ambiguously, I show 
that the U.S. discounted contested evidence on China’s culpability in the covert Pakistani 
nuclear program and determined that the Chinese government’s non-proliferation 
commitments could be trusted. This leads to the Regime Instability variable being coded 
low. In sum, all of the sub-variables that could elevate the Strategic Liability variable 
were low during this period, leading us to conclude that America’s strategic liability from 
a Chinese nuclear program was low. Further, the presence of an elevated Common threat 
perception meant that the U.S. had an incentive to further discount any concerns with the 
Chinese nuclear program, increasing the likelihood that it would support it. In the next 
section, I examine the second independent variable, Commercial Value. 
 
                                                 
218 See Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive issued on January 9, 1984 attesting to this goal. 
Obtained from Digital National Security Archives. 
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5.3 EXAMINING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF COMMERCIAL VALUE IN THE U.S.-CHINA 
RELATIONSHIP 
By the time President Reagan’s term in office was underway, the United States 
and China enjoyed a trading relationship unlike any that existed between the U.S. and a 
Communist state. In 1980 China was America’s twenty fourth largest trading partner and 
the U.S. was China’s third. By 1983, China had become the United States’ sixteenth 
largest trading partner, and the U.S. China’s second largest219. This rapid increase in 
prominence of the U.S.-China trade relationship during the first Reagan administration 
illustrates the fact that China was growing in economic as well as strategic importance. In 
this section, I will show that the Reagan administration perceived the commercial value 
of this relationship to be high. The significance of a high commercial value in the 
presence of low strategic liability is that it creates incentives for the United States to 
legitimize civilian nuclear trade with the aspirant state. The absence of strategic liability 
here mitigates concerns that the establishment of these trading linkages will free the latter 
to devote more of its resources towards military nuclear programs, and allow the cross-
pollination of capabilities between military and civilian sectors. 
Economic links between the U.S. and China resumed in 1973 following the visit 
of President Nixon to China and gathered steam following the establishment of full 
diplomatic ties between the two countries. By the advent of President Reagan’s 
administration, commercial links between the two states were becoming a major focus 
area for the United States, with a push by senior members of Reagan’s cabinet to remove 
restrictions on trade with China. In their early engagements with China, American 
officials such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig reiterated the message to senior 
                                                 
219 See Yue Chia, Siow and Bifan Cheng, Trade Flows between China and ASEAN, “ASEAN-China 
Economic Relations: Developments in ASEAN and China”, p. 223 and  Zhou, Shijian “China-U.S. 
economic relations: accords and discords”, February 27, 2012, China.org.cn. Also see Briefing 
memorandum, “Your meeting with Deng Xiaoping”, ibid. 5 
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Chinese leaders, highlighting the Reagan administration’s decision to liberalize trade to 
China220. This decision was pushed by the Commerce Department, keen to remove the 
remaining restrictions on trade with China that still existed, a vestige of the time when 
China was an ally of the Soviet Union. It was accompanied by Reagan’s successful veto 
of legislation that would have curbed Chinese imports, a measure that required significant 
support from his fellow Republicans in Congress, many of whom had to be convinced to 
sustain the veto based on the promise of greater market access to China221.  Reagan’s 
liberalization of export controls on goods and technology meant for China was a further 
signal of America’s eagerness to take advantage of the growing Chinese appetite for 
goods and services from the West. American efforts to make sure the economic 
relationship with China realized the potential that the Reagan administration believed 
existed took on greater momentum in the run up to the visit by the Chinese Premier to 
Washington D.C., in January 1984 and President Reagan’s return visit later in the year. In 
a National Security Decision Directive (NSDM), Reagan reaffirmed his commitment to 
conclude bilateral investment and tax treaties, saying that the U.S. wanted to further build 
on the already “substantial trade benefits the two countries (had) derived..” from their 
ties. This optimism was accompanied by angst over China’s adherence to licensing rights 
of American manufacturers, and China’s perceived unwillingness to abide by the terms of 
                                                 
220 Haig conveyed to his Chinese counterparts that the U.S. “had a strong interest in the successful 
modernization of China’s economy” and that the U.S. was liberalizing export controls towards “increasing 
the level of U.S. technology transfer to China” as a next step. Source: ‘Secretary’s Talking Points’, ibid. 2 
221 See ‘Message from Commerce Secretary Baldridge on U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Commission on Trade and 
Commerce, Confidential Cable, June 16, 1981, pp. 1. Digital National Security Archive. Initiatives such as 
the Joint Commission were key fora where the push for trade liberalization occurred, with Administration 
officials such as Baldridge pushing Reagan to make this happen. Reagan’s Republican Party was more 
amenable than the Democrats who were in control of Congress at this time. The latter attempted to impose 
curbs on textile imports which would affect China in particular, which resulted in a Presidential veto. 
Increasing American exports to China was part of the reason such curbs were seen as being harmful by 
many in his party. See “Textile Curbs win in Senate”, The New York Times, November 14, 1985 and 
"House Sustains Veto of Textile Import Curbs." In CQ Almanac 1986, 42nd ed., 347-48. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1987.  
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a bilateral agreement to purchase grain from American producers – all of which were 
important to the Reagan administration’s domestic support coalition222. American 
interests in commercial ties extended to the military sector, and figured significantly in 
deliberations within the Reagan administration. The U.S. was keen on selling arms and 
munitions, as well as sensitive civilian technology to China. Building up China’s military 
capabilities was one of America’s goals, but the lucrativeness of the Chinese arms import 
sector was a major factor223.  
As the preceding discussion shows, economic ties with China were of great 
significance to the Reagan administration, which had liberalized technology and export 
control rules governing trade with China to a degree that was unprecedented for 
American ties with a Communist state.  The economic aspect of America’s relationship 
with China was as much a part of Reagan administration deliberations as was the 
strategic aspect. China’s expanding economy, and importantly, the potential that it 
represented, was valued by the Reagan White House. Consequently, I code the 
‘Commercial Value’ variable, which represents the United States’ perception of the 
importance of the nuclear aspirant’s economy and its ties with the American economy, 
‘high’. 
I have shown above that the U.S.-China relationship during the Reagan 
administration was governed by an American perception of low strategic liability and 
high commercial value. I have argued previously that this combination leads to the 
United States adopting a policy of strategic acquiescence towards the nuclear program of 
                                                 
222 See “National Security Decision Directive” dated January 9, 1984. Obtained from Digital National 
Security Archive. 
223 See Briefing Memorandum”, Meeting with Deng Xiaoping ibid. 5. While the U.S. approved sales 




the state in question. In the next section, I examine archival evidence for support of this 
postulation. 
5.4 THE EVIDENCE – DID THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A POLICY OF STRATEGIC 
ACQUIESCENCE TOWARDS CHINA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
I seek to answer two primary questions in this section 
- Did the United States follow a policy of strategic acquiescence, as defined earlier, 
towards the nuclear program of China? 
- If it did, was it because of the perception of low strategic liability and high 
commercial value from the standpoint of the Reagan administration? 
American attitudes towards the Chinese nuclear program, both civilian and nuclear, had 
gone from alarm to a grudging acceptance between the Johnson and Carter 
administrations. As discussed in Chapter 2, President Johnson actively considered 
attacking Chinese nuclear facilities, going so far as to approach the Soviet Union to see if 
it was amenable to joint action. The hardening of the Sino-Soviet split and the 
rapprochement initiated by President Nixon’s trip to China saw the United States and the 
former become, if not allies, “non-allied friendly states” that had a loose collaboration 
against the Soviet Union in the 1970s. By the time President Reagan came to office, 
China had firmly established itself as an opponent of the Soviet Union and a partner with 
the United States in areas such as Afghanistan, South-east Asia and Pakistan. The 
American intelligence community’s perceptions of China’s nuclear program and its intent 
were evident in a 1981 memorandum where it was judged that the Soviet Union was the 
primary target of these nuclear capabilities224, and that too as a defensive measure. While 
there is evidence that the United States still conducted routine planning for a nuclear war 
                                                 
224 See “China Nuclear Missile Strategy”, March 13, 1981, Secret Intelligence Appraisal, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, p. 2. Obtained from Digital National Security Archive. 
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scenario with China, the planners involved conceded225 that contemporary circumstances 
made such an eventuality unlikely. Rather, the United States appeared predisposed to 
boosting China’s nuclear capabilities. In January 1984, President Reagan issued a 
directive to his administration to make all necessary efforts to conclude a civilian nuclear 
cooperation agreement that would allow the sale of nuclear reactors, fuel and associated 
technology to China. This was preceded by several years of discussions between the two 
states, with Reagan’s first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, broaching the subject in 
1981 while visiting China. While China had opened up its nuclear power sector to 
overseas investment in 1979, American suppliers were precluded by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act (NNPA) from entering into any agreement with states that were not 
signatories to the Nuclear (non) Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a legal requirement that was 
a reaction to India’s 1974 nuclear test. However, the Reagan administration was willing 
to conclude an agreement with China that overrode this mandate, with the only 
requirement being that China agree to prevent the proliferation of this technology to other 
states226.  
 The United States and China initialed an agreement to cooperate in the field of 
nuclear energy during President Reagan’s 1984 visit to China, followed by a formal 
signing in July 1985. Heralded as an unprecedented agreement that would allow 
American companies to sell nuclear technology to China, the agreement did not require 
                                                 
225 See “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy Toward China: 1985-1995”, Report, February 10, 1981, Defense 
Nuclear Agency, p. 4. Obtained from Digital National Security Archive. The authors said that the study 
was being done because one could not rule out the possibility that China would “once again” become 
antagonistic toward the United States.  
226 Reagan said that he wanted to conclude an agreement of cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. They key requirement according to Reagan was a “clear statement” from the Chinese Premier that 
China would not assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons and agreement on U.S. consent and 
visitation rights NSDD. Ibid. pp.5 
 
 160 
that China accede to the NPT, a treaty that the Chinese claimed was discriminatory227. 
The Reagan administration made major concessions to China, by not even requiring a 
formal declaration that the latter would refrain from proliferating nuclear technology in 
contravention of the global non-proliferation regime. Rather, it settled for what it said 
were private (classified) assurances from the Chinese leadership that they would behave 
responsibly with respect to nuclear technology, and statements by Chinese leaders that 
China was not engaged in proliferation. The Reagan administration also gave up the right 
to formally approve the reprocessing of spent fuel from American nuclear reactors sold to 
China as part of the agreement, instead agreeing to use “diplomatic channels” to 
‘favorably’ discuss such requests from China228. The agreement required an amendment 
in American law due to the exceptions it made for China, in particular its non-adherence 
to the NPT. Facing stiff opposition from Congress, in particular from Democrats who 
pointed to leaked intelligence estimates of Chinese involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons program, the Reagan administration had to delay submitting the agreement to 
Congress for approval. In hearings before Congress, the administration played up the 
commercial aspect of the nuclear deal, with companies testifying about the importance of 
the deal for their businesses to remain viable229. Reagan ultimately succeeded in winning 
Congressional assent by agreeing to condition the agreement’s operative clauses on a 
certification from the President that China was not engaged in nuclear proliferation, 
giving the President the authority to override these requirements on national security 
                                                 
227 In his visit to Washington following the issuance of the confidential NSDD by Reagan, Chinese 
Premier Zhao said that China would not assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons even though 
the main international agreement that legalized such a prohibition, the NPT, was one the Chinese found 
discriminatory and unacceptable. See Chin, Benjamin ibid. 326. 
228 The United States got ‘discussion rights’ instead of consent rights, no visitation rights to Chinese 
nuclear facilities, and finally, no written commitment to abide by U.S. non-proliferation rules. See Chin, 
Benjamin, ibid. pp. 335-338.  
229 There was a significant amount of lobbying by the administration, the energy department and the 
nuclear industry to get Congress to pass the cooperation agreement bill. See Tan, Qingshan, ibid. 129-132. 
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grounds230. In sum, the nuclear agreement represented a significant strategic success for 
China in its quest to gain acceptance as a responsible nuclear power. American strategic 
acquiescence with China’s nuclear program was now visibly demonstrated by this 
nuclear agreement, which would allow China to augment its nuclear energy needs with 
American technology while being able to devote resources towards its strategic nuclear 
sector.  
I have argued that a policy of strategic acquiescence will go beyond a de jure 
acceptance of the nuclear aspirant’s weapons status. It will result in the following actions. 
- A willingness by the American government to make country specific exceptions to 
non-proliferation regimes.  
- Broad American cooperation with that state’s civilian nuclear sector. 
- Cessation of any significant efforts to curtail its development or deployment of 
nuclear weapons.  
The United States accepted China’s nuclear weapon status as early as 1968 when the 
NPT was ratified. However, true acceptance and cooperation with China’s strategic 
ambitions, including its desire to boost its civilian nuclear infrastructure, occurred after 
the Reagan administration came to power in 1981. As the discussion above indicates, the 
United States passed laws allowing for trade in nuclear material with China, with 
                                                 
230 In spite of these conditions, the fact remained that Congress essentially let the agreement go through 
without any concessions from China. The history of U.S. certifications of other countries’ nuclear weapons 
programs has shown that American Presidents have wide leeway in interpreting any given act or set of 
actions of a particular country as contributing to proliferation. As an example, even though American 
intelligence was signaling that Pakistan was developing a nuclear weapon in the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration was able to find a way to technically certify that the former did not possess a ‘nuclear 
device’. See “Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman for the 
President, 'Certification on Pakistan',” November 21, 1987, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, Department of State mandatory declassification review release. Obtained and contributed by 




minimum concessions from the Chinese side. This was complemented by efforts to boost 
China’s defensive capabilities against the Soviet Union, and the absence of any American 
efforts to block China’s development or deployment of nuclear weapons. Together, this 
represents a policy of strategic acquiescence with China’s nuclear program, as predicted 
by my model. 
I have established previously that President Reagan’s administration followed a 
policy of strategic acquiescence towards China’s nuclear program. Next, I examine the 
causal logic behind these actions. Public and private statements by Reagan administration 
officials were in alignment with the perception that China was a collaborator, if not an 
ally, against the Soviet Union. President Reagan’s national security directive on the eve 
of his visit to China in 1984 called for his administration to pursue policies that would 
boost strategic cooperation with China and strengthen its ability to ward off Soviet 
influence in Asia, and this message was central to the talking points used in dialog with 
China. In talks with the Chinese leadership, senior Reagan administration officials such 
as Secretary of State Schultz reinforced the same message, warning the former about 
Soviet aggression in its neighborhood and stressing America’s readiness to help China 
combat it. While there was some concern within the American intelligence community 
that China would attempt to pursue a more equidistant foreign policy with respect to the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union, Reagan was convinced231 that China and the U.S. shared a 
common threat in the Soviet Union, which therefore engendered a need for the American 
government to strengthen China’s defensive military capabilities. As seen previously, 
American intelligence analysts concurred with the assessment that China’s conventional 
                                                 
231 Reagan tied strategic and economic arguments together in his directive to liberalize the sale of nuclear 
technology to China. He argued that bolstering China’s infrastructure capabilities was crucial to both 
America’s economic and strategic interests in the Cold War, and the nuclear deal was a critical part of 
boosting China’s energy infrastructure. See National Security Decision Directive, ibid. 5 
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and nuclear forces were primarily oriented towards countering a Soviet threat. There also 
appeared to be little concern that boosting China’s civilian nuclear industry would free up 
resources that could then be used to further its military sector, including the development 
of nuclear warheads that had started to become the mainstay of China’s nuclear strike 
force. Rather, President Reagan directed his administration to boost China’s defensive 
military capabilities, investing in both its civilian and military infrastructure projects to 
counteract perceived Soviet expansionism in Asia. This clearly demonstrates the effect of 
the common threat that the Reagan White House perceived to exist. 
Commercial interest in increased trade with China, including the export of nuclear 
reactors was high. Corporate leaders lobbied both overtly232 and covertly, putting intense 
pressure on the Reagan administration to liberalize trade with China. Even before the 
nuclear deal with China was signed, Reagan approved orders relaxing export controls to 
allow the sale of previously restricted items including dual use technology that found 
application in civilian and military areas233.  This commercial impetus was at work in the 
negotiations between the U.S. and China as China stuck to its stand of not agreeing to 
mandatory U.S. consent rights for reprocessing or language specifying China’s 
obligations towards non-proliferation in the final agreement. As noted earlier, the Reagan 
administration made concessions at every stage of the negotiations to advance the deal to 
the final step. From the outset, the record of discussions within the Reagan White House 
indicates that the U.S. was willing to make significant amendments in domestic 
                                                 
232 A particularly prominent example of the pressure on the Reagan administration was a meeting between 
Secretary of State George Shulz and American business leaders with interests in China, where he was 
grilled on the American government’s delay in approving the sale of nuclear equipment to China as well as 
other export controller items. Shulz responded by criticizing the business community for not giving the 
Reagan administration time to work on eliminating these barriers. See “Shulz snaps at U.S. Business 
leaders in Peking”, February 3, 1983, The New York Times 
233 This pressure resulted in Reagan listing China as a non-embargoed state, the same category as other 
friendly countries such as Japan, which allowed the sale of dual use technology to China. See Presidential 
Decision Memorandum, June 6, 1981. Obtained from Digital National Security Archive. 
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legislation to win trade deals with China in the energy sector, as seen from Reagan’s 
National Security Directives. In hearings before Congress during the ratification process 
of the agreement, both the administration and industry representatives expressed strong 
support for liberalizing nuclear trade with China because of its potential economic 
benefits, in spite of the perceived non-proliferation related deficiencies that existed in the 
deal. Importantly, the Reagan administration framed the nuclear deal as important not just 
to the nuclear industry, but to the overall vitality of the U.S.-China trade relationship.  
Rather than play the role of one among several actors in a bureaucratic negotiation 
process, the administration occupied a central role in framing and driving its favored 
outcome through the domestic ratification process. Even as it defended its position that 
the nuclear deal contained sufficient (if weaker than desired) safeguards, the 
administration touted the economic benefits of the nuclear deal to counter the arguments 
of the non-proliferation advocates in Congress234.  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
As the preceding discussion shows, the Reagan administration used two key 
parameters in gauging the criticality of the nuclear cooperation agreement with China – 
the importance of building up the infrastructure capability of a key friendly state and 
partner against a common foe, the Soviet Union, and the economic boost such as deal 
would give to an important trade relationship. There is little evidence to show that the 
U.S. was concerned about the enhanced nuclear capabilities of China threatening it in any 
                                                 
234 Key members of the Senate such as Alan Cranston, a Democrat, were opposed to the nuclear deal on 
non-proliferation grounds. Others such as John Glenn viewed it as ‘salvageable’. It was to the members of 
the Congress in the middle who wavered between non-proliferation objectives and the trade advantages of 
the deal that the Reagan administration made its pitch. Groups such as the National Council for U.S.-China 
Trade were deployed to make an argument that this nuclear deal was beneficial to the U.S.-China trade 
relationship and therefore to the overall American economy. See Chin, Benjamin, ibid. 322 and Tan, 
Qingshan, ibid. 141. 
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way. Rather, American intelligence analysis and the Reagan administration perceived the 
Chinese strategic nuclear weapons program as a hedge against Soviet threats. 
Additionally, American intelligence perceived the threat of an actual nuclear exchange 
between China and the Soviets to be low. This made an enhanced Chinese nuclear 
capability attractive because of its limited liability. The key roadblock in both the Reagan 
administration’s discussions with China as well as in the subsequent deliberations in the 
American Congress was China’s perceived support for covert nuclear weapon programs 
in countries such as Pakistan. The Reagan administration appears to have discounted the 
evidence that did exist235, casting it as doubtful, and was able to overcome Congressional 
objections, partly using the economic logic of the agreement as a weapon. Therefore, the 
behavior of the Reagan administration correlates with my argument that low strategic 
liability and high commercial value motivate American Presidents to pursue a policy of 
what I have termed strategic acquiescence with the nuclear program of an aspirant state. 
The crucial issue on which the U.S.-China nuclear deal hinged was the question on 
whether China was covertly supporting the nuclear weapons programs of other states 
such as Pakistan. I have argued previously that high regime instability can create 
increased strategic liability for the United States. That implies the existence of a credible 
threat of further nuclear proliferation to rogue states or groups due to the unwillingness or 
inability of the aspirant state’s government to enforce non-proliferation norms. The case 
of Pakistan is unique in that it also happened to be an indispensable partner of the United 
States in the Cold War, and as I have argued previously, one whose nuclear program the 
                                                 
235 To the end, the administration continued to deny the allegations of Congressional critics that it had 
withheld evidence regarding the alleged proliferation of nuclear technology by China to states such as 
Pakistan. The State Department directly refuted the allegations of critics such as Senator Alan Cranston, 
saying that Richard T. Kennedy, the State Department official who was in charge of negotiating the 
agreement with China, had provided all available evidence and the Administration’s analysis of its validity. 
See “Cranston assails U.S.-China Accord”, The New York Times, October 22, 1985. 
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U.S. was willing to accept grudgingly. Given that Pakistan at this time was far removed 
from being considered a ‘rogue state’, the American willingness to discount evidence of 
China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear program appears to have been influenced to a 
limited extent by this dynamic236. Ultimately however, intrinsic problems in the 
credibility of the intelligence reports on Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation appear to 
have limited their impact on strategic liability. Therefore, the perceived overall lack of 
strategic stability, combined with the presence of a common threat perception and high 
commercial value, clearly influenced the strategic acquiescence of the Reagan 
administration with China’s nuclear program.  
The history of Sino-American nuclear cooperation in the years following the passage 
of the nuclear deal is testament to the fact that changing strategic and economic 
circumstances can force re-evaluations. Towards the end of the Reagan administration, 
renewed concerns about proliferation by the Chinese and perhaps most importantly, the 
absence of any Chinese initiative to purchase American nuclear equipment, stalled further 
cooperation. The end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square incident changed the 
calculus for the United States, removing the common threat factor (the U.S.S.R.). It was 
only during the Clinton agreement that the agreement saw forward progress in the form 
                                                 
236 The Reagan administration’s focus in the course of responding to the leaked information regarding 
China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear program was on damage control to save the nuclear deal.  This 
dilemma is evident in an earlier memorandum from Secretary of State Shulz to President Reagan, where he 
warned that American attempts to curb the Pakistani nuclear program were hindered by the need to 
maintain the strategic relationship that was crucial to the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Source: 
“Secretary of State George Shultz to President Reagan, 'How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect 
Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Activities',” November 26, 1982, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA Records Search Tool [CREST]. Obtained and contributed 
by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #6. 
 
 167 
of a Presidential certification that China was not proliferating nuclear technology237. 
While this delay could be characterized as a hiatus rather than an abrogation of policy, 
even the latter sort of response would be consistent with my framework, since it can 
adapt to any alteration in American perceptions of strategic liability or commercial value, 
which can lead to a reconsideration of policy. In the Chinese case, one could argue that 
the delay in the agreement’s implementation was due to the elimination of the Soviet 
threat, which in turn reduced the impetus for the American government to move quickly 
on the nuclear front, especially given broader economic sanctions imposed in the wake of 
Tiananmen Square. The impermanence of strategic and commercial factors can best be 
illustrated by recent American policy actions.   In many ways, the Sino-American nuclear 
agreement and the constellation of factors that influenced it mirror the India-U.S. nuclear 
agreement reached during the George W. Bush administration238. Ironically, China was 
                                                 
237 See Kan, Shirley and Mark Holt, “U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”, Congressional 
Research Service, September 6, 2007. 
238 I have argued in Chapter 3 that the United States had ‘weakly’ accepted India’s nuclear weapons 
capability going back to the latter’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in 1974,  an argument buttressed by the 
anemic attempts in 1998 to constrain India’s nuclear weapons program, which were also abandoned 
towards the end of the Clinton administration. In this section, I briefly examine the Indian case during the 
George W. Bush administration and argue that a similar constellation of factors, low strategic liability, 
common threat perception (the common threat was ironically China) and high commercial value led to 
America’s de jure recognition of India’s nuclear weapons status and support for its civilian nuclear energy 
program. The signing of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation agreement was the capstone of this 
policy of strategic acquiescence. 
 
George W. Bush’s first early months in office were marked by rising tensions with China as China 
extended the reach of its naval and air forces in the South China Sea, engaging in tense encounters with 
American naval units that had traditionally enjoyed unfettered access to the area. With the decline of 
Russia, it had become evident to American policy makers that China would be America’s next great 
strategic and economic rival. In Asia, the only other state that matched China in terms of sheer population 
numbers and arguably, military abilities, was India. India had fought a border war with China and viewed it 
warily, citing China’s military might as the chief strategic rationale for its own nuclear weapons program. 
U.S.-China tensions were temporarily dwarfed by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, which saw the Bush administration and the United States re-engage significantly with South Asia. 
While the Bush administration relied on India’s traditional rival, Pakistan, to advance its war against terror 
in Afghanistan, this engagement also saw the U.S. draw close to India, with both states now perceiving a 
common threat from terrorism. This constellation of a common Chinese threat and terrorism emanating in 
the Afghan-Pakistan borderland was cited by American officials as a rationale for closer American-Indian 
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the ‘Common Threat’ that provided inducements for the Bush administration to 
strategically acquiesce with India’s nuclear weapons program and confer de jure 
legitimacy on it.  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
strategic cooperation.  The fact that both China and Pakistan, India’s regional rivals, had advanced nuclear 
weapons programs reduced the possibility that recognition of India’s nuclear capabilities would lead to a 
qualitatively difference in either country’s nuclear trajectory, depressing the Bush administration’s strategic 
liability. 
 
By time George W. Bush had come to office, India’s economy had started achieving consistently high 
growth rates, drawing comparisons in American political and economic circles with China. While India had 
opened up its economy to foreign investment in 1991, it was only at the turn of the twenty-first century that 
the reforms had matured to a point where sustained foreign investment and trade became evident as India’s 
economic growth exceeded its previously perennial rate of 5%. The field of Information Technology in 
particular was a major source of bi-directional trade between the two countries. In the run-up to President 
Bush’s visit to India in 2005, the commercial prospects of the U.S.-India relationship were repeatedly 
highlighted by senior members of the Bush administration in both public statements and Congressional 
hearings. Clearly, the Bush administration viewed the commercial value of the Indian relationship as 
‘high’. 
When the U.S.-India nuclear deal was signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
of India, it elicited similar reactions from non-proliferation advocates as did the U.S.-China deal. In many 
ways, the two agreements were similar. While the China deal made exceptions for Chinese non-adherence 
to the NPT and the typical American reprocessing requirements, the Indian deal created an exception by 
recognizing India as a nuclear weapons state outside the framework of the NPT and exempted Indian 
military nuclear facilities from IAEA inspection requirements. As with the Chinese deal, economic 
arguments were used by the Bush administration to counter non-proliferation advocates in Congress, while 
arguing that the U.S. and India shared common strategic and geopolitical interests. The Bush administration 
effectively reframed the nuclear question as one of strategic cooperation and economic salience, away from 
arguments that focused on non-proliferation. In this way, the U.S.-India nuclear deal mirrored the 
agreement that came to define the U.S.-China strategic relationship a generation earlier.  
See Testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
April 5, 2006, Congressional Record, Government Printing Office Website. Secretary Rice and Under-
Secretary of State Burns framed the U.S.-India nuclear deal as a significant strategic and economic 
breakthrough in their relationship. Positive framing such as this allowed the administration to turn the focus 
away from nuclear proliferation related issues associated with the deal.  
See Frankel, Francine R. "The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean” 
Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (2011), pp. 1-17. Frankel articulates the strategic calculations 





Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, I have presented a two-level framework to explain the 
varying American response to nuclear proliferation around the world. I have introduced 
two independent variables, Strategic Liability and Commercial Value, which are the 
primary causal factors involved in shaping the response of the United States, and 
specifically the Executive Branch, to the efforts of nuclear aspirant states as they attempt 
to obtain or significantly enhance their nuclear weapon capabilities.  
6.1 A SUMMARY OF EXPECTED AND OBSERVED OUTCOMES 
This work posited four distinct policy outcomes based on the configuration of the 
two independent variables, Strategic liability and Commercial value. I analyzed one 
major case for each combination of the two independent variables. Each substantive 
chapter contains an exposition of the data that allows us to situate the case in the specific 
quadrant and the evidence for the validity of my hypothesis that this configuration led to 
the expected policy outcome. Table 1 below summarizes this in terms of expected and 
observed outcomes. The first case to be considered was China in the 1960s during the 
Lyndon Johnson administration. The archival material clearly indicated that the Johnson 
administration perceived a high degree of strategic liability from China’s nuclear test in 
the context of virtually non-existent commercial ties between the two states (low 
commercial value). Further, there was ample evidence from the archival material that 
Johnson pursued a policy of coercive military threats and maintained a policy of strict 
economic sanctions against the communist regime prior to and in the immediate 
aftermath of the nuclear test. These findings are consistent with a policy of ‘Active 
Rollback’ which is in line my framework’s predictions. While the evidence is 
unambiguous in this period, there was a nuanced change towards accommodation in the 
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latter part of the Johnson administration (1967-68), where evidence indicates that the 
administration made conciliatory gestures towards the Chinese and their nuclear weapons 
capabilities, even as Strategic liability remained elevated and commercial value stayed 
diminished. I have argued that this seeming nuanced departure from my model’s 
predictions in the latter part of the Johnson era can be explained with reference to the 
unique exigencies presented by the need to ratify the Nuclear (non) Proliferation treat 
(NPT), and the perception by the Johnson administration that it could take advantage of 
the hardening Sino-Soviet split by drawing the Chinese closer. The ratification of the 
NPT offered the chance that the U.S. could further its global non-proliferation 
objectivities even though it came at a price (accepting a Chinese nuclear weapon status). 
In a sense, these factors diminished strategic liability, consistent with my predictive 
framework.  
The next case to be considered was that of India in the 1970s during the Nixon-
Ford administrations. There was sufficient justification to place the U.S.-India 
relationship in this period in the Low Strategic liability, Low commercial value quadrant. 
Archival evidence from this era indicates that the U.S. grudgingly accepted the Indian 
nuclear weapons program, even as it imposed anemic sanctions that – while hindering 
India’s development of nuclear weapon capabilities – did little to coerce it into rolling 
back these capabilities. A noteworthy observation that needed further elaboration was the 
American behavior when India conducted a second nuclear test and officially declared 
itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998. The United States’ imposition of seemingly 
stringent sanctions immediately following this test would appear to indicate a shift away 
from a policy of weak acceptance. However, the evidence analyzed clearly showed that 
most of the punitive measures were removed within a few short months, before they had 
any real impact on India. Indeed, the record of deliberations from within the Clinton 
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administration indicated that the United States settled quickly back into a policy of 
‘Weak Acceptance’ once the dust had settled on India’s nuclear tests, validating the 
notion that  this was (and had been) American policy.  
The third major case to be analyzed was South Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
during the Ford administration. This attempt by the Park regime in the R.O.K. occurred in 
the context of high strategic liability and high commercial value from the American 
standpoint, as the material from this period established. While the United States was 
determined to stop South Korea’s nuclear development, the evidence indicates that it did 
so using heavily circumscribed tactics substantially consistent with the predicted outcome 
of ‘Soft Rollback’. The U.S. used the threat of eliminating its security guarantee to coerce 
the Park government into stopping its nuclear pursuits. From an international institutional 
standpoint, even though the South Korean government had signed the NPT, the U.S. 
sought to deny or delay the former’s access to nuclear reprocessing technology from 
France and Canada. Crucially, it avoided any economic sanctions or the threat of such a 
possibility. 
The final case was that of nuclear armed China during the Reagan administration 
when it stood at the threshold of a massive expansion of its military and civilian nuclear 
technology. The evidence indicates that the Reagan administration followed a policy of 
strategic acquiescence with the Chinese nuclear program, beating back Congressional 
opposition to pass a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement with the Chinese 
government. The U.S. concluded the agreement in spite of China’s reluctance to sign on 
to formal American safeguards on non-proliferation and inspections due to strategic and 
economic imperatives. This is consistent with the framework’s prediction of ‘Active 
Rollback’. The fact that a similar agreement was signed several years later between the 
U.S. and India, where China was now the ‘Common threat’ that elicited American 
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acquiescence with India’s nuclear program, while consistent with my framework, is an 
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Table 1, cont. 
6.2 SITUATING THE THEORY IN NON-PROLIFERATION LITERATURE 
The Structural context: An important goal of this effort is to attempt an 
explanation of why the United States pursues varying approaches to the problem of 
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nuclear proliferation around the world. I have argued previously that Realist theories are 
fundamentally under-determining or silent insofar as explaining this variation. While 
works such as Waltz (1981) have argued that nuclear proliferation may have been 
effective in preventing or reducing the frequency of wars, and have used this argument 
prescriptively (Waltz, 2012), it is clear even in these works that such calculations did not 
factor into the deliberations of American policymakers. In essence, Realism does not 
explain why the United States has accepted or acquiesced with the nuclear programs of 
certain states, - hostile ones such as communist China in the 1960s and a non-aligned 
India in the 1970s, - while attempting to dissuade others, such as South Korea, a close 
ally, in the 1980s. My theory does have an important role for structural factors in 
determining American preferences vis-à-vis a nuclear aspirant’s proliferation attempts, 
and the nature of policies that these preferences engender.    My first independent 
variable, Strategic Liability, signifies the perception of risk that the American Executive 
faces while confronted with the possibility of nuclear proliferation. Strategic Liability is 
measured by four constituent variables – Primary Conflict, Secondary Conflict, Regime 
Instability and Common Threat perception. This composition allows us to accurately 
capture the various factors that contribute to the Executive’s perception of risk. While the 
Primary Conflict variable estimates the probability that the United States and the nuclear 
aspirant will engage in a nuclear conflict, the Secondary Conflict variable measures the 
impact of a state’s nuclear weapons program on other states in the region, particularly its 
adversaries. This distinction allows us to model both ‘traditional’ scenarios where the 
United States is faced with an adversary who is on the threshold of obtaining nuclear 
weapons capabilities, as well as other ones in which allies may be pursuing nuclear 
weapons projects.  I have used this approach to examine scenarios such as with China’s 
nuclear test in 1964 when the U.S. was engaged in a proxy battle with that country in 
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Vietnam - a case of high strategic liability where the U.S. feared that China would deploy 
its nuclear weapons against the U.S. Another case where strategic liability was elevated 
for the United States even though it did not perceive a direct threat was South Korea’s 
nuclear weapons push in 1975. Here, it was the perception that a South Korean nuclear 
program would lead to a Chinese nuclear response and jump-start a Japanese proliferation 
effort that elevated the Ford administration’s strategic liability.  
Strategic Liability is also informed by Regime Instability, which measures the 
inability or unwillingness of the proliferating state’s government to secure its nuclear 
weapons and know-how from rogue groups or regimes. I have shown that this was a key 
point of contention in the United States when the Reagan administration debated the 
completion of a civil nuclear agreement with China. Finally, another constituent 
component, ‘Common threat perception’, plays a role in making collaboration with the 
nuclear aspirant especially attractive when the other components of strategic liability are 
diminished.  
A feature of this framework is that it does not assume that the United States seeks 
to equally deter all states in their pursuit of nuclear weapons or weapon technology. Here, 
it departs from other works based on Bargaining theory or deterrence (Powell, 2003) that 
have focused on situations where states have pursued nuclear weapons capabilities in the 
context of an antagonistic relationship with a status-quo state. The puzzle there is 
primarily whether or not such actions lead to a preventive war or actually prevent it 
(Debs, Monteiro 2014). In contrast, I have posited that there are several situations where 
the procurement of nuclear weapons technology by an aspirant state, even when viewed 
askance by the U.S., does not lead to the consideration of a military option, let alone the 
exercise of one. The South Korean case is one such instance. Furthermore, my framework 
comprehends situations where the U.S. appears to view the nuclear weapon programs of 
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certain countries benignly (India, 1974) or embraces it (China, 1985). Therefore, distinct 
from the literature quoted above, the question I seek to ask is not whether the introduction 
of a nuclear component in a crisis dyad will lead to preventive war. Rather, I seek to find 
the source of American preferences towards deterrence or accommodation, neither of 
which I view as binary choices - as the four policy options I enumerate and examine 
clearly indicate.  
The domestic political-economy context: My thesis argues that strategic liability alone 
does not determine the American response to proliferation. I have introduced a second 
independent variable, which I term Commercial Value.  Commercial Value represents the 
American’s Executive’s perception of the importance of the nuclear aspirant’s economy 
and its linkages to the American one.  I have shown that the causal effects of this variable 
were at work when the Nixon and Ford administrations grappled with President Park’s 
attempts to obtain nuclear reprocessing equipment from France. The significant 
investments made by successive American administrations in developing South Korea’s 
capitalist market economy, and the benefits that this effort had begun to accrue for 
American trade interests greatly elevated the commercial value of South Korea in the 
eyes of President Ford and his senior advisors. This dynamic was also at work when the 
Reagan administration faced pressure from American manufacturers and exporters who 
pushed the Administration to liberalize the export of strategic and dual- use technology to 
China. The economic arguments put forward by White House officials and the 
marshalling of economic interests in support of the deal speaks to the salience of the 
commercial value variable.  These cases help to distinguish my framework from 
‘Domestic’ or ‘Innenpolitik’ based approaches towards nuclear proliferation, such as 
those using Bureaucratic politics based models to explain the Reagan administration’s 
strategic acquiescence with China’s nuclear program (Tan, 1992). The bureaucratic 
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politics argument is that the interaction between domestic political actors shaped the final 
policy outcome. While the evidence clearly indicates that the Reagan administration had 
to navigate Congressional opposition and politics to the nuclear deal - primarily non-
proliferation advocates who used evidence from the administration’s own intelligence 
apparatus to try and block the deal – the final outcome and the very fact of its passage 
clearly shows that the Administration prevailed, and played a central role in the process. 
Other bureaucratic politics based approaches have attempted to explain short-term 
tactical aspects, such as the fact that the United States has not yet taken military action 
against Iran’s nuclear program (Oren, 2012). What distinguishes my framework from 
such approaches is that it seeks to understand the factors that influence and orient the 
general direction of American policy towards these aspirants. It seeks to explain U.S. 
preferences for (strong or weak) opposition and (strong or weak) accommodation. 
Therefore, while the framework predicts that the American government will actively 
consider coercive military action and even threaten it in cases of high strategic liability 
and low commercial value, whether or not such a tactic is actually employed will depend 
on tactical considerations, such as the probability of success. 
 The necessity of a two-level scheme: I have shown that neither of my two 
independent variables is sufficient by itself to determine American non-proliferation 
policy. While a few studies have broadly explored American commercial co-operation 
with the nuclear programs of aspiring nuclear states (Fuhrman, 2012), they have 
discounted any economic incentives that may have contributed to this phenomenon, or 
focused primarily on ‘aid’ programs such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ that had an inherently 
strategic component to them. However, I have shown that commercial interests were very 
much at play when the United States considered nuclear cooperation with developing 
nuclear powers, and economic considerations mattered even when it did not. To take the 
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case of China in 1964 and South Korea in 1975, American strategic liability was 
significantly elevated in both instances. However, the lack of significant (or any) 
commercial ties between the United States and China in the former case allowed the 
Johnson administration to threaten and strongly consider military action against the 
Chinese government. My examination of the archival record uncovered evidence that 
senior members of the Johnson administration were in favor of pre-emptive military 
action against China, and even approached the U.S.S.R. to see if it was amenable to joint 
action to accomplish that goal. While doubts about the effectiveness of a military 
response ultimately forced President Johnson to abandon these plans, the serious 
consideration of such measures validates my prediction of an American policy of ‘Active 
Rollback’. In the South Korean case, an elevated perception of strategic liability – this 
time due to an elevation in the secondary conflict variable, or knock-on effect of the Park 
regime’s covert nuclear push – led to a policy of ‘Soft Rollback’, where the Ford 
administration used the threat of taking away South Korea’s security “guarantee” – the 
stationing of American forces on the Korean peninsula – to coerce Park into abandoning 
his nuclear pursuits. Importantly, there was no attempt to use economic sanctions as a 
tool to coerce the South Korean government, even though this was one of its greatest 
vulnerabilities.  This finding is in alignment with my model’s prediction that the 
perception of high commercial value – which I show to exist in the Korean case – plays a 
crucial role in ‘softening’ the United States’ attempts to roll back the nuclear proliferation 
efforts of  an aspirant state.  
One of the more interesting cases that I explored was the case of the Indian 
‘Peaceful Nuclear Test’ in 1974. Here, the lack of both strategic liability and commercial 
value were instrumental in determining the final policy outcome. While most analysts 
have argued that the U.S. reconciled itself with an India capable of nuclear weapons in 
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the early 2000s, I show that the Ford administration, and especially the larger than life 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was inclined to live with India’s newly demonstrated 
nuclear capabilities in 1974 and even assumed that the latter would weaponize its nuclear 
material quickly. This was in large part due to the lack of significant strategic liability, as 
perceived by the Ford administration. The fact that China had already acquired a vastly 
superior nuclear capability contributed to this judgment, as did the perception that a 
greatly weakened Pakistan would not be in a position to follow suit (a perception later 
events disproved). Additionally, the fact that much of the rest of the world had signed on 
to the newly ratified Nuclear (non) Proliferation Treaty (NPT) diminished the probability 
that other states would follow India’s path, thereby reducing the strategic implications of 
an Indian advance. I have also shown that the lack of significant commercial linkages 
between the United States and India reduced the impetus for a wider embrace of India’s 
strategic capabilities, keeping the United States’ acceptance of India’s nuclear 
capabilities ‘weak’. 
 My final substantive chapter focused on the most liberal options that American 
policy-makers have available to them; the one I term Strategic Acquiescence. The China-
U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement represented a major example of this dynamic, 
where the lack of significant strategic liability and the existence of a common threat in 
the form of the Soviet Union greatly diminished the Chinese nuclear program’s strategic 
liability to the United States. This was the case even though the Chinese government had 
not signed on to the NPT, a crucial requirement for American cooperation with the 
nuclear programs of other states. Additionally, the booming Chinese economy presented 
a great temptation to the Reagan administration, which utilized the domestic support (and 
pressure) this engendered to push a civil nuclear agreement with China through a 
reluctant Congress. This policy represented the epitome of Strategic acquiescence as the 
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administration made significant concessions to the Chinese by not requiring stringent 
visitation and consent rights for the nuclear equipment and fuel that it sold to China.  
 The Executive’s role: My theory privileges the Executive as the American entity 
that is most influenced by this combination of independent variables and is in a position 
to make policy decisions pursuant to this influence. The phenomenon of rapid policy 
change due to issue reframing by domestic actors has been previously explored in Public 
Policy literature on domestic policy areas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Here, I showed 
how the Executive used its privileged position to reframe a non-proliferation issue into 
one of strategic and economic interest.    The examples of the Chinese nuclear agreement 
and the United States’ weak acceptance of India’s nuclear capabilities offer especially 
compelling examples of this predominance. In the Chinese case, the Reagan 
administration was able to selectively highlight intelligence data and confidential Chinese 
assurances of responsible nuclear policy to push through the nuclear deal through a 
Congress that was greatly concerned by reports of Chinese support for Pakistan’s nuclear 
program. The administration also channeled industry support for its policy actions to 
‘frame’ the nuclear deal question as one of significant economic importance.  The 
juxtaposition of these ‘hard’ economic interests against more diffuse concerns about non-
proliferation allowed the administration to win the day on the nuclear deal.  The 
importance of the Executive was also on display in the Indian case in 1974. While many 
in Congress saw the Indian nuclear test as a breach of Indian assurances to the United 
States, the Ford administration chose to discount this view. When Congress passed bills 
to force the Administration to oppose international aid to India, the Ford administration 
chose to selectively interpret this mandate, choosing to abstain, rather than vote against 
India in bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and lobbying other states 
to vote for the aid packages. This dynamic illustrates the importance of the Executive’s 
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prerogatives over Congress’, especially when effective action against a proliferator 
requires close coordination with other international allies. The administration’s flexibility 
in interpreting foreign policy mandates – a feature that Congress is reluctant to constrain 
given the need to quickly adapt to changing international circumstances, especially in the 
area of national security – is further magnified in matters requiring coordination with 
other states. 
 Comprehending proliferation’s intent and impact: Another important feature 
of this framework is its accommodation of the fact that the intent of the nuclear 
proliferator is only one aspect among several that is under the consideration of the 
American executive in the process of fashioning a foreign policy response. In instances 
such as the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the Ford administration misread the test as an 
indication of India’s resolve to quickly develop nuclear weapons. However, what 
mattered most was President Ford’s perception of the impact of the program, which 
ultimately led him to a grudging acceptance of the Indian capability. In the case of 
China’s push to modernize its civilian nuclear and military programs, the United States 
was cognizant of the fact that China was moving towards a more equidistant relationship 
relative to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. (and therefore somewhat away from close 
coordination with the U.S.). It nevertheless chose to strengthen, not weaken its strategic 
cooperation and nuclear trade with China, perceiving this to be useful for economic and 
strategic reasons. I have also shown in the South Korean case that the United States was 
primarily influenced by the impact of the R.O.K.’s nuclear weapons capability on China, 
North Korea and Japan. When nuclear weapons were introduced into a pre-existing 
conflict situation, such as in the Chinese case in 1964, the U.S. was concerned that the 
Chinese intended to wield it as a weapon against American interests. Indeed, bellicose 
statements from Chinese leaders explicitly pointed to that possibility. Regardless, my 
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model posits that American perceptions would have been along similar lines due to the 
elevation of the ‘Primary conflict’ variable, whether or not such statements had been 
made. 
 In summary, this framework seeks to explain the widely diverging set of policy 
choices that the United States has made towards nuclear proliferation around the world. 
While not discounting the fact that the U.S. has ‘latent’ non-proliferation preferences, it 
does not treat such preferences as immutable. Rather, I have shown here that the United 
States, and in particular the Executive branch, is influenced by strategic considerations of 
liability as well as ‘domestic’ considerations of commercial value in deciding what 
course to adopt towards an aspiring or developing nuclear weapon power. In doing so, I 
have shown the Executive to have a privileged position in deciding the course of such 
policy, in some instances over the active opposition of other branches of government. I 
have shown that the primary strategic factor that influences American action is the 
‘impact’ of the proliferant’s actions, and not necessarily its intent in acquiring nuclear 
weapons, which in some cases may pose no direct military threat to the United States or 
its allies.  
6.3 CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 While this framework has primarily analyzed historical cases of American 
response to proliferation, it has significant relevance to contemporary cases as well. One 
of the most important foreign policy questions facing the United States today is the 
question of Iran’s nuclear program and the Obama administration’s attempts to come up 
with a policy response. While this is still an evolving issue, one can already perceive the 
elements that make this an acute problem for the United States. Commercial ties between 
the two states were already greatly diminished following the 1979 Revolution in Iran that 
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deposed the Shah of Iran, an American ally. In the strategic domain, Iran has battled the 
United States indirectly in the Middle-East in areas such as Lebanon and has been 
accused of harming American interests overseas. Further, the prospect of an Iranian 
nuclear weapons capability has greatly alarmed the Israeli government as well as 
American allies in the Middle-East such as Saudi Arabia, which are perceived by 
American governments to be ready and capable of conducting pre-emptive action against 
the developing Iranian nuclear capability (Israel) or starting their own nuclear 
proliferation efforts (Saudi Arabia). There is also great alarm that an Iranian nuclear 
capability could fall into the hands of non-state actors who may be willing to use it 
against the West. All of these factors point to a significant elevation in the Primary and 
Secondary conflict variables as well as Regime instability, alongside a low Commercial 
value. While the rise of sectarian violence in the Middle East has afforded opportunities 
for U.S.-Iran cooperation in places such as Iraq and Syria, this factor alone is proving to 
be too weak to change the American strategic perceptions. American threats to attack 
Iranian nuclear facilities, actual reported cyber-warfare against the Iranian nuclear 
program, and stringent economic sanctions against Iran with the cooperation of American 
allies are all aspects of an American policy of ‘Active Rollback’, which is what my 
model predicts in such a scenario. 
 I have expounded previously how my framework privileges the role of the 
Executive in nuclear policy-making. However, as the case of China under Reagan clearly 
shows, even with the Congressional tradition of deference to the Executive on foreign 
policy, Executive agreements with nuclear aspirants are vulnerable to challenges from 
domestic actors such as the American Congress. This is especially the case when 
domestic concerns about the durability of non-proliferation assurances are deemed 
insufficient, for whatever reason. While the historical record indicates that the Executive 
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has generally prevailed in the final outcome, it has had to expend significant political 
energy, marshalling domestic actors and interests to overcome hurdles along the way. 
Such hurdles can be expected to be even more onerous when it comes to negotiations and 
outcomes that lack domestic votaries. In this scenario, a distinguishing and relevant 
feature is the formal multilateral auspices under which modern nuclear negotiations, such 
as the one with Iran, occur. As coordinated commercial sanctions and other economic 
tools become increasingly important as non-proliferation ‘weapons’ in the globalized 
post-Cold War world, such frameworks have become the ‘cost of doing business’ for the 
American Executive, who loses some of its leverage due to the need to carry along other 
participants. However, the presence of other state actors can serve a useful role in 
buffering the Administration from domestic attempts to veto or unilaterally renegotiate a 
bargain. Since the costs of rejecting a multilateral bargain are unpredictable and 
potentially costly, such a framework raises the threshold for domestic opponents of these 
agreements.  
 Another point worth considering when examining the historical record of 
American non-proliferation attempts is that with the notable exception of Iraq, the United 
States has rarely taken recourse to armed action against a (suspected) nuclear weapon 
aspirant. Even in a case such as China, whose leaders’ bellicose rhetoric in the run-up to 
the nuclear test in 1964 frightened American policy-makers sufficiently for them to 
contemplate preventive strikes, a restrained policy secured a global non-proliferation 
framework that has had remarkable (but not perfect) results. The United States has often 
misread the intent of a nuclear aspirant, but in the final analysis, its policy-makers have 
typically made conservative judgements on the impact of nuclear weapon programs in 
deciding which approach to follow. 
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 In conclusion, I expect this model to apply to other powerful states that grapple 
with nuclear proliferation. For example, I envision extending this framework to China’s 
support for Pakistan’s nuclear industry, and in general, the approach China takes to 
nuclear programs around the world as its strategic reach increases. Beyond the issue of 
nuclear proliferation, I believe this model can be extended to study issues such as alliance 
formation, where the liabilities and commercial considerations evaluated by great powers 
play similar roles in decision making. It is my hope that this work and its future iterations 
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